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ABSTRACT

In addition to auditing and tax services, many CPAs now render
other services to clients, both of an accounting and nonaccounting
nature.

The term most commonly used for these additional services

is "management advisory services" (MAS).
Questions have been raised both within and outside the pro
fession about whether the CPA can render MAS to audit clients and still
remain independent when conducting the audit.

Regardless of whether

he does in fact remain independent, the public must also believe him
to be independent when performing both functions.

This dissertation

is a study of the latter situation, independence in appearance.
The major objective was to determine the opinions of many
financial statement users regarding.CPAs who perform MAS for their
audit clients.

This objective was achieved by mailing questionnaires

to 223 individuals representing the nation's largest financial insti
tutions.

This was not a random sample; and the results are not

necessarily representative of all members of the financial community.
There were 160 replies, giving a response rate of 71»7%*
Respondents were provided with a list of 33 specific services.
They were asked to check those services which they think may result
in some loss of independence.

The results showed that 42% do not

think that providing any of the services may result in a loss of
independence; 9% have no opinion; and 49% believe that one or more

of the listed services may possibly lead to a loss of independence.
To gain a better insight as to the seriousness of the independ
ence in appearance problem, several questions were asked which measured
the respondents' degree of concern.

The most important question asked

whether CPAs should be prohibited from providing their audit clients
with the services that they had previously indicated might lead to
a loss of independence.

Assuming that the MAS and the audit were

conducted by different personnel, 24$ of 149 respondents of the finan
cial community favor prohibiting one or more of the services.
Referring to specific services, 17$ favor prohibiting CPAs
from providing the service of mergers and business acquisitions, the
highest on the list.

The other services which apparently require

CPAs to work closely with top management were also high in disfavor.
Specifically, these services and the percent of respondents favoring
prohibition are:

executive recruitment, 15$; management audits, 12$;

policy determination, 12$; personnel appraisal and/or selection, 11$;
and executive and wage incentive plans, 10$.

The percentages for the

remaining 27 services ranged from 10$ to a low of 2$.
Financial executives and analysts were also asked to check the
specific services that they thought or knew CPAs provided.
were compared to a comparable survey of CPA firms.
specify the services which they offer clients.

The replies

CPAs were asked to

A comparison of the two

surveys showed that respondents generally are aware of the types of
services which CPAs offer; but some possibly misunderstand the CPA's
specific role in providing some of the services.

This possible mis

understanding may have been the cause of some of the unfavorable
replies regarding CPA participation in MAS.

xi

Based upon the survey responses, this author concludes that
independence in appearance is not now a major problem for the account
ing profession.

He recommends that the accounting profession provide

more information to the public regarding the CPA's role in MAS, and
that CPAs insure that they are performing their proper role.

He

also recommends that the profession conduct additional research in
the future in order to be continually informed about public opinion
on this subject.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Background

For many years the accounting profession has wrestled with
the subject of management advisory services.

The controversy centers

on the desirability of independent certified public accounting firms
providing these services in addition to the traditional auditing
and tax services.

Accounting literature contains many articles on

this subject, with arguments both for and against the practice re
ceiving considerable coverage.
The term "management advisory services" (MAS) is the preferred
designation for these types of services.

1

However, the terms "man

agement services" and "management consulting" are found throughout
the literature and may be used interchangeably. Briefly stated, we
I
are referring to those additional services, both of an accounting and
^

a nonaccounting nature, not normally included as part of the audit or
tax functions.

A later chapter will discuss the specific nature of

management advisory services.
Most accountants agree that CPAs have always provided their
clients with business advice when they felt they were able to do so.
i
"Final Report of Ad Ho.c Committee on Independence," The
Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (December, 19^9)» 55*

2

But this has generally "been incidental to providing them with audit and
tax services.

There is evidence that accountants provided MAS as a

distinct function in the early part of the twentieth century.

Although

one national CPA firm created a separate MAS department as early as
1908, it has been since World War II that MAS have emerged and expanded
as a separate and distinct area.

Most national firms established

their MAS departments after the end of the second world war.

2

It has

also been within the last two decades that we have witnessed so much
attention to this topic in accounting literature.
As a consequence of the increased activity in this field,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) estab
lished a Committee on Management Services by CPAs in 1953.

The

objectives of this committee have been to improve and increase the
services of CPAs to their clients in the field of management advi
sory services, to improve the prestige of the CPA as an advisor to
management, and to increase the reliance of the business community
upon the CPA.^

Through the years the committee has published a series

of bulletins designed to assist CPAs in providing these types of serv
ices.

In 1969 the committee began issuing Statements on Management

Advisory Services.

They are published for the guidance of AICPA

members in conducting an MAS practice.

To date, three statements

have been issued, the subjects of which will be discussed later.
CPAs received encouragement from the AICPA to expand in the

2
James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services by Certi
fied Public Accountants (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research,
The University of Texas, 1961), p. 12.
3Ibid.

field of management advisory services from a formal resolution by the
Council of AICPA '

'961 stating:

It is an objecxxv of the Institute, recognizing that
management service activin.-as are a proper function of CPAs,
to encourage all CPAs to perform the entire range of management
services consistent with their professional competence, ethical
standards, and responsibility.4
This encouragement has been fostered even further by the Committee
on Professional Ethics of the AICPA.

Opinion No. 12 of the Code of

Professional Ethics, which covers the area of "Independence," states:
In summary, it is the opinion of the committee that there is
no ethical reason why a member or associate may not properly
perform professional services for clients in the areas of tax
practice or management advisory services, and at the same time
serve the same client as independent auditor, so long as he does
not make management decisions . . . .5
Prom a financial viewpoint there is also a tremendous in
centive to be a part of the MAS business.

In 1966 CPA firms were

capturing a major share of the approximately $900 million market in
management consulting in the U.S.

One CPA firm grossed an estimated

$ 17*5 million in this field alone, while the largest general manage
ment consultant (non-CPA) grossed $20 million.

Furthermore for the

"Big Eight" CPA firms, the dollar volume of management services op
erations was expanding at an average annual rate of 15$, as against
4$ for the consulting business in general, and 10$ for the 45 general
management consultants who belong to the Association of Consulting
Management Engineers.

6 This aspect is discussed more fully later.

^Code of Professional Ethics— By-Laws (New York:
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1967)* P» 33*

American

^Ibid., p. 2 6 .
^"Are CPA Firms Taking Over Management Consulting?", Forbes,
XCVIII (October 1, 1966), 57.

The Problem
There is a great demand by businesses for CPAs to provide
management advisory services.
lucrative area.

Financially, CPAs find this a very

The AICPA has promoted and greatly encouraged CPAs

to push even deeper into this field.

There have been no restrictions

or limitations placed on CPAs by the SEC or any other governmental
agency regarding their work in management advisory services.

With so

many things going for them, it would appear that CPAs have no problems
in this area.

However, this is not the case.

One primary problem is whether or not providing management
advisory services is compatible with the CPA's primary reason for
being, that is, providing auditing services.

There are two major

questions around which the problem revolves:

(l) Are CPAs competent

to provide management advisory services?

(2) Can CPAs provide these

services to their audit clients without any sacrifice of their inde
pendence?

Neither question is easily answered.
There are several areas of discussion in these two questions.

This paper is concerned with only one such area, that of independence
in appearance of CPAs who provide management advisory services for
their audit clients.
below.

However, each area will be discussed briefly

For although there are several separate and distinct prob- .

lems, they interrelate.

If the reader has some concept of all facets

of the overall problem of compatibility, he can understand more
fully the nature of the specific problem.to be explored in depth in
this study.

The following summary should provide the necessary

insight into the overall problem.

Competence
CPAs should be competent to perform the management advisory
services which they offer to the public.

The accounting profession is

dependent on public confidence for their survival.

Although this

confidence is necessary primarily in regard to the audit function,
ineptness in the field of MAS may be detrimental to the profession.
We frequently look with disdain upon any professional person who does
not measure up to the standards of competence expected.
may be thoroughly competent in the field of auditing.

The CPA
But evidence

of incompetence in any field in which he holds himself out to the
public, such as management advisory services, will undoubtedly reduce
his image in the eyes of the public.
Whether or not a CPA is competent depends on how we define
management advisory services, a subject discussed in detail in the
next ohapter.

There is general agreement that there are two types of

management advisory services.

One type is that which is normally

considered to be within the realm of accounting.

This would include

such activities as assistance in preparation of operating budgets and
cash forecasts, cost accounting systems, and inventory control, to
name a few.

There is little doubt regarding the accountants' competence

in these areas; and very few persons raise questions as to whether the
CPA has the ability to perform MAS of this type.
The other type of MAS is that which is not generally considered
to be within the realm of accounting.

This type includes services

that the CPA is not, by his inherent nature as an accountant, educated
and trained to perform.

These services normally may be obtained from

general management consulting firms.

They include suoh areas as

factory layout, executive recruiting, market studies, personnel
selection, psychological testing, and labor negotiations.
Serious questions regarding competence have arisen relative to
the latter types of services.

Obviously, the mere possession of a CPA

certificate is not evidence of recognition of the qualifications
necessary to perform thiB type of work.

Of course, there is nothing

to prevent a CPA from obtaining the necessary education or training
to perform in specialized fields outside of accounting.

Undoubtedly,

members of many firms have received additional training in selected
areas, which has qualified them to offer services in these areas.
A firm also may hire specialists in other fields such as marketing
or engineering if it so desires in order to have competence in these
various nonaccounting fields.
There presently appears to be no prohibition against the
employment of non-accountants as members of a CPA firm's staff
to furnish services that are proper for an accounting firm.
However there appears to be a strong sentiment in support of the
contention that no firm should render a service through a staff
man that a partner is not qualified to supervise.7
Although the above quotation was written in 1958? its validity
remains unchanged today.

An addition to the Code of Professional

Ethics along this line has been recommended by one writer.
read as follows:

It would

"A member shall undertake only those accounting and

administrative services that he or a partner of his firm are competent,
Q
as evidenced by training and experience, to perform and supervise."
7

Max Block, "Management Advisory Services— Opportunities and
Limitations," The Hew York Certified Publio Accountant, XXVIII
(February, 1958), 39.
:
O
Walter G. Kell, "Public Accounting's Irresistible Force and
Immovable Object," The Accounting Review, XLIIT (April, 1968), 272.

A rule similar to this was considered by the AICPA1s Com
mittee on Professional Ethics in 1958.

It was not adopted because

many accountants objected to it, feeling that it would be difficult
to interpret and enforce.

9

Recently the Committee on Management Services has stated that
general standards analogous to those adopted for auditing are appli
cable to management advisory services.
1. Management advisory services are to be performed by
persons having adequate training and experience in both the appli
cation of the analytical approach and process, and in the subject
matter under consideration.
2. In all matters relating to a management advisory services
assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be main
tained by the member and his staff.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the per
formance of management advisory services.^
Although members of the AICPA may be called upon to justify
departures from recommendations of the Committee on Management Services,
such departures would not be considered as serious as would departures
from the Code of Professional Ethics.

The Institute, therefore, has

not gone as far as Mr. Kell's recommendation quoted above; but never
theless there has been an increasing awareness by the AICPA on the
importance of providing guidelines to members in this area.

Independence
Although there are problems regarding the competence of CPAs
9
^Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics and Public Opinion,"
The Journal of Accountancy, CVI (November, 1958) * 36.

10

"Competence in Management Advisory Services," Statement
on Management Advisory Services No. 2 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, 1969)? PP* 18-19.

to provide some of the services that are currently being offered,
there appears to be a consensus within the profession that the greatest
problem regarding the compatibility of auditing and management advisory
services lies with the question of independence.
The CPA's greatest service to society is his ability to audit
a client, and render an independent and unbiased opinion to the
public as to the fairness of the presentation of the financial state
ments.

In this respect he is unique and is so recognized.

Various

laws require CPA audits of firms; and regulations of some governmental
agencies and stock exchanges frequently require this also.

Many

non-CPAs are completely competent to prepare tax returns, provide book
keeping services, and perform management advisory services.

But the

CPA is the recognized expert in auditing, being licensed to practice
as such by meeting the educational and experience requirements of the
various states.

It is his reputation of independence and integrity

that keeps him in this lofty position.

To retain this status, the CPA

must continue to be completely independent in his audits of clients.
If public confidence should ever cease, or even wane, because of a
loss of independence by the CPA, or because the public thinks there
has been a loss of independence, the CPA's value to society as an
independent auditor will diminish accordingly.

He then will be no

different than the non-CPA.
A later chapter will explore the problem of independence in
much detail.

The basic outline of this

problem is presented here.

In performing an audit, the CPA must be in fact independent.

In

addition, the public which includes investors, government officials,
and the general public, must believe that he is in fact independent;

that is, he also must he independent in appearance.
these statements.

No one disputes-—

There are a number of factors or situations which

possibly could result in the loss of audit independence by CPAs.
Since this paper is concerned with the area of management advisory
services, the discussion will be limited to that facet.
Rephrasing the question which we asked previously, can CPAs
provide management advisory services to their audit clients without
sacrifice of independence in fact or in appearance?

The problem is

limited to audit clients for whom the CPA provides MAS.

Since we are

concerned with the possible loss of audit independence, there is no
problem in providing MAS to clients for whom the CPA does not also
serve as auditor.
There is no disagreement among accountants that the profession
would suffer greatly if CPAs should ever lose audit independence as
a result of being involved in an MAS engagement for an audit client.
Fortunately, there has been no evidence that this has ever occurred.
As part of his doctoral research, Dr. Arthur A. Schulte, Jr. sent
inquiries to all of the state boards of accountancy asking if they
had ever had to take disciplinary action on loss of independence in
any case where MAS was a factor.

He received replies from 44 of the

boards, with none ever having had such a case.

11

This, of course,

does not mean that there has never been any instances of loss of in
dependence in this manner.

It is a very difficult problem to research.

Evidence that audit independence has in fact been lost as a result of
MAS obviously would prove the point.

11

But lack of such evidence does

"Final Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," The
Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (December, 1969)i 52.

10

not prove the converse.

No doubt it could happen.

The difference of

the nature of necessary attitudes between auditing and MAS suggests
this.

As discussed in a well-known auditing textbook, management

advisory services often must be sold.
To achieve results in consulting engagements, it is sometimes
necessary to be persuasive— to convince the client and his entire
organization of the merits of the system or policies recommended
by the consultant. This type of salesmanship may not come easily
to the accountant. By nature and training he may be averse to
making definite recommendations until he has gathered incontravertible evidence, but success in management consulting may
demand strong persuasive conviction based on factual evidence
which is by no means complete. 12
The attitude depicted above is completely different from the type
necessary in auditing.
Most GPAs seem to think that there is little chance of a loss
of independence in fact associated with management advisory services.
If a CPA has lack of integrity in this matter, he probably is not
adhering to the ideals of the profession in other areas.

But although

the evidence, or lack of it, seems to indicate that this is no major
problem at the present time, it would take only one case, particularly
by an individual with a large national CPA firm, to make it a major
problem.

Therefore, we should not forget that it could happen and

should remind ourselves of the consequences if it does happen.
As mentioned previously, it is not enough for the CPA to be
in fact independent.

It is also vitally necessary that the public

believe that he is in fact independent.

Those individuals who rely

on financial statements, and who must make decisions based on the data
presented therein, must have full confidence that the CPA has been
1P

Walter B. Meigs, Principles of Auditing (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959)» P * 750.

completely independent in conducting the audit upon which his opinion
of the financial statements is based.

It makes no difference how

independent he is in fact, if the users of the financial statements
believe him to be otherwise.

Consequently, the Code of Professional

Ethics requires that the CPA avoid any relationships which might
suggest a conflict of interest to outside observers.

Rule 1.01 of

the Code expressly prohibits members to render an opinion on state
ments of firms in which they have a financial interest, or for which
they serve as officers or directors.
There are many individuals both within and outside the account
ing profession who believe that providing MAS to audit clients could
suggest a conflict of interest to outside observers.

As quoted earlier,

Opinion 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics states that there is no
ethical reason why CPAs may not provide such services to their audit
clients.

This is presently the official position of the AICPA.

never

theless, some CPAs still argue, and there is some empirical evidence
to support them, that many outside parties feel that there is a loss
of independence by CPAs who provide MAS to their audit clients.

If

a large number of outside observers, who therefore constitute the
public, believe that there is a loss of audit independence under
these circumstances, the accounting profession does have a problem.
To summarize briefly, there are two major problem areas
which question the compatibility of the CPA auditor providing man
agement advisory services.

These are "competence" and "independence."

The problem of competence is relevant to the CPA who offers MAS to
both his audit clients and also his non-audit clients.
alone could be the subject of considerable research.

This area
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The problem of independence has two facets, both relevant
only when the CPA provides MAS to

those clients for whom he also

as auditor.

is a problem which cannot be com

Independence in fact

pletely resolved except in a negative manner.

serves

That is, it can only

be stated that providing MAS causes a loss of independence in fact
when actual cases are proven illustrating this point.

Most

CPAs

donot

feel that this is a major problem at the present time.
Independence in appearance is a problem if interested outside
observers are worried about CPA participation in MAS.

This is true

regardless of whether or not there has been a loss of independence
in fact.
This study is directed to this latter problem.
is given that the other problem areas exist.

Recognition

They have been discussed

in order that the reader could receive an overview of all of the
implications involved when CPAs offer management advisory services
to the public.

But the remainder of this dissertation emphasizes

the question of independence in appearance.

Area of Discussion for This Study

This dissertation is aimed toward determining the effect of
management advisory services by CPAs on the users of financial state
ments.

Specifically, the central theme is to ascertain whether or

not the user of audited financial statements believes that the CPA's
independence is lessened by his participation in management advisory
services for his audit clients.
There has been research of this nature done previously.

Two
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doctoral dissertations, one completed in 1964 anc* one in 1 9 6 5 * have
included this topic as part of the research.

Specific findings from

this research are discussed later; but generally both authors con
cluded that a substantial number of outside observers were concerned
over the possible loss of independence by CPAs who provide MAS to their
audit clients.
In the fall of 1969 ^he AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence
included as a part of its summary of observations and recommendations
the following:
. . . the committee believes that so long as a significant
minority of users of financial statements has a concern that the
rendition of management advisory services (all or some), or the
manner in which they are rendered, raises questions as to an
auditor's independence, the profession needs to be sensitive to
their concerns and address itself to themJ 3
The committee also recommended that the committee on professional
ethics and the management services committee of the AICPA keep the
practice of management advisory services under constant surveil
lance.

Additionally, it recommended continued liaison with user

groups to keep the profession aware of the views of those outside
of the accounting profession who also have a vital stake in the
continued independence of the profession.
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Although this dissertation was begun before the report from
the ad hoc committee was published, research has- been in accordance
with the committee's recommendation.
garding the subject of M S
11

Opinions of third parties re

and independence were obtained.

The

"Pinal Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," The
Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (December, 19^9)» 55*
14Ibid.
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"basic methodology used in obtaining these opinions was the question
naire.

It was sent to 223 financial executives and analysts of the

nation's larger financial institutions, specifically, banks, insur
ance companies, mutual funds, closed-end investment companies, and
brokerage firms.

It asked specific questions regarding the CPA and

MAS, and also requested additional comments pertinent to the subject.
A very respectable response i-ate of 71*7% was obtained; there
fore, the findings are significant to the accounting profession.

As a

result, it is anticipated that the conclusions of this study will give
additional knowledge, as I'equested by the AICPA, to the px-ofession
regarding the views of outside parties in this matter.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Independence observed that there are
definite limitations in the use of a questionnaire.
recognizes these limitations.

This writer

Anyone who uses this method risks

the possibility that respondents might not understand some of the
terms used or that a question may not be phrased cori'ectly, thus
causing some misinterpretation.

Yet it is a valid research tool.

If an honest attempt is made to constiuct a good unbiased question
naire, the responses do give indications of opinions, even though the
possibility exists that there may be some misunderstanding.

If the

response is significant, additional research, possibly through per
sonal interview, can then be conducted to either substantiate or
maybe refute the original findings.
Although research of this nature has been done previously,
it was conducted over 5 years ago.

The results presented here will

serve to update previous research, by showing either a continued,
a lessening, or an increasing concexn by outside observers.

Although

the overall objective of this current research is similar to the pre
vious research, that is, obtaining third party opinions relative to
CPAs and MAS, the approach is different.

Organization of the Study

Including the introduction and conclusion this study has 7
chapters.

The purpose of Chapter II is to give the reader a compre

hensive understanding of what is meant by "management advisory services"
as conducted by CPAs.
the nature of MAS.

It discusses pronouncements by the AICPA as to

The chapter also sets forth what other researchers

have found to be the types of services actually conducted by CPAs.
This writer sent a questionnaire to 16 CPA firms, including
the "Big Eight" and 8 other large firms.

One purpose was to determine

what specific management advisory services they provide to their
clients.

The results of this aspect of the survey are included in

Chapter II.

Other questions from this survey have relevance to other

chapters.
Respondents of the questionnaire sent to members of the
financial community were also asked to indicate those areas in which
they think CPAs are providing MAS.

A comparison of their replies

to this question with those of the CPAs will indicate whether there
is any lack of communication between what CPAs are doing in this field,
and what outside observers think that they are doing.

This comparison

is made in Chapter II.
Chapter III discusses the economic phenomena that has resulted
in CPA firms practicing in areas that have no relation whatsoever
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to accounting.

The financial incentive has been mentioned briefly in

an earlier section.

One question on the survey sent to CPA firms

asked for the percentage of gross billings that could be attributed
to MAS.

The results of thiB question are included in this chapter.
There is another side to the economic question.

This in

volves the savings to the client and hence to society in having the
CPA auditor provide the needed management advisory services.

This

is particularly relevant for small clients who have a need for such
services, but who do not have the resources to hire someone other
than their regular auditors.
Discussion in Chapter III is pertinent to the question of
independence.

We must weigh the economic benefits society as a whole

gains from CPAs' participation in MAS, against the possible loss
society may incur because of a lack of independence by some CPAs
providing such services.
The problem of independence is the subject of the fourth
chapter.

The focal point, however, is independence in appearance.

The problem of independence in fact was discussed briefly above
and is mentioned to some extent in Chapter IV.
The primary objective of this chapter is to synthesize the
opinions of others, in the fields of both education and accounting
practice.

It brings out the pros and cons regarding the question of

independence as expounded upon in the literature over a number of
years.

It demonstrates that a genuine controversy exists.
Specific results of the empirical research conducted on this

topic in 1964 and 1965 are discussed.

The ohapter also sets forth

some criticisms by others about this prior research.
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The fifth chapter is the heart of this study.

This chapter

discusses the method of seleotion of respondents, the reasons for the
specific questions asked, and most importantly the results of the
questionnaire sent to the users of financial statements.
shows the responses for each question for all respondents.

Chapter V
It also

categorizes some responses according to each group, that is, bankers,
insurance executives, mutual fund investment officers, and brokerage
firm representatives.

This is done in order to determine what differ

ences of opinion exist among these various groups.
Very little can be done these days in the field of accounting
without considering the position of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).

Certainly, if any group is an interested outside

party in regard to accounting matters, it is the SEC.

Consequently,

the sixth and final chapter preceding the conclusion covers this area.
The attitude of the SEC in this matter can be of extreme
importance in trying to determine how far the profession should go,
or whether it has already gone too far, in the area of management
advisory services.

Therefore, this chapter discusses any pronounce

ments or positions taken by the SEC or any of its members on this
subject.
In the final chapter the dissertation is summarized.

Based

on the results obtained from the questionnaires, this writer's con
clusions and recommendations are presented also.
It is anticipated that this project will make a worthy
contribution to the literature of accounting.

The question of whether

or not independence in appearance is a problem about which the pro
fession should be concerned has raged for quite some time.

Undoubtedly

the users of financial statements are in a better position to answer
this question than anyone else because it is around them that this
controversy revolves.
solve all problems.

This study does not answer all questions nor
But it sheds light on the direction which the

profession should take.

It will assist in the determination of

whether or not the interests of all parties are being served properly
by the continued participation of CPAs providing management advisory
services to their audit clients.

The conclusions and recommendations

of the AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence were based partly on
the results of research conducted in 1964 and 19^5-

Hopefully, this

current research will serve to update the previous conclusions.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES

Management Advisory Services Defined

Various writers have provided definitions of management
advisory services, which this section will present.

Although the

AICPA through its Committee on Management Services has written ex
tensively on the subject, it has not provided a succinct definition.
But what it has said will also be summarized here.

The purpose of

this chapter is to give the reader an understanding of the nature of
management advisory services.

After reading the chapter, he may not

be able to recite a definition; but he should have an insight into
what is meant when the term is used.

Definition by AICPA
An independent accounting firm's purpose in engaging in man
agement advisory services is to utilize the essential
qualifications it has available to provide advice and technical
assistance which will enable client management to conduct af
fairs more effectively . . . .
The role of an independent accounting firm in performing
management advisory services is to provide advice and technical
assistance, and should provide for client participation in the
analytical approach and process.^
Management advisory services by independent accounting firms
i

"Tentative Description of the Nature of Management Advisory
Services by Independent Accounting Firms," Statement on Management
Advisory Services No. 1 (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants), February, 19691 P« 1»
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can be described as the function of providing professional ad
visory (consulting) services, the primary purpose of which is to
improve the client's use of its capabilities and resources to
achieve the objectives of the organization. This can relate to
areas such as:
— The management functions of analysis, planning, organizing,
and controlling
— The introduction of new ideas, concepts, and methods of
management
— The improvement of policies, procedures, systems, methods,
and organizational relationships
— The application and use of managerial accounting, control
systems, data processing, and mathematical techniques and
methods, and
— The conduct of special studies, preparation of recommen
dations, development of plans and programs, and provision
of advice and technical assistance in their implementation.
Thus the AICPA provides a conceptual description of MAS
without compiling a list of acceptable services.

The reader should

note, however, that no type of service is expressly prohibited.

In

essence, CPAs are allowed to offer any type of service provided that
they stay within the bounds of competence and independence.

The

criterion of competence was discussed in Chapter I; independence is
the subject of Chapter IV.

Definition by Other Writers
Generally, the broad field of management advisory servioes
can be divided into two distinct types.
these types as follows:

One writer has classified

(1) services related directly to the clients

total information and control system, broadly conceived, and (2)
services totally unrelated to the olients' information and control
system.^

He refers to the former as "accounting services" and

2Ibid.. p. 3.
^Walter G. Kell, "Public Accounting1s Irresistible Force and
Immovable Object," The Accounting Review. XLIII (April, 1968), 268.
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to the latter as "administrative services."
A total information system or management information system
may defined aB "the coordination of all of the quantitative con
trol mechanisms of management in such a manner that with the flow of
information through the system, management may be apprised, on a timely
and effective basis of the need for decisions which maximize the
opportunity for achieving the integration of all quantitative data
generated by the system.

4

In accordance with this definition,

accounting services generally are thought to include those areas
which are normally within the realm of accounting.

This would in

clude such activities as operating budgets, cash forecasts, cost
accounting systems, and inventory control.
Administrative services, as defined by Kell, include those
types commonly referred to as consulting services.

These may nor

mally be obtained from general consulting firms, and are not considered
to be within the realm of accounting.

Repeating the examples mentioned

in Chapter I, these includes such services as factory layout, exec
utive recruiting, market studies, personnel selection, psychological
testing, and labor negotiations.
Some accountants believe that the possible loss of audit
independence is a factor only when administrative services are per5

formed.

Kell has this opinion.

But Schulte believed that both

areas were factors in the potential loss of independence, and based

^Robert Beyer, "Management Services: Time for Decision,"
The Journal of Accountanoy. CIX (March, 19^5)» 48.
^Kell, op. cit., p. 269.
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his study on this hypothesis.^

In the questionnaire Bent in relation

to the present study, services of both types were included.

Con

sequently, for purposes of this study, providing either type is
considered to be a factor in the possible loss of audit independence.
James E. Redfield conducted a very comprehensive study into
the nature of management services in 1960.

In his work he discussed

5 possible approaches to a definition for management services.

Out

of this evolved the following definition:
Management services by certified public accountants may be
defined as those services which are designed primarily to furnish
advice or assistance to management through a professional re
lationship with respect to planning, organizing, or controlling
any phase of business activity. As a general rule, these engage
ments would include those types of service that are intended
primarily for internal utilization by management, as opposed to
those types of services that are designed primarily to provide
third parties with accounting information.7
This definition would encompass both accounting and administrative
services, as defined by Kell.

Previous Survey as to the Nature of MAS

Redfield's questionnaire was sent to 925 individual CPAs
and firms in Texas.

He received 331 replies.

In some instances

results were based on fewer than 332 replies because not all ques
tions were answered by all respondents.
One question provided a list of 39 possible categories of

Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., "The Concept of the CPA's Audit
Independence and its Compatibility with Management Services" (un
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 19 6 4 )* PP« 20-22.
7

James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Servioes by Cer
tified Public Accountants (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business
Research, The University of Texas, 1961), p. 24*

management advisory services.

Respondents were asked to check those

items which they considered generally to be outside the scope of a
CPA.

This list was based on a pamphlet issued in 1957 by the AICPA

that contained 35 areas in which some CPA firms had provided manage
ment services.

Redfield added 4 areas to this list.

this aspect of his survey are shown in Table 2-1.

The results of

They may be sum

marized as follows:
1.

Twenty-eight categories were considered to be outside the scope
of the certified public accountant by less than 30 percent of
the respondents.

2.

Three categories were considered to be outside the scope of
the certified public accountant by from 30 percent to 50
percent of the respondents.

3.

Eight categories were considered to be outside the scope of
the certified public accountant by more than 50 percent of the
respondents.8

Redfield considered the percentages in the first group as insignif
icant; but did elaborate on the second and third groups.
By referring to Table 2-1 we can determine that the 3 specific
categories in the second group are:

General management— objectives

and policies (38$); Sales management— prices and results (39$)5 and
Other professional services— arbitrating disputes (42$).

Redfield

explained that these high percentages were apparently caused by
possible confusion as to what these areas specifically encompass,
insofar as the CPA's participation in them is concerned.

He then

explained how from one viewpoint these areas could well be within
the scope of the CPA.
present discussion.

His explanation will not be included in this
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TABLE 2-1
FIRMS SPECIFYING POSSIBLE CATEGORIES OF MANAGEMENT SERVICE
THAT GENERALLY WOULD NOT FALL WITHIN SCOPE OF CPA

Replies

Question

Percent of 301
firms indicating
"outside the scope"

Check each category which you consider
to be outside the scope of CPA generally.
General management
Objectives and policies
Internal organization
Management controls
Special investigations: purchase or
sale of business
Financial
Structure: types and sources of
capital or financing
Requirements: short- and long-term
Policies: retention or distribution of
earnings; credit and collection
Planning: forecasting and budgeting
Finance
Insurance: coverage; records
Cost accounting: all phases
Pensions and profit sharing
Government contracts: all phases
Production
Plant & equipment: needs; depreciation
Production methods and standards
Production control
Material handling and control
Sales
Distribution and merchandising
Sales management: prices; results
Packaging and shipping3Advertising or market research
Office management
Accounting systems and records
Office equipment
Office layout and space utilization
Office organization
Office personnel

38
9
10
2

3
4
6
3
8
1
4
15
24
54
27
16
64
39
70
72
—
2
13
4
7

^ h e s e four categories were not included in the AICPA
pamphlet, Management Services by CPA's.
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TABLE 2-1 (oontinued)

Replies
Percent of 301
firms indicating
"outside the scope"

Question
Check each category which you oonsider
to be outside the scope of CPA generally.
Purchasing
Purchasing procedure
Inventory control
Traffic and transportation
Transportation equipment: all phases
Personnel
Job classification and evaluation
Training: accounting personnel
Recruitment or interview: office personnel
Compensation and incentives
Employee benefit programs
Industrial relations3.
Safety and health programs '
Research and development
Records and controls
Other professional services
Accumulating and reporting trade statistics
Arbitrating disputes
Assistance in rehabilitating a business

Source:

13
—

61
51
2
18
12
13
66
84
16
21
42
6

James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services
by Certified Public Accountants (Austin, Texas:
Bureau of Business Research, The University of
Texas, 1961), p. 18.

Reference to Table 2-1 shows that the third group contains
8 categories that a majority of respondents felt were outside the
soope of the professional accountant.

They are:

(a) Sales— distribution and marketing

(64%)

(b) Sales— packaging and shipping (70$)
(c) Sales— advertising or market research (72$)
(d) Traffic and transportation equipment (61$)
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(e) Personnel— job classification and evaluation (51%)
(f) Personnel— industrial relations

(66%)

(g) Personnel— safety and health programs (84$)
(h) Production— methods and standards (54$)
Categories (a) through (d) may be classified as marketing functions;
whereas, (e) through (h) are related to the field of industrial man
agement.
The author explained the high percentages of marketing cat
egories in that most CPAs have little competence or desire to provide
assistance in this area.

He also stated that CPAs who provide

services of this nature might face some professional and ethical
restraints that could limit their assistance.
The high percentage of respondents who listed categories
in the field of industrial management might also be explained on
the basis of competence.

But Redfield did not believe that this

was necessarily a valid argument.
Although a majority of acoountants apparently have little or
no desire to provide services in the area of industrial management,
such assistance would appear to be as much within the scope of the
professional accountant as within the scope of the professional
engineer. Admittedly, the knowledge of materials, machines, and
processes that is acquired through formal engineering education
is advantageous in many respects, but a foimal engineering edu
cation frequently is not essential to the competent provision of
such assistance. In many instances, competence in the area of
industrial management would be dependent more upon a professional
discipline designed to develop an ability to think independently,
to analyze and evaluate constructively, and to solve problems in
a practical manner, than upon purely technical knowledge. There
fore, if an accountant possesses sufficient competence in these
respects, industrial management services would appear to be within
his scope, with the possible exception of assistance in which
engineering training and technical competence would tend to be
more essential than merely advantageous.9

^Ibid., p. 2 0 .
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Redfield.'s definition of management advisory services, given
in the previous section, is all encompassing.

Apparently his defi

nition was "based considerably on the results of his questionnaire.
A majority of CPAs considered most items listed to be within the scope
of the profession.

For those 11 categories which a high percentage

of respondents did not consider to be within the scope of the CPA,
Redfield has explained this negative attitude, and apparently con
cluded that they could be considered within the scope.
There may be some biaB in his conclusions if we try to apply
them on a national level.

He sent his questionnaire only to CPAs in

Texas; so it was limited to some extent.

Nevertheless, the question

naires were received by representatives of 20 national firms; that is,
firms with offices throughout the nation, including the "Big Eight."
We might expect that responses by individuals of these firms possibly,
although not necessarily, reflect the thinking and policy or the firms
which they represent.
Having looked at what a number of CPAs in Texas considered
the scope of MAS to be in 1960, we will turn now to a recent survey
of large CPA firms regarding this same subject.

Management Advisory Services— As Practiced by CPAs

Purpose
The primary purpose of this section is to determine spe
cifically those areas in which CPAs are currently practicing MAS.
The next major section of this chapter will point out those areas
in which the users of financial statements think that CPAs are
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performing MAS.

Toward the end of the chapter, a comparison will he

made between what CPAs are doing and what the financial community
thinks that they are doing in this field.

We hope to show whether or

not there is a lack of communication between these two groups on this
topic.

The relation to the central theme of this paper, independence

in appearance t is that any laok of understanding by the financial
community as to the role of the CPA in MAS may contribute to an opinion
that the CPA does lose independence in performing MAS.

If the mis

understanding is clarified, the potential loss of independence may
not seem as threatening.

Survey Sample and Questionnaire Construction
The sample for this survey consisted of 16 large CPA firms,
including the "Big Eight."

The 8 other firms were either small

national firms or large regional firms that perform audits for large
corporations.

Since CPA firms are not listed by size in any publi

cation, choosing the latter 8 firms was done by picking firms that
are known to have offices nationally and by reviewing corporate annual
reports to discover firms other than the "Big Eight" that had per
formed audits for large corporations.
The sample was limited to the nation's largest CPA firms
because the objective was to obtain as wide a coverage as possible
in learning specific MAS areas.

Numerous smaller firms may provide

many of the same services as the larger firms; but it is unlikely
that they are providing any category of service not performed by at
least some of the large firms.
Another consideration was that CPA firms selected for this
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survey probably provide close to 100$ of the annual audits of the major
national corporations (as opposed to small local corporations).

Since

the survey to the financial community was to individuals who are more
likely to be concerned with annual reports of major corporations,
we can make a valid comparison of the results of the surveys.
The questionnaire, Survey of Leading CPA Firms (Appendix A),
consisted of 7 specific questions with number 8 asking for any
additional comments considered pertinent by the respondent.

Some

questions related more to independence; one related to the economics
of MAS.

These are discussed fully in the applicable chapters.

question most relevant to our present discussion is number 7«

The
It

reads, "From the following list, indicate the types of management
advisory services which your firm performs.
are applicable."

Check as many items as

The list consists of 33 specific services which are

of the type that CPAs possibly perform.

Space was provided for the

listing of other services if needed.
Questions number 1 and 2 asked whether the firm offered MAS
to its clients and whether there was a separate management services
division, respectively.

It was anticipated that both questions

would be answered affirmatively by all respondents; but the questions
were necessary to assure the validity of responses to subsequent
questions.

Results of the Survey
Replies were received from 10 of the 16 CPA firms to which
questionnaires were sent, giving a response rate of 62.5$.

Inter

estingly enough, 5 replies were from "Big Eight" firms and 5 were
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from other firms.

62,5%,

Therefore, the response rate for each group was also

All respondents do offer MAS and do have a separate management

services division.

(Questions 1 and 2.)

A summary of responses to question 7 is illustrated in
Tahle 2-2 in alphabetical order.
quency in Tahle 2-3.

They are listed in order of fre

In addition to the listed services, one firm,

not a "Big Eight" member, added the following types of services which
if offers:

Organization studies, work simplification, feasibility

studies for new businesses, economic studies for various industries,
hospital dietary analysis, food and beverage cost and operations
analysis, kitchen design and layout, and hospital cost (Medicare
cost analysis).
As might be expected, accounting-oriented services rank at
the top, being offered by 9°$ to 100$ of the firms in all cases.
But even such nonaccounting services as development of work measure
ment standards, executive and wage incentive plans, executive re
cruitment, management audits, and sales forecasting are offered by
70$ to 90$ of the firms.

A number of other nonaccounting services

are offered by 50$ to 60$ of the respondents.

Correlating somewhat

with Redfield1s earlier study was the number of marketing and in
dustrial management type services that are offered by 40$ or fewer
of the firms.

Pour services— insurance analysis, labor negotiations,

packaging development, and product engineering— are not offered by any
of the firms responding to the survey.

It is possible that these

services are offered by Borne of the firms that did not return the
questionnaire; but it is a safe assumption that they are provided by
very few firms.
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TABLE 2-2
TYPES OP MAS WHICH CPA FIRMS OFFER
LISTED ALPHABETICALLY

Replies

Type of Service
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Capital budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Development of work measurement
standards
Distribution channels
Executive and wage incentive plans
Executive recruitment
Factory automation
Financial budgeting
Forms design
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Installation, review, and improve
ment of overall accounting
systems
Insurance analysis
Inventory control
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Management audits
Material handling
Mergers and business acquisitions
Operations budgeting
Packaging development
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Plant layout
Plant location
Policy determination
Product engineering
Product pricing
Quality control
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
Warehousing

Big Eight

Other

Percent of
5 Firms

Percent of
5 Firms

Total
Percent of
10 Finns

100
100
100

100
80
100

100
90
100

80
40
80
80
20
100
80

80
20
80
60
40
100
100

80
30
80
70
30
100
90

100

100

100

100
0
100
0
0
80
80
40
80
80
0
40
20
40
40
0
40
40
60
60
40
40

100
0
100
40
0
20
100
80
100
100
0
60
40
20
20
0
80
20
80
60
80
40

100
0
100
20
0
50
90
60
90
90
0
50
30
30
30
0
60
30
70
60
60
40
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TABLE 2-3
TYPES OF MAS WHICH CPA FIRMS OFFER
LISTED ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY

Replies
Type of Service
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Computer systems and applications
Financial budgeting
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems
Inventory control

Percent of 10 Firms

100
100
100
100
100
100

Capital budgeting
Forms design
Management audits
Mergers and business acquisitions
Operations budgeting

90
90
90
90
90

Development of work measurement
standards
Executive and wage incentive plans

80
80

Executive recruitment
Sales forecasting

70
70

Material handling
Product pricing
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives

60
60
60
60

Maintenance planning and scheduling
Personnel appraisal and/or seleotion

50
50

Warehousing

40

Distribution channels
Factory automation
Plant layout
Plant location
Policy determination
Quality control

30
30
30
30
30
30

Inventory valuations

20

Insurance analysis
Labor negotiations
Packaging development
Product engineering

0
0
0
0
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One problem with a questionnaire that simply lists a group
of services with no explanation is that, conceivably, respondents may
not fully understand a specific item, or may have a slightly different
interpretation from someone else aB to what an item means.

Although

not indicated in Tables 2-2 and 2-3, some CPA firms did alter some
of the category titles slightly.
Two firms added the word, procedures, to capital budgeting,
implying that their firms instruct clients in how to do capital budg
eting, but they (CPAs) do not perform the capital budgeting for the
clients.

Possibly other CPAs limit their role in this area as well.
One firm indicated that they assisted clients on product

pricing systems and sales forecasting systems, the implication being
that the CPA firm does not actually recommend product prices nor does
it forecast sales.
One respondent changed management audits to read management
reviews; another changed it to read general surveys.

These changes

would suggest that the firms do not go as deeply into the area as
the term audit would indicate.
There were several other changes of this type, and the meaning
is clear.

To properly evaluate the nature of MAS as provided by CPAs,

one must consider the specific role that the CPA as an individual
plays in performing the assignment.

As one respondent commented:

It is one thing for the CPA consultant to actually forecast sales
for a client and it is something entirely different to advise a
client as to the most appropriate methods of forecasting sales.
It is also one thing for the CPA to work within a client's or
ganization on a unilateral basis and it is something entirely
different to provide consulting advice to a group of client per
sonnel in order to help them improve the effectiveness of their
organization in developing solutions to their own problems.
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If there is a lack of communication between CPAs and the
financial community, it lies perhaps not so much with the types of
services provided, but rather with the specific role of the CPA in
performing these services.

This aspect will be explored more in

another section.

Management Advisory Services—
As Viewed by Users of Financial Statements

Purpose
Having learned of specific areas in which the large CPA firms
are currently providing MAS, we turn our attention now to the users
of financial statements.

Our purpose in this section is to determine

those services that the financial community thinks that CPAs provide.
As mentioned in the previous section, we will later compare responses
to determine whether a lack of communication exists between the two
groups regarding the nature of MAS.
Prom his study in 1964* Schulte concluded that 33$ of the
respondents to his questionnaire believed that management consulting
seriously endangers the CPA's independence.

"Management consulting"

was the term he used throughout his questionnaire.

Use of this term

was challenged.
But nowhere in the questionnaire or the article inter
preting it is there a definition of the term "management con
sulting." The term may well evoke a reaotion different from that
evoked by "management services," which is commonly used by the
profession itself. In any event, it cannot be assumed that all
the respondents to the questionnaire were familiar with the
specific services offered by CPA firms as aids to management.
The respondents may have read into the question types of

1

"consulting" which in fact are not commonly engaged in "by CPAs.
CPAs practice in a very wide latitude of areas, as amply
illustrated in the previous section.

Since they are engaged in so

many areas of "consulting," it is difficult to see how anyone could
read into the question types of consulting in which at least some
CPAs are not engaged.

Quite possibly some of the 67$ of the re

spondents who saw no threat to audit independence were also unaware
of the types of consulting in which CPAs are now engaged.

If they

knew just how far out of the realm of accounting that some CPAs
have gone, they may very well have had a different opinion, and
responded accordingly.
Nevertheless, this problem has been avoided in the present
study.

The terms "management advisory services" and "management

services" were used throughout.

The word "consulting" was used only

once, this being in the cover letter.
sulting" never appeared.

The term "management con

Therefore, if there are negative connota

tions associated with this phrase, they would not be applicable in
this questionnaire.
One purpose of the current questionnaire was to determine
whether or not the financial community is aware of the specific
services that CPAs offer.

Therefore, Carey's and Doherty's criti

cism on this point also has no validity here.
10

John L. Carey and William 0. Doherty, Ethical Standards
for the Accounting Profession (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Acoountants, 1966), p. 23.

Survey Sample
The "basic purpose of the survey was to obtain opinions re
garding independence.

Consequently, we will wait until Chapter V

to discuss methodology and reasoning for the sample selection and
the questionnaire construction.

However, since one question dealt

specifically with the nature of management advisory services, analy
sis of replies to that question belongs in this chapter.

Also, in

order to properly evaluate the responses, the reader should know
the composition of the sample and the response rate.

These points

are mentioned here and will be expanded on in Chapter V.
Questionnaires were sent to financial executives and analysts
of the nation's largest banks, brokerage firms, mutual funds, closedend investment companies, life insurance companies, and propertyliability insurance companies.
of 220 firms.

One questionnaire was sent to each

Because of duplicate replies the total sent actually

was 2 2 3 , and this figure was used as a basis for the response rate.
A summary of the number of responses is shown on Table 2-4*

11

The

overall response rate was 71*75^* which is extremely good, and there
fore gives significance to the replies.

The response rate for those

groups replying ranged from a high of 8 2 . for life insurance
companies to a low of 57*6$ for mutual funds.

The rate therefore

was fairly high for all categories and extremely high for life
insurance companies and banks.

11

One group, closed-end investment

After receiving follow-up questionnaires when they did not
reply to the first letter, three firms sent back two oompleted ques
tionnaires each. Since the survey was of individuals and not of firms,
it was decided to include these additional three questionnaires as part
of the initial population and to include the replies in the analysis.
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companies, did not respond at all.

Fortunately, they comprise

only 4 out of a total 223 to whom the questionnaires were sent.
Hence, their nonresponse was not detrimental to the survey as a
whole.

TABLE 2-4
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES FROM FINANCIAL COMMUNITY

Types of Firms

Total
Sent

Total
Responded

Response
Rate

n i(a )

90

80,2$

Brokerage firms

39(b)

23

59.0$

Mutual funds

33

19

57.6$

4

0

0.0$

28

23

82.1 $

8

5

•62.5$

223

160

71.7$

Banks

Closed-end investment companies
Life insurance companies
Property-liability insurance
companies
Totals

f |
Includes two duplicate replies
^ I n c l u d e s one duplicate reply

Question number 4 of the Survey of Leading Financial Exec
utives and Analysts (Appendix B) is pertinent to this chapter.

It

states, "From the following list, indicate the types of management
services which you know or think that some CPAs perform.
check as many items as you think are applicable.)"

(You may

The list of 33

specific items with space for additional services is identical to
that used in the survey of CPA firms discussed above.

The alterna-

tive of checking, "I am not aware of any specific types of manage
ment advisory services that CPAs perform," was also provided.

The

list was presented alphabetically to avoid emphasis on any one item.
Admittedly, there may be items listed that some respondents
did not understand.

But if they did not know what a specific item

was, it is unlikely that they would have indicated that they knew or
thought that CPAs were performing that particular service.

Because

of the caliber of the sample to whom the questionnaire was sent, it
is reasonable to assume that the respondents are intelligent, respon
sible individuals; and the probability is very high that they checked
only those items with whioh they had some familiarity, thus achieving
the purpose of the question.

Possible misunderstanding of the

specific role of the CPA is any one category is conceivable.

This

problem is discussed later.

Results of the Survey
The results are tabulated in Tables 2-5 through 2-7.

Of the

160 replies received, only 5 (3$) indicated that they were unaware
of any specific types of management advisory services that CPAs per
form.

One respondent (in addition to the 5) did not answer the

question.
Of the 5 who were unaware of specific types of MAS, one was
a representative of a brokerage firm; one was with a mutual fund; and
3 were with property-1iability insurance companies.

Since the total

population of this latter group was only 8 , this part of Table 2-7
is probably not too significant.

It is interesting to note however,

that 3 of the 5 were from this very small population.
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TABLE 2-5
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
KNOW OR THINK THAT CPAS PERFORM
LISTED ALPHABETICALLY

Replies
Type of Service
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Capital budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Development of work measurement
standards
Distribution channels
Executive and wage incentive plans
Executive recruitment
Factory automation
Financial budgeting
Forms design
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems
Insurance analysis
Inventory control
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Management audits
Material handling
Mergers and business acquisitions
Operations budgeting
Packaging development
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Plant layout
Plant location
Policy, determination
Product engineering
Product pricing
Quality control
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
Warehousing

Number

Percent of 160

150
114
128

94
71
80

76
20
92
71
27
133
61

48
13
58
44
17
83
38

150

94

143
51
123
109
11
21
107
15
134
106
6
49
16
25
48
8
54
30
70
54
58
9

89
31
77
68
7
13
67
9
84
66
4
31
10
16
30
5
34
19
44
34
36
6

--
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TABLE 2-6
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
KNOW OR THINK THAT CPAS PERFORM
LISTED ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY

Replies

Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Installation of oost accounting
systems
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems
Mergers and business acquisitions
Financial budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Inventory control
Capital budgeting
Inventory valuations
Management audits
Operations budgeting
Executive and wage incentive plans
Development of work measurement
standards
Executive recruitment
Sales forecasting
Forms design
Wage incentives
Product pricing
Salesmen compensation plans
Insurance analysis
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Policy determination
Quality control
Faotory automation
Plant location
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Distribution channels
Plant layout
Material handling
Labor negotiations
Warehousing
Product engineering
Packaging development

150

94

150

94

150
143
133
128
123
114
109
107
106
92

94
89
83
80
77
71
68
67
66
58

76
71
70
61
58
54
54
51
49
48
30
27
25
21
20
16
15
11.
9
8
6

48
44
44
38
36
34
34
31
31
30
19
17
16
13
13
10
9
7
6
5
4

TABLE 2-7
TYPES OF MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS KNOW OR THINK THAT CPAS PERFORM
RESPONSES CLASSFIED BY TYPES OF FIRMS

Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Banks
Type of Service
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Capital budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Development of work measurement
standards
Distribution channels
Executive and wage incentive plans
Executive recruitment
Factory automation
Financial budgeting
Forms design
Installation of cost accounting systems
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems
Insurance analysis
Inventory control
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Management audits

(90)a

Brokerage
Firms
(23)

Mutual
Funds
(19)

Life Ins.
Cov
(23)

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)

Totj
(16(

96
82
79

96
52
87

95
74
74

96
57
96

40
20
20

94
71
80

50
12
57
62
19
90
37
97

57
9
65
74
9
74
44
83

47
16
84
63
26
90
47
100

39
17
39
21
13
74
35
83

0
0
20
20
0
20
20
20

48
13
58
44
17
83
38
94

92
31
86
73
7
12
76

74
39
83
70
9
13
57

100
37
68
79
11
26
68

78
26
57
48
4
9
52

20
20
20
20
0
0
20

89
31
77
68
7
13
67

^ h e number in parentheses indicates the total number of respondents for each type of firm

TABLE 2-7 (continued)

Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Banks
Type of Service

(90)

Material handling
Mergers and business acquisitions
Operations budgeting
Packaging development
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Plant layout
Plant location
Policy determination
Product engineering
Product pricing
Quality control
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
Warehousing

10
86
74
4
26
11
16
31
7
42
21
58
36
38
6

Brokerage
Firms
(23)
0
87
61
0
39
4
17
17
0
26
21
30
48
48
4

Mutual
Funds
(19)
16
84
68
5
68
21
26
63
5
32
26
42
42
53
11

Life Ins.
Co.
(23)
13
83
52
4
13
4
9
17
4
13
4
13
9
9
4

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)
0
40
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
20
0
0
20
20
0

Total
(160)
9
84
66
4
31
10
16
30
5
34
19
44
34
36
6

-P*
I\5
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Table 2-6 ranks the services in order of frequency.

As might

he expected, those more aligned with accounting rank near the top,
while those outside the realm of accounting are ranked lower, thus
corresponding with the CPA responses.

One notable exception was

that management audits was checked by 67$ of the respondents, and
therefore ranked fairly high; it was high with CPAs also.

There is

some correlation with Redfield's study of Texas CPAs and with the
CPA survey discussed in the previous section in that marketing and
industrial management type services tend to be at the bottom of the
scale.

Although a few of these items are in the 30$ and 40$ range,

there is a dramatic drop (30$ to 19$ and below) for the majority
of these types of services.
In addition to the 33 items listed on Table 2-5, 8 other
services were written in by some respondents.

These services and

the number of firms adding them to the list are as follows:
(l) assistance in bank loans and other financing— 4; (2) job. descrip
tion— 2; (3) consulting for state and local government— 2; (4 ) tax
return preparation and planning— 2; (5 ) organization charts— 1;
(6) retirement and profit sharing— 1; (7) SEC— 1; (8) legal
problems— 1.
Most of these 8 items could be considered to be within the
scope of MAS.

CPA firms normally have a separate tax department

and would not include tax preparation as a part of MAS.

It is not

known what the category legal problems would encompass.

It would

not appear to be the type of service in which CPAs would be engaged.
Possibly there is some aspect of legal service of which the respondent
had knowledge of CPA participation.

Comparison of the Surveys

If we compare Table 2-3 with Table 2-6, we can conclude
that generally there is no lack of communication between CPAs and
the financial community regarding the types of MAS offered.

Those

services offered by all or almost all CPA firms are the ones that
most financial executives and analysts think that CPAs provide.
The services that rank far down the list of the financial executives
are

generally offered by only a few CPA firms.

there would not be many outside

It is natural that

parties aware that a particular

service is being offered when there are veiy few firms providing
the service.
There are some exceptions to the general conclusion above
which are discussed briefly below.
Forms design —
38$

90$ of ihe CPAs offer this service, but only

of the financial executives thought that it was being offered.
Inventory valuations —

Only 20% of the CPAs offer this ser

vice; but 68$ of the financial executives think that they do.

This

disparity may be caused by a different understanding of what the
teirn-means.

CPAs do of course install cost accounting systems, which

can result in determination of the cost of ending inventoiy for income
statement and balance sheet purposes.
executives had in mind.

This may be what the financial

Generally, however, CPAs do not detei-mine

the fair market value of inventory unless there is some reason to
believe that it is below cost.

Determination of fair market value

might have been the interpretation by CPA respondents for the term
inventory valuations.

45
There may be a few other exceptions if we compare differences
in percentages.

However, this in itself is not a valid comparison.

More relevant is the ranking within each group.

In this respect

there is fairly close correlation between CPAs and the financial
community on most items.
If there is a lack of communication, it is probably regarding
the specific role of the CPA in performing MAS.

Some CPAs who replied

to the survey made a special point to clarify certain items or to
explain what they do or do not do in performing MAS.

The financial

community, in general, is aware of the vast array of services being
offered by CPA firms.

It is doubtful, however, whether or not all

are aware of the limitations which some films have placed on their
involvement in specific types of services.

There are implications

regarding independence in appearance over this possible lack of
communication.

This particular point is discussed later.

Summary

The nature of MAS from a conceptual viewpoint, as presented
by the AICPA, to a listing of specific services, as provided by prac
ticing CPA firms and the financial community, presents a fairly clear
picture of the subject from which considerable controversy has evolved.
There is an apparent understanding between CPAs and the users of
financial statements as to what generally constitutes MAS.

There is

some possible misunderstanding as to how involved the CPA becomes
when performing these services.

The nature of his personal involve

ment has ramifications regarding both independence in fact and in

appearance*

Before considering the effects on independence that

the nature of MAS may have, however, we will look next at how the
economics of MAS also merits consideration in the independence
issue.

CHAPTER III

THE ECONOMICS OP MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES

Purpose

Chapter II showed specifically the types of services that
the major CPA firms now offer.

Many services are accounting oriented;

hut quite a few are completely unrelated to accounting.
point we should study the question of "why?".

At this

Why have CPA firms

gone so far afield in the nature of services that they provide?
We might explain that certain types of services are a natural ex
tension of the accounting expertise of the CPA.

But obviously such

things as plant layout and distribution channels would not fall
into that category.
While not normally presented this way, some reasons for the
proliferation of MAS can be explained by using economic theory.

Our

discussion will not go too deeply and will be confined to relatively
simple theory, but will be pertinent nonetheless.

The reader should

receive an insight into the relationship between these two seemingly
diverse subjects.
Chapter III relates to the problem of independence in two
ways, both at opposite extremes.

The fact that the area is finan

cially lucrative is one of the potential pitfalls to the state of
independence.

Conversely, the total advantages derived by all business
47
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firms, which use their CPA auditors for MAS, may benefit society as
a whole to such an extent that the potential loss of independence
is negligible by comparison.
or disproven here.

This specific premise will not be proven

But the idea is presented for consideration.

Supply and Demand

To obtain what the economists refer to as "market equilib
rium" for any one product or service, consumers and producers must
be in agreement as to the quantity and the price.

Stated another

way, the quantity supplied must equal the quantity demanded at some
specific price.

While we cannot state whether or not there is equi

librium in the MAS market at the present time, supply and demand
factors are present nevertheless, and therefore serve to explain
the vast expansion of this market.

Demand

If CPAs are going to provide management advisory services
successfully, business firms must desire such services and be willing
and able to pay for them.
servioes.

Thus, there must be a demand for such

As stated in Chapter I, the management consulting market

(CPA and non-CPA) totaled approximately $900 million in 1966, indi
cating that there has been a demand in the past.
Redfield's study evaluated the past and future demand for MAS
by Texas CPAs.

Regarding past demand, he found that only

of the

respondents (326 firms) had had no demand for MAS, while 65$ had had
a limited demand, and 34$ a substantial demand.

As to whether or not

the demand had been changing over the last few years, he found that 1$

49
(of 317) had experienced a decreased demand; for 16$ the demand had
remained stable; 48$ said it had increased slightly; and 35$ stated
that they had had a substantial increase in demand.

1

The results of one question to CPA firms on future demand are
shown below.

TABLE 3-1
FIRMS INDICATING CATEGORIES OF MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN WHICH
INCREASING FUTURE DEMAND WAS ANTICIPATED AND THE
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH CATEGORY

Replies

Question

Percent of
261 firms
expecting
increased
demand

Relative
importance
ranked from
1 high to
35 low

Check each category in which your firm
expects an increasing future demand:
Accounting systems and records
Financial planning:
forecasting
and budgeting
Financial structure:
types and
sources of capital or financing
Special investigations:
purchase
or sale of business
Pensions and profit sharing
Financial requirements:
shortand long-term
Management controls
Inventory control
Cost accounting:
all phases
Financial policies:
retention or dis
tribution of earnings; credit and
collection

80

1

73

2

69

3

64
57

4
5

55
54
54
52

6
7-8
7-8
9

49

10

1

James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services by Cer
tified Public Aooountants (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business
Research, The University of Texas, 1961), P» 11*
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TABLE 3-1 (continued)
M JT

Replies

Question

Percent of
261 firms
expecting
increased
demand

Relative
importance,
ranked from
1 high to
35 low

Check each category in which your firm
expects an increasing future demand:

Office equipment
Office organization
Training: accounting personnel
Internal organization
Compensation and incentives
Assistance in rehabilitating a business
Office personnel
Employee benefit programs
General management: objectives
and policies
Office layout and space utilization
Recruitment or interview: office
personnel
Insurance: coverage; records
Purchasing procedure
Plant and equipment: needs; depreciation
Material handling and control
Production control
Accumulating and reporting trade
statistics
Job classification and evaluation
Sales management: prices; results
Research and development: records
and controls
Arbitrating disputes
Production methods and standards
Government contracts: all phases
Sales: distribution and merchandising
Transportation equipment: all phases

Source:

46
45
44
43
43
41
41
40

11
12
13
14-15
14-15
16-17
16—17
18

33
30

19
20

28
25
25
22
22
21

21
22-23
22-23
24-25
24-25
26

18
17
16

27
28
29-30

16
15
12
11
7
6

29-30
31
32
33
34
35

James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Servioes
by Certified Public Accountants (Austin, Texas:
Bureau of Business Researoh, The University of
Texas, 1961), p. 8 5 .

It would appear that the overall demand for MAS was expected
to increase.

Since Table 3-1 was not stratified between local firms

and national firms, the significance is not completely clear.

Many

small firms have never offered a number of various services.

There

fore, these firms may see no future demand for certain services.
However, Redfield did state:
. . . Insofar as local firms were concerned, the relative im
portance of the following nine categories of service apparently
would be greater in the future than had been the situation until
that time:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Pensions and profit sharing
Financial planning: forecasting and budgeting
Financial requirements
Financial structure
Assistance in rehabilitating a business
Special investigations: Purchase or sale of business
General management: objectives and policies
Management controls
2
Employee benefit programs

One other question was stratified, however.

"In the reason

ably near future does your firm expect an increasing need or demand
for management service separate engagements as opposed to management
services performed in connection with other accounting services?"^
Results are shown below.
Offices of national firms
with a separate MS dept.
Humber of replies

Total

14

325

72
14
14
0

17
49
33
1

100

100

Percent of total:
Considerably more
Slightly more
Same number
Less
Total

52
Apparently a separate engagement would be analogous to
employing a management consulting firm.

The MAS department, or the

individuals performing MAS are called in to solve a specific problem.
The problem may have been spotted during the audit; or the client
may have been the one to discover the problem.

Management advisory

services in connection with other accounting services would seem to
arise and be performed in conjunction with these other services.
For example, an inventory-type problem may be discovered during the
audit; and it may actually be Bolved by the audit staff.
That a demand for management advisory services exists and
will expand seems evident.
swer to "why CPAs?".

Not quite so evident, however, is the an

As mentioned above, some aspects of MAS are

natural extensions for CPAs; but others are not.
Redfield queried his respondents about consulting engage
ments performed by others outside the accounting profession.

He

specifically wanted to know the opinion of his respondents (CPAs)
and their clients regarding management consulting engagements of
non-CPAs as they pertained to:

(l) quality of work and/or personnel;

(2) quantity of work performed; (3 ) fees charged; and (4 ) follow-up
assistance and advice.

"This study revealed that a significant portion

of the consulting done in Texas has been provided by management con
sultants that apparently do not maintain a professional attitude in
their relationships with clients and that openly solicit clients."^
A high degree of dissatisfaction is evident from the results illus
trated in Table 3-2.

^Ibid., p. JO.
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TABLE 3-2
FIRMS INDICATING THEIR OWN REACTIONS AND CLIENTS’ REACTIONS
TO ENGAGEMENTS PERFORMED BY CONSULTANTS
OUTSIDE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

Replies

Question

Reactions
of the
respondents

Reactions
of their
clients

If your firm has knowledge of services
performed by management consultants,
indicate the clients' satisfaction and
your satisfaction with respect to each
of the areas below, generally.
Quality of work and/or personnel
Number of replies

223

223

Percent of total
Satisfied
Dissatisfied

29
71

32
68

100

100

"219

221

30
70

33
67

100

100

221

224

21
79

17
83

100

100

Total
Quantity of work
Number of replies
Percent of total
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Total
Fees charged
Number of replies
Percent of total
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Total
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TABLE 3-2 (continued)

Replies
Reactions
of the
respondents

Question

Reactions
of their
clients

If your firm has knowledge of services
performed by management consultants.
indicate the clients' satisfaction and
your satisfaction with respect to each
of the areas below, generally.
Follow-up assistance and advice
Number of replies
Percent of total
Satisfied
Dissatisfied
Total

Source:

217

219

16
84

15
85

100

100

James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services by
Certified Public Accountants (Austin. Texas: Bureau
of Business Research, The University of Texas, 1961),
P. 71.

As before, it must be remembered that the study was limited
to the state of Texas.
on a national basis.

One cannot necessarily apply these results
Redfield also suggested that there may have

been some personal bias existing in the replies.

Therefore, we

cannot use this study as an indictment against all management consult
ing firms.
Probably the most logical answer to "why CPAs?" is explained
by the familiarity that the CPA firm has with the client's business.
The auditors are likely to see problem areas and have potential
solutions before the client is even aware that a problem exists.
It would be quite natural in these cases to let the CPA firm provide
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the needed management service.

Even if the client spots the problem

first, it is usually more convenient and economical to employ someone
already familiar with the firm's operations and system.

The rapport

that has already developed between the client's management and the CPA
firm also could be a factor in utilizing the CPA for services in
addition to the audit.

This was an explanation of one of the partners

of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
We have a tremendous edge over the general consultant by
virtue of our continuing relationship with the client. Part
of the finesse of management consulting is coming up with a so
lution that's not beyond the capabilities of the client. We know
his capabilities pretty well through the audit relationship and
we don't have to spend weeks learning about the business.5
Also, as mentioned by the author of the article from which that quote
was taken, "Nor does it hurt that a senior partner of the CPA firm
is often on golfing terms or first-name terms with the client's
chairman or president."^
To summarize briefly, there has been a strong demand for MAS
in the past.

These services are also currently demanded by many

business firms; and it appears that the demand will continue well
into the future.

Our next interest is to examine how and why this

demand is being met.

Supp.1y
To obtain mar^&et equilibrium there must be a supply available
to meet the existing demand.

There must be firms (CPA and non-CPA)

^"Are CPA Firms Taking Over Management Consulting?", Forbes,
XCVIII (October 1, 1 9 6 6 )r 60.
6Ibid.

willing to provide the servioes that are needed by the business com
munity.

There has been no reluctance by CPA firms to help satisfy

this demand.

Redfield found that CPAs provided all of the services listed
in his questionnaire, although not all firms provided all services.
Chapter II spotlighted current practice of major CPA firms.

Almost

all of the 33 listed services are provided by some CPA firms; but
again, not all firms offer all servioes.

The point is that the

accounting profession in general is attempting to meet the demand
for MAS.

The likelihood of their continued expansion in this field

seems evident.
The trend is unmistakeable. The big accounting firms, with
their computer knowhow, their top contacts with management, their
reputation for probity and their wide knowledge of business,
have no intention of stagnation. They want to expand and manage
ment consulting has been a natural.?
We must again ask "why?".

Why have CPAs wanted to supply

these services at the risk of hurting their reputations if they should
prove to be incompetent?

Why shouldtthey want to risk the possible

loss of independence, so vital in the performance of audits which
are still their "stock-in-trade?"
quite easily— the profit motive.

These questions can be answered
As in most decisions of whether or

not to expand produots or services into other areas, the opportunity
for profit is normally the overriding factor.
with this analysis.

Some would not agree

They would argue that the chance to provide

additional service for the benefit of the client is the most impor
tant concern.

Undoubtedly, the opportunity for service is a very

strong factor; and CPA b certainly do provide their clients with a much
needed service.

As will he discussed below, CPAs are frequently more

efficient and less expensive for the client than would be a general
management consultant.

Nevertheless, should the profit incentive

of MAS for CPA firms ever decrease, so would CPA participation in
such services.

This is not meant as a criticism of CPA firms engaged

in MAS.
In the United States, • . . , people have been left largely
on their own to satisfy their wants. But what is the motive of
people who are left on their own, without guidance from a dictator
or from government? The answer is profit or, in a much broader
sense, the opportunity for economic gain. The chance for selfimprovement in a market economy spurs people to do those things
necessary to make the economy function.
The prospect of profit encourages businessmen to search for
better ways of making existing products, . . . .
In their efforts
to satisfy the wants of people, they are rewarded with profits.6
As implied above, the majority of business firms operate on
the profit incentive.
in this respect.
system.

CPA firms are no different from other firms

They are serving their proper role in our economic

They are supplying a service which is demanded by consumers,

and are spurred on by the opportunity for profits.
The actual profitability of MAS to CPA firms is not known.
They operate as partnerships and have no requirement to make public
their profit figures.

The lucrativeness of the field is usually

measured in gross billings of MAS and grosB billings of MAS as a
percentage of total gross billings.
available either.

This information is not readily

As pointed out in Chapter I, in 1965 one CPA firm

grossed $17.5 million in MAS alone as compared with $20 million for
O

James E. Brown and Harold A. Wolf, Economics: Principles
and Practioes (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1967), PP. 32-33.

the largest non-CPA management consulting firm.

It is a reasonable

assumption that the field is at least close to the profitability of
other CPA functions or we would not have witnessed such continued
expansion.
In 1966 it was estimated that the average percentage of gross
revenues derived from MAS by the "Big Eight" CPA firms had risen from
5$ in 1955 "to 15$.in 1965» and were expected to reach 40$ by 1 9 8 0 .^
CPA firms were specifically questioned on this point in the
survey for this current study.

They were asked, "What percentage of

gross billings do fees from management advisory services represent?"
The results are shown below.

TABLE 3-3
PERCENTAGE OP GROSS BILLINGS THAT MAS PEES REPRESENT

Replies
Big Eight
No.

Percent

Less than 10$
10$ —

25$

26$ —

40$

41$ —

50$

Other
No.

Total

Percent

No.

Percent

2

50

2

29

3

100

2

50

5

71

3

100

4

100

7

100

Over 50$
Totals

9

^"Are CPA Firms Taking Over Management Consulting?", op. cit.,

P. 57.

The results appear to correlate with the figures used in the
1966 estimate.
"10$—

Of all firms answering the question, 71$ checked

25$"; and all the "Big Eight" firms checked this category.

Two

firms indicated that MAS fees account for less than 10$ of their gross
billings.
Two of the "Big Eight" firms did not answer the question,
stating that information of this nature was confidential.

One other

firm did no t ''Sirswe r this question nor the following one regarding the
percentage of MAS clients that are also audit clients because
". . . certain answers imply problems of independence; we disagree
with this implication . . . ."
We may conclude from this survey that MAS represents a small
to moderate portion of gross fees for most large CPA firms; and at
the present time, it does not account for the major share of revenues
of any firm surveyed.

If the estimate of 40$ for the future mentioned

above is correct, however, it would be of interest to follow-up on
this aspect in future years.
The next section will demonstrate and discuss the economic
market structure which has evolved as a result of the supply and
demand for MAS.

The MAS Market Structure

There are basically 4 major economic market structures of
which an industry may be a part— pure competition, monopolistic
competition, monopoly, and oligopoly.

This section will look at the

characteristics of each of these market structures to determine

in which one the MAS market fits.
Some writers have suggested that in order to strengthen
independence CPAs should be prohibited from providing MAS to their
audit clients.
independence.

It is true that such a prohibition would strengthen
However, we must also analyze the effect on the market

structure of this type of action.

Do we have a better market structure

because CPAs are providing MAS than we would have if CPAs were re
stricted in this practice?
otherwise be the case?

Does society get a lower price than would

These questions will be answered in this

section.
By examining the characteristics of each market structure,
we can determine in which market the MAS industry is a part.
this, we can then determine the effect on the market if

Knowing

CPAs were

prohibited from providing their audit clients with MAS.
This analysis will not provide us with a definite conclusion
as to whether the increased independence, to be gained by restricting
MAS, would be outweighed by the detriment to society of

such action.

But it will point out other factors which must be considered in
deciding whether to take the action which some writers have recom
mended.

Pure Competition
"In important respects an economy of free, competitive markets
in long-run equilibrium is 'the best of all possible worlds.'"

10

This market structure is commonly referred to as "pure competition"
1n

New York:

Lawrence Abbot, Economics and the Modern World (2d ed.;
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.), p. 112.

or "perfect competition."

The conditions for a purely competitive

market as outlined by one economist are listed below.
1. There are many sellers and buyers in the market~so many
that no one of them can influence market price by his own actions;
•

•

•

•

2. The oompeting products are identioal— or so nearly so that
it is not worthwhile for any buyer to prefer one seller's product
to another's.
The only basis for preference is price.
3. There is freedom of entry into the market. Whenever
newcomers find it attractive to come into the market, no barriers
stop them. And whenever any seller or buyer finds it unattractive
to stay in, he is free to get out.
4. Economic advantage is the sole determinent for buyers'
and sellers' actions. Sellers try to get the biggest profit.
Buyers try to pay the lowest price.^
Probably the third condition is the only one which is appli
cable to the MAS field.

Any CPA firm can offer MAS if it desires;

and it can easily withdraw such services from the market should this
prove to be the most expedient thing to do.
Some may argue that there are definite and exacting require
ments to beooming
market.

a CPA; hence, there are barriers to entry into

the

Although there are definitely restrictions to becoming a

CPA, this

is irrelevant to the MAS market.

One does not have to be

a CPA in order to practice in the field of management advisory serv
ices.

Anyone can become a management consultant.

Of course, he

must have a certain level of competence in order to compete.
again is irrelevant.
ket.

But this

Incompetence does not prevent entry into the mar

It merely precludes success in the market, which is the case

with practically any business endeavor.
Even if it is agreed that the MAS market fulfills the third
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condition listed above, it must fulfill all 4 conditions in order to
be classified as pure competition.

In this respect it fails.

That MAS is not pure competition is most easily illustrated
with the second condition, "the competing products are identical."
In the MAS market the products are not identical.

MAS firms (CPA

and non-CPA) are selling a service to clients which they hope will
solve some specific problem.

Basically, their objective is the same,

that is, the solution to the client's problem.

But the approaches

to the solution and the solution itself may differ.
The competence among firms may differ also.

The difference

in competence may result in one firm's solution being better than
another film's.

For example, two firms may be competent to solve a

particular problem for a client, such as, a cost-reduction program
of some type.

Both firms may provide acceptable solutions which will

reduce the client's costs.

But one solution might reduce costs more

than the other; hence, it would be preferred.
In addition to any real difference in ability, there may be
an "imagined" difference.

Some MAS firms specialize in specific

fields and have a reputation for being the "best in the field."

They

may not necessarily be best; but if the clients think that they are,
thiB may influence their decision to choose one firm over another.
This type of situation cannot occur under pure competition.
Difference in the personality of staff members among firms
might also be a basis for preference.

This could occur even if the

competence of the firms and the solutions to the problems were the
same.

Hence, there would still be some product differentiation.
Even though pure competition has been ruled out as not

applicable to the MAS market, there are 4 other features of pure
competition which should be mentioned for the sake of completeness.
They reinforce the conclusion that MAS does not come under pure com
petition.
1. There are no ties of loyalty or friendship affecting
buyer-seller relationships.
2.

There is no advertising on the part of individual sellers.

3. Two prices cannot continue to exist side by side for any
substantial amount of time.
4. No firm needs to make price decisions or have a price
policy; it simply sells at the xixling market price.^
These conditions are not met in the MAS market.

One reason

that CPAs have been successful in the MAS field is because of the
audit relationship which has existed with the client, possibly for
many years.
Although CPAs are not permitted to advertise, there is no
such restriction on non-CPA firms.

Some firms do advertise to a

limited extent; however, advertising is not a major feature of the
MAS market.
There can be some difference in prices among firms.

One of

the major advantages which CPAs have in offering MAS to their audit
clients is that they can provide services at a lower price than any
other firm.

This point will be discussed more fully below.

Dis

regarding MAS for audit clients, there could also be some differences
among firms regarding their fees for an MAS engagement for a non-audit
client.
We can conolude that MAS is not a purely competitive market

"because it fails to meet the strict criteria of this type market.
We will now look at monopolistic competition to see how the MAS field
may fit in there.

Monopolistic Competition
The term monopolistic competition refers to an economic market
in which there are many sellers, each one offering a slightly
different foim of a particular economic product. The differences
among the products, . . . , may he real or imaginary, hut none
theless there are differences.13
Although there are some similarities between pure competition
and monopolistic competition, there are some major differences.

The

primary differences are that monopolistic competition contains product
differentiation, price differentiation, and advertising.

There are

also some differences and similarities regarding the shape of the
demand curves, profits, and costs, all of which are heyond the scope
of this present discussion.
Under monopolistic competition there are product differences;
under pure competition the products are identical.

In the previous

section we pointed out that product differences do exist in the MAS
market.

This is therefore one characteristic which would relate MAS

to monopolistic competition.
We also rejected pure competition on the grounds that the MAS
market may have some price differentiation and some advertising.
Both of these conditions would also tend to classify MAS under monop
olistic competition.
Like pure competition, entry into the monopolistically compet
itive market is relatively easy.

The previous section pointed out that

13Brown and Wolf, op. cit., p. 1 4 8 .

this criterion is met in the MAS field.

In addition, there are a large

number of firms in the MAS industry, including many CPA and non-CPA
firms.

Thus the condition of "many sellers" is also fulfilled.
The characteristics of the MAS market which caused us to

reject pure competition as the applicable market structure are the
ones which tend to place it Tinder monopolistic competition.

Since

each of these conditions was discussed fully in the previous section,
no further elaboration iB needed here,

However, before deciding

whether to olassify the MAS market under monopolistic competition,
we need to examine monopoly and oligopoly.

Monopoly and Oligopoly
These two markets are discussed together because the analysis
is rather brief for each one.
Under monopoly there is only one seller.

Obviously, this

condition is completely lacking in the MAS market beoause we have
already seen that there are many sellers in that market.

Therefore,

we can exclude monopoly as being applicable to the MAS field with
no further elaboration.
The oligopolistic market has only a few sellers.

This is one

major difference between oligopoly and monopolistic competition.
Another difference is that entry into the market is rather difficult;
whereas entry is relatively easy in the monopolistically competitive
market.
There are some similarities between oligopoly and monopolistic
competition.

Under oligopoly there may be price differentiation,

product differentiation, and advertising, just as there is in

monopolistic competition.
Could the MAS market be classfied as oligopoly?
point of view, it possibly could.

Prom one

If we were to speak in terms of

specific services, we might find some particular service which only
a few firms offer.

However, if we look at MAS generally, we find that

there are many firms (CPA and non-CPA) offering a wide variety of
services.

Not all firms offer all services.

But almost all services

are offered by a large number of firms.
Some may argue that in terms of total fees, a few large CPA
firms and non-CPA firms dominate the MAS field so completely as to
make it oligopolistic.
the case.

However, evidence indicates that this is not

The many firms in the MAS market, including many large

firms, would seem to preclude domination by a single firm or even a
few firms.

Consequently, the MAS market does not appear to meet the

criteria for oligopoly.

Summary of Market Structures
The MAS market meets the conditions of monopolistic competi
tion.

There are many sellers in the industry.

product differentiation.

There is price and

Advertising, while not extensive, does

exist to some degree in the non-CPA firms; and entry into the market
is not restricted.

Thus, while the MAS market has some characteristics

common to the other market structures, the foregoing analysis strongly
suggests a classification of monopolistic competition.
Given this conclusion, we will next consider why CPAs offer a
particular advantage to their audit clients.

Eoonomic Advantage of CPAs to the Client

Mention has been made several times that CPAs are able to
provide MAS to their audit clients for a lower fee than might be
charged by other CPA firms or non-CPA firms.

The reader should under

stand why this is possible.
Basically, it is a question of time.

CPAs bill their clients,

both for audits and MAS, according to the number of manhours needed
to complete the job.

When a CPA firm renders MAS for an audit client,

he already has a basic knowledge of the client's staff and operations.
He may also have some insight into the nature of the problem to be
solved since it may have been discovered during the audit.
of course, is not always the case.

This,

Nevertheless, beoause of his. basic

knowledge of the client, the CPA auditor requires less time in ob
taining background information than some other CPA firm or non-CPA
firm.

Consequently, his cost of performing the MAS is less than that

of some other firm.

The extent of this cost differential depends on

the particular client and the magnitude of the MAS to be performed.
The oost difference may be small, but it also may be quite substantial.
This explains why the CPA who performs the audit could charge a lower
fee for an MAS engagement them some other CPA or non-CPA.
There are two other questions that need to be answered:
(1) does the CPA charge a lower fee? and (2) if he does, why does
he?

This writer believes that in most, if not all, cases the CPA

auditor does charge a lower fee.

As mentioned above, CPAs normally

bill their clients at a predetermined hourly rate for the number of
applicable hours.

As a result, if the total number of hours to
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perform an MAS engagement is lesB than it would be if someone else were
to provide the service, the total fee will be less.

This writer does

not believe that a CPA firm would bill a client based on the number of
hours that some other firm would require to perform a job.
ably, the hourly billing rate could vary among firms.

Conceiv

But even in

this case, it is unlikely that an hourly price differential would
normally offset the savings in hours.
The other question is, "why do CPA auditors charge less than
their competitors?".

An earlier section in this chapter stated that

CPAs are interested in profit maximization.

Some might argue that if

the CPA is a rational profit maximizer, he will charge the same or
only a slightly lower fee than his competitors would charge.

In other

words, they argue that he will take advantage of the time saved to
do the job to increase his profit on the job.

For the most part,

this argument does not appear to be valid in this type of situation
for the following reason.
The CPA's primary source of revenue is his audit.

For an

audit client the MAS fee is likely to be substantially less than the
audit fee.

This is particularly true when viewed in the long-run.

The audit is performed annually.
intermittently.

MAS is performed one time or

Quite possibly, the client believes that the CPA who

does his audits should be able to perform MAS engagements for a lower
fee than some other firm.
lower fee.

Consequently, the client would expect a

If the client suspected that his CPA was taking advantage

of his position and charging a higher fee for MAS than was warranted
by the time spent performing the job, the client might veiy well
discharge him as auditor.

Therefore, this writer believes that the
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CPA is actually maximizing his profits when he passes cost savings
to his olient.
Since we have seen that CPAs oan offer an economic advantage
to their audit clients, we need to determine what would happen if
CPAs were restricted in the rendering of MAS.

The Effeot of Limiting CPAs in MAS

According to economic theory, we would like an economy in which
no one could he made better off without someone else being made worse
off.

Economists frequently refer to this idea as "maximization of

social welfare."

It is a complicated subject, and one of which a

detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Even

economists are not in complete agreement as to how this ideal state
can be achieved.

Nevertheless, there are certain principles that

can be discussed, even though they will not be proven here.

The

purpose is to relate these principles to the MAS field in order to
demonstrate its role in the maximization of social welfare.
To achieve social welfare maximization, all resources must
be allocated in a manner which will make this maximization possible.
Economists are in general agreement that pure competition is the best
type market to achieve welfare maximization.

We have already concluded

that the MAS market is a part of monopolistic competition, not pure
competition.

However, even within a monopolistically competitive

market, we want to allocate resources in the best manner possible;
and analysis oan be made on this basis.
As discussed in the previous section, a CPA can and probably
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does, provide MAS to his audit client for a lower fee than some other
firm because he does not have to spend costly time familiarizing him
self with the client and his system.

This is particularly important

for the smaller clients who might do without MAS rather than pay the
increased cost of calling in someone completely unfamiliar with the
firm.
A number of persons believe that CPA firms should be prohibited
from providing MAS totheir audit clients in order to preclude the
possibility of

a loss of independence.

What would be the economic

consequences from this type of recommendation?
In the

short run at least, this would increase monopoly power

within the MAS

marketsince there would be fewer fiims providing this

type of service.

Economic theory suggests to us that such an increase

in monopoly power reduces the welfai’e of society.
The social benefits to be derived from prohibiting MAS for
audit clients would be a greater assurance of independence and thus
usefulness of the CPA audit, which is the primary function of the CPA
in our society.

Thus we must compare these benefits to the social

costs of prohibiting MAS by CPA auditors.

This social cost is the

increased presence of monopoly power in the MAS market which will
result in a higher price and lower supply of MAS services.

If the

social costs exceed the social benefits, society would be better off
by allowing the CPAs to perform MAS for their audit clients.
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure
quantitatively the benefits and the costs of increased independence.
Nevertheless, data presented in Chapter V may give some inkling as to
the benefits because users of financial statements were asked whether

CPAs should "be prohibited from providing MAS to their audit clients.
Since independence in appearance is extremely important to the account
ing profession, a high percentage of replies favoring prohibition may
be considered as indicating that independence in appearance will be
increased if prohibition is enacted.

Conversely, a small number fa

voring such restriction might suggest that the amount of independence
in appearance to be gained is not worth the economic cost.

Summary

The strong continuing demand for MAS by the business community,
along with the profit incentive of providing such services, has ac
counted for the tremendous growth of the accounting profession in this
area.

The MAS market structure is one of monopolistic competition.

Although monopolistic competition is not considered as good as pure
competition for allocating resources, the addition of the CPA firms
to the market has decreased monopoly power and has led to a more
efficient allocation of resources than would be the case if buyers of
MAS had to depend only on non-CPAs for these services.
The specter of loss of independence by CPAs who provide MAS
for audit clients has resulted in suggestions for restricting CPAs
in this field.
market.

Such a restriction would reduce competition in this

There would be a smaller supply and an increased price for

MAS to purchasers of these services.

In effect, we would be "buying"

more independence at the cost of decreased welfare to society because
of increased monopoly power.

We need to determine whether the net
-*

effect of such action would increase or decrease the social welfare.

There is no easy answer to this question.

This ohapter has

presented the subject in a different manner than is normally done.
Hopefully, it sheds some light on additional considerations neces
sary for an intelligent discussion of the overall problem of MAS and
independence.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTION OP INDEPENDENCE

Purpose

At this stage we want to examine the potential pitfalls to
independence that arise when CPAs perform MAS for their audit clients.
We do not need to elaborate further on the necessity for complete
independence by CPAs in conducting an audit, a point which was ad
equately made earlier.

The primary objective of this chapter is

to synthesize various opinions on this subject, as brought out in
the literature.

The major area of interest is independence

in

appearance; but it is sometimes difficult in a discussion to divorce
this from independence in fact.

While the chapter's focal point is

the former, some mention is made of the latter.

We will also examine

the results of those questions pertaining to independence, asked in
this writer's survey of CPA firms.

The reader will see from this

chapter that a genuine controversy exists within the accounting
profession.

Hopefully, he will gain an understanding of the argu

ments on both sides of the question.

Attitude of the AICPA

The position of the AICPA regarding independence iB set forth
73
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in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Ethics.

It states in part:

Neither a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a
partner, shall express an opinion in financial statements of
any enterprise unless he and his firm are in faot independent
with respect to such enterprise.
Independence is not susceptible of precise definition, but is
an expression of the professional integrity of the individual. A
member or assooiate, before expressing his opinion on financial
statements, has the responsibility of assessing his relationships
with an enterprise to determine whether, in the circumstances,
he might expect his opinion to be considered independent, objective
and unbiased by one who had knowledge of all the facts. 1
The rule subsequently describes various types of relationships in
which CPAs may be considered not independent.

The prime example is

when they serve as officers or directors of clients on whose state
ments they express opinions.
The summary of Opinion No. 12 of the Code of Professional
Ethics was quoted in Chapter I.

In essence, it states that there

is no ethical reason why CPAs may not perform MAS while serving the
same client as independent auditor.

Some reasoning that led to this

conclusion is as follows:
The committee does not intend to suggest, however, that
the rendering of professional services other than the independ
ent audit itself would suggest to a reasonable observer a
conflict of interest. For example, in the areas of management
advisory services and tax practice, so long as the CPA's serv
ices consist of advice and technical assistance, the committee
oan discern no likelihood of a conflict of interest arising
from such services.2
The committee also cautions CPAs to avoid situations in which they
actually make the decisions for management.
To summarize briefly the position of the Committee on
1
Code of Professional Ethics and Interpretive Opinions
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
1970), p. 2.
^Ibid., pp. 24-2 5 .

Professional Ethics, they state that the CPA must he independent
in fact when serving as auditor for a MAS client.

They conclude

that so long as the CPA does not make any final decisions, he is in
fact independent.

The committee implies the necessity for independ

ence in appearance by requiring the CPA to assess his relationships
to insure that he would be considered independent "by one who had
knowledge of all the facts."

They conclude that MAS would not

suggest a conflict of interest to a reasonable observer.
The committee offered no evidence in support of the latter
conclusion.

There is difficulty in understanding how the committee

could determine that MAS does not suggest conflict of interest to
an outside observer, when no empirical research had been conducted
to support this conclusion.
here.

The conclusion is not being refuted

The source of contention is the premise on which the con

clusion is based.

This premise has never been explained.

Regardless of the criticism attacking the validity of the
methods used to arrive at their conclusions, Rule 1.01 and Opinion
No. 12 stand as written.

They represent the official position of

the AICPA on the subjeot of MAS and independence, and CPAs have con
ducted their activities accordingly.
Recently the AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence studied
this problem quite thoroughly.

Part of their observations and

recommendations were presented in Chapter I.

In brief, they con

cluded that there is no major problem regarding MAS and independence
at the present time; but they also recommended that we continue to
keep informed of potential problems that may arise.

Since this was

an empirical study, it will be explored more thoroughly in the next

major subsection.
The AICPA Committee on Management Services has taken a
position consistent with Rule 1.01 and Opinion No. 12.

Statement

on Management Advisory Services No. 3 . "Role in Management Advisory
Services," admonishes CPAs to always assume an objective, advisory
role and to avoid any relationships that place them in a position
of making management decisions.

Previous Empirical Research

To this writer's knowledge, there have been only two pre
vious empirical studies conducted in which the opinions of third
parties were sought on the subject of CPAs and MAS.

Dr. Arthur A.

Schulte, Jr. centered all of his dissertation research on the subject
of MAS and independence.

Although his study included both independ

ence in fact and in appearance, the most important aspect of his work
appears to be the results of his questionnaire to outside observers.
This questionnaire was devoted exclusively to the question of inde
pendence in appearance.
Dr. Abraham J. Briloff centered his dissertation on accounting
communication.

His questionnaire to third parties covered a wide

range of areas, of which independence and MAS was only one.
The AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence has also researched
the problem; but their work was something of a sequel to the studies
of Doctors Schulte and Briloff.
Both men conducted their research at approximately the same
time, 1964 and 1 9 6 5 .

The results proved quite interesting and have
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generated considerable discussion within the accounting profession.
The findings of each individual as they relate to independence in
appearance is presented below.

Included in this presentation is

some of the criticisms which other CPAs have written about these
studies.

We will also discuss the research conducted by the ad hoc

committee.

Study by Schulte
Dr. Schulte's dissertation, "The Concept of the CPA's Audit
Independence and its Compatibility with Management Services," was
completed in August, 1 9 6 4 .

Part of his research was a survey to

state boards of accountancy in all 5 0 states.

In this questionnaire

he was seeking information as to whether or not disciplinary action
had ever been taken against any CPA because of loss of independence
in a case in which MAS was a factor.

As brought out in Chapter I,

he received 44 replies, none of which ever indicated such a case.
Dr. Schulte was directing this facet of his research to the question
of independence in fact.
The bulk of his study, however, was centered on the question
of independence in appearance.

Results of this aspect were published

in The Accounting Review in 1 9 6 5 .^
Dr. Schulte sent 1,260 questionnaires to representatives of
525 financial institutions.

The population was divided into 4 groups:

(1) research and financial analysts of brokerage firms, (2) commercial
loan and trust officers of banks, (3) investment officers of insurance

■^Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., "Compatibility of Management Consult
ing and Auditing," The Accounting Review, XL (July, 19^5)> 587-93.

companies, and (4 ) investment officers of domestic mutual funds.

He

sent questionnaires to 5^4 financial executives of the 130 largest
institutions in these 4 groups.

The remaining 756 questionnaires

were sent to representatives at 395 institutions selected on a
random basis.
There were 665 replies, representing 76$ of the financial
institutions contacted.
53$•

This provided an overall response rate of

However, some replies were not usable, and 635 (5°»4$) formed

the basis for his conclusions.
The questionnaire was relatively short, consisting of only
6 questions.

Two of the most important questions were as follows:

4 . Has the expansion of the CPA into the field of manage
ment consulting affected your confidence in his audit independence?

5 . To what degree do you believe that CPAs can perform the
managerial consulting type of services to management on a fee
basis and still remain completely independent?4
A scale was provided with each question to allow for varying degrees
of opinions.

By analyzing and combining the replies of these two

questions, Schulte concluded that 43$ of the respondents did not
believe that management consulting seriously endangered the CPA's
audit independence; and 24$ were undecided.

However, the remaining

33$ seriously doubted whether the CPA was able to maintain his in
dependent state of mind in regard to a client when he also served that
5

client as a management consultant.-'
In stratifying the responses, Schulte found that opinions
differed significantly between representatives of large firms and
those of small firms.

^Ibid.. p. 593.

^Ibid., p. 591.

For commercial loan officers from the largest banks, 60$
do not believe that management consulting seriously endangers
the CPA's audit independence} 17$ believe that it does; the
remaining 23$ are undecided. For their counterparts from the
randomly selected banks, 39$
not believe that management
consulting seriously endangers the CPA's audit independence; g
39$ believe that it does; and the remaining 22$ are undecided.
Similarly, he found that large brokerage firm representatives were
less concerned about CPA participation in such services than were
small brokerage firm representatives.
Schulte believed that this difference of opinion probably
arose because financial executives associated with large firms gen
erally read audit reports prepared by large CPA firms with separate
MAS departments.

Hence, the separation of duties decreases the

chance of losing independence and increases confidence in the reports.
In fact, several respondents voluntarily indicated that the size of
the CPA firm was an important factor in judging the compatibility of
MAS.

7

This point of Schulte's study is mentioned because we will

see in Chapter V that it correlates directly with comments made by
some respondents in this writer's survey.

Schulte's general conclusion

was that:
Acting as a management consultant does suggest a conflict
of interest to 33$ of the reasonable observers answering our
questionnaire. Thus, the contention of the AICPA's Committee
on Professional Ethics that the rendering of management advisory
servioes would not suggest to a reasonable observer a conflict
of interest is challenged by the findings of this study.
He realized that some may doubt the seriousness of the findings
since there naturally can be different interpretations based on the
same facts.

Nevertheless, he believed that since one-third of the

financial statement users had serious reservations about the propriety
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of CPAs performing MAS for their audit olients, the profession
needed to study this question further.
Schulte's recommendation for further study has certainly
been carried out.

His article itself has led to considerable dis

cussion, both pro and oon.

Additionally, the AICPA Ad Hoc Committee

on Independence personally interviewed Schulte in trying to obtain
data for their study of this problem.
The strongest criticism of Schulte'b study was by Carey and
Doherty who objected to the term "management consulting," which was
used in the questionnaire.

Their criticism was quoted in Chapter II.

They followed this criticism with the assertion that:
It is difficult to believe that reasonable observers— stock
holders, creditors, or other users of financial statements, or the
business public generally— would see any conflict of interest
in the fact that the auditor, in addition to giving an opinion on
the financial statements, also applied his technical knowledge
and skill to the improvement of management's planning, control
and decision-making processes.9
They are of course entitled to express their opinion.

How

ever, it seems somewhat presumptuous to attempt to discredit an
empirical study by merely making a statement to the contrary with
no support whatsoever.
Schulte later defended his use of the term "management
consulting" by stating that the types of services CPAs perform are
not the critical factors.

The important point is that the relation

ship inherent in a consulting engagement may suggest a confliot of
interest to a reasonable observer.

Carey and Doherty countered that

g
John L. Carey and William 0. Doherty, "The Concept of
Independence — Review and Restatement," The Journal of Accountancy,
CXXI (January, 1966), 41•

"management consulting" meant different things to different people.
They believed that a discussion of the subject would more likely
result in sound conclusions if conducted in terms of specific
services.

10

C. E. Graese, in discussing possible questionnaire bias,
was concerned that the phrase "completely independent," used in
Schulte's fifth question (cited above), may have been misleading.
He stated that the answers may have been different if the word
"completely" had been eliminated from the question.

11

Graese also interpreted some of the findings differently than
Schulte.

As pointed out above, the percentage of representatives

of larger banks and brokerage films with the opinion that MAS are a
serious threat to independence was considerably less than the per
centage of the population as a whole.

Schulte's explanation was that

this difference arose because those individuals were familiar with
large CPA firms with separate MAS departments.

Graese differed with

this interpretation.
I am inclined to believe that a more significant interpre
tation of this data is that these loan officers and financial
analysts are better informed as to the nature of management
services work as performed by CPAs and have probably given
further thought to the factors which are significant in the
12
matter of independence and reliability of the auditors' opinion.
Graese generally concluded that the results of the survey were
10

Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., John L. Carey and William 0. Doherty,
"Management Consulting— Letters to the Journal," The Journal of
Accountancy, CXXII (April, 1966), 32-34*
11

C. E. Graese, "Management Services and the Independence Issue,"
The New York Certified Public Accountant, XXXVII (June, 1967)» 434*

12
1 Ibid.

not really detrimental to the profession.

A substantial majority

were not worried about independence in connection with MAS.

He con

ceded that a substantial minority with doubt would be a cause for
concern by the profession.
the case.

However, he did not believe that to be

Graese suggested a continuing study of this problem.

He

recommended that the profession make every effort to enlighten and
reassure those who have concern in spite of past findings and
experience.

13

Whether or not aocountants agree that Schulte's results are
cause for concern, they must all concede that they did give evidence
that many reasonable observers do see a conflict of interest in the
audit-MAS relationship.

Possibly there was bias in the questionnaire

or misinterpretation of the questions.

But this possibility does not

justify a complete degrading of the results as irrelevant, as some
have done.

Schulte never suggested that CPAs give up MAS.

pointed out that his results did raise questions.

He

Realizing the

limitations inherent in a questionnaire, he recommended that addition
al research be conducted.

He specifically suggested follow-up depth

interviews in which third parties oould elaborate on their opinions.
There is no indication that this suggestion has been carried out to
any great extent.
interview

The AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence did

some individuals.

This is discussed in a section below.

Study by Briloff
Dr. Abraham J. Briloff conducted a study somewhat similar to
Schulte's and at about the same time.

He sent questionnaires to 177
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individuals.

He received 136 replies, of which 72 were from the

financial community and 64 were from the accounting profession.

There

were approximately 200 questions covering a wide range of topics, hut
all primarily concerned with accounting communication.

There were 3

questions regarding MAS which are of particular interest here.

Two

questions were:
A. In your opinion, the rendering of management services
by CPAs in situations where they will also be fulfilling the
independent audit function will:

(a) Enhance the significance of the auditor's opinion.
(b) Detract from the significance of this opinion.
(c) Have no important effect on the significance of this
opinion.
B. In your opinion, the rendering of management services by
CPAs in situations where they will also be fulfilling the inde
pendent audit function is:
(a) Compatible with the traditions of the auditor.
Incompatible with these traditions.
(b) Compatible with independence of the auditor.
Incompatible with such independence.
(c) An involvement which should be encouraged and extended. ..
An involvement which should be discouraged and restricted.
The results of these questions were stratified among "Big
Eight" practitioners, other practitioners, accounting professors, and
members of the financial community.
greatest interest to us.

This last category is the one of

In answering the first question, 53$ of the

financial community felt MAS detracted from the significance of the
audit opinion; 17$ said MAS enhanced the opinion; and 18$ thought MAS
had no effect.

Regarding the three parts of the second question, 49$

said MAS were incompatible with the traditions of the auditor; 58$
indicated MAS were incompatible with independence; and 54$ felt this

^ A b raham J. Briloff, "Old Myths and New Realities," The
Accounting Review, XLI (July, 1 9 6 6 ), 492.

involvement should "be discouraged and restricted.

Generally, these

responses were diametrically opposite those given hy members of the
accounting profession.
Although Briloff's study was conducted at the same time as
Schulte's, he published his findings about a year after Schulte.
He considered his results entirely consistent with Schulte's and
was quite vehement in his criticism of Carey and Doherty.
It might well be emphasized that the Carey-Doherty difficulty
in believing did not move them to ask for a research study to
be conducted by the AICPA or anyone else to develop data empir
ically in order to substantiate or refute the Schulte indictment;
instead their very difficulty in thus believing was presumed to
negate his findings.
Entirely fortuitously, my study did not use the emotionallycharged term "management consulting" and instead used the phrase
approved by Carey-Doherty, namely "management services." And
even though I used the phrase which would meet this Carey-Doherty
test, the results obtained by my inquiry also reject their
sanguine acceptance of the compatibility of the two functions.
To proceed further, another of the questions of my study
did do exactly what Carey-Doherty asserted that Schulte should
have done, namely give the respondents an opportunity to express
their views regarding "the specific services offered by CPA
firms as aids to management."^
In this question Briloff listed 12 categories of services.

He

asked the respondents to indicate those services they believed were
currently being rendered and those services they believed should be
rendered.

Of the 12 listed, there were only 2 in which over 50fo of

the financial community respondents were aware of CPA participation.
In addition, over 50f° of the financial community approved CPAs render
ing MAS in only 2 categories— the same 2.

These 2 categories were:

(1) Review phases of a business in connection with a plan of the
accounting firm's client to buy the business; and (2) Review all

85
phases of a business in connection with a plan to reorganize the
company.

16

As before, replies from accounting profession members

generally differed sharply from the responses above.
Briloff's results must be evaluated in the same light as
those based on any questionnaire.

We must consider the possibility

that some respondents misinterpreted some of the questions.

Never

theless, his study certainly indicated a very strong probability
that independence in appearance was a definite problem.
Briloff was somewhat more vocal as to the significance of
his results than was Schulte.
. . . It seems clear from the accompanying data that a probe
directed to persons who are believed to be sophisticated members
of the financial community as to their awareness of the auditor's
involvement in these peripheral services, and their views regard
ing the appropriateness of such services under the circumstances
here involved, would undoubtedly reject the Carey-Doherty hypoth
esis. Correspondingly, there is no study known to me which would
support the assertion that if respondents were made better aware
of what was swept into the oompound of management services, they
would not "see any conflict of interest. . . . " Nor is there,
to my knowledge, any reported study which would support the
Opinion No. 12 of the Institute's Committee on Professional
Ethics.^'
In a book based on his dissertation, Briloff evaluated and
criticized quite strongly the arguments that had been advanced for
the continued proliferation of MAS by CPAs.

His general conclusion

is that CPAs should be prohibited from performing MAS for their
audit clients.

Realizing that this would never come about in the

near future, he offered the following interim recommendations:
1.
The American Institute of CPAs and/or the Securities
and Exchange Commission should move to accumulate better and
more definitive data regarding the kinds of services presently
being performed by public accounting firms, and the revenues

l6Ibid., p. 494.

17Ibid., p. 493.

being derived therefrom.
2.
The Institute and/or the SEC should move to require
all proxy statements requesting the shareholders' approval of
management's engagement of independent auditors to describe
in some detail any services performed during the preceding year
by such audit firm other than the independent audit, per se,
and the amounts paid for such peripheral services.
The AICPA through its Committee on Management Services has
become more officially involved in the area of MAS.

The previously

mentioned Statements on Management Advisory Services evidence this.
Whether or not the Institute has gone as far as Briloff recommended
is questionable.

There is no evidence that his second recommendation

has received any consideration whatsoever.
not.

The chances are it has

Strangely enough, Briloff's study, which in its entirety

encompassed far more than Schulte's, has not received much attention
in the literature.

Yet his recommendations were potentially more

controversial than Schulte's.

A number of writers have commented on

Schulte's study; but little has been written regarding Briloff's
work.

Briloff was consulted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Independence

during their research, however.

The results of this research are

discussed below.

Ad Hoc Committee on Independence
The general conclusions and recommendations of this committee
were disoussed in Chapter I.

At this point we want to look at the

work of this committee to determine the basis for its conclusions.
We are also interested in determining the relationship between this
committee's research and that of the two previous studies.
1A
Abraham J. Briloff, The Effectiveness of Accounting Communi
cation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 19^7)* P* 194*
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The committee began its work in the fall of 1966, held 10
meetings, and issued its final report in the fall of 1969*

As a

part of its approach, the committee interviewed Drs. Briloff and
Schulte to discuss firsthand the negative attitudes which they had
expressed in their articles.

The point that the committee seemed

most enthused about as a result of these meetings is that neither
gentleman knew of any situation in which independence in fact had
been impaired.

19

In addition to the above interviews, the committee read
all known articles on the subject, as well as the statements issued
by the AICPA Committee on Management Services.

Interviews were

also held with financial statement users representing the American
Bankers Association, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Finan
cial Executives Institute, and the Life Insurance Association of
America.

From these groups there were 16 individuals interviewed.
Interviews were held on 4 occasions.

At one interview the

participants were asked to answer Dr. Briloff's question regarding
the 12 specific services.

Although the users asked for clarification

of the meaning of some services, committee members refused to answer
such questions.

They felt that the participants should be subjected

to the same conditions as the original respondents, that is, one
way communication.
The committee later discussed with the participants the
reasons for their answers.

Some users apparently did not under

stand the nature of the services or the maimer in whioh they were
19

"Final Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," The
Journal of Accountancy, December, 1969? P« 51•

offered.

Some participants "based their answers on their opinion

of a CPA's competence to render such services, rather than on the
question of independence.

The committee concluded that there was

misunderstanding "by some participants.

However, it admitted that

there was doubt in the minds of some users about the appearance of
a CPA's independence in some aspects of MAS.

20

Later the participants were given revised questionnaires.
To the surprise of the committee, other questions of interpretation
arose.

Apparently the questionnaires were revised again.

After

completing this phase of their study, the committee found that there
was a diversity of opinion among the participants; but no one thought
that all of the listed services should be prohibited.
The committee provided the following observations:
The committee's study has led to the observation that there
is substantial misunderstanding as to the nature of management
services rendered by CPAs and the manner in which such services
are rendered— there is a definite need for long-range education.
Another observation . . . is that there are definite limi
tations on the value of questionnaires on this subject. These
limitations arise not only from lack of understanding as to
the nature of management services and how they are rendered
but also from the difficulty of phrasing questions so as to
elicit the desired information; and the respondent's difficulty
in interpreting the questions . . . .
• . . the committee feels that the procedure of conferring
with the representatives of the user groups was quite satis
factory, principally beoause of the opportunity afforded to
engage in dialogue— to clarify, to explain, to explore as the
representatives of the user groups desired. 1
In 1967 the chairman of the ad hoc committee rendered a
progress report of the committee's work to that date.
recognized the limitations of questionnaires.

The committee

Nevertheless, the

chairman stated that they were considering sending an additional
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questionnaire to the population to which Dr. Sohulte had addressed
his survey.
helpful data.

They had hoped that this would accumulate further

22

They did not do this.

In fact, they decided not to use any

additional questionnaires.
The committee has given consideration to (1) preparation
of further questionnaires and/or (2) additional meetings with
representatives of user groups. We decided not to employ the
use of further questionnaires as, in our opinion, results ob
tained through interviews with user groups give more valid
results. We also concluded that extension of the interviews
with representatives of user groups would not likely add further
insights, at least at this point of time, to our exploration of
the subject.23
As stated earlier, one of the general recommendations from the
committee's study was that the profession keep abreast of user
attitudes in the future.
At this point some comments are in order regarding the
committee's work.
Although the committee criticized the use of questionnaires,
possibly the results of the previous surveys were partially respon
sible for the committee's formation.

Certainly, we had no evidence

of widespread dissatisfaction among financial statement users prior
to the research by Schulte and Briloff.

Regardless of their limi

tations, these questionnaires did serve as a basis for further
research into a very important topic.
centered on these prior studies.

Much of the committee's work

To simply write off the future use

22Malcolm M. Devore, "Compatibility of Auditing and Manage
ment Services— A Viewpoint from within the Profession," The Journal
of Accountancy, CXXIX (December, 19^7)« 37•
23

p. 53.

"Pinal Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," op. cit.,

of questionnaires would not appear to be a wise decision.

In fact,

in any topic concerning large numbers of people, it would be folly
to conduct in-depth interviews without a prior indication that such
interviews were needed.

This indication can come from questionnaires

Questionnaires also have some advantages over interviews.
Sometimes people are not inclined to criticize openly, but have no
compunction about commenting anonymously in a questionnaire.
This writer questions whether the interviewing of only 16
statement users provided valid results.

True, these interviews

have provided much information upon which to base future research.
But the committee has closed its doors on the matter for the present
time.

It stated that no additional interviews are currently planned.

Discussion by Other Writers

Articles have been published about CPAs and MAS for over
20 years.

Most of the earlier articles did not even use the term

"management services."

Generally, they covered some specific aspect

in which CPAs oould help their clients.

Since the latter half of the

1950's, articles on this subject have become more and more common.
The question of independence has been brought more to light in these
later articles also.
The literature concerning MAS and independence is reviewed in
this section.
with 1956.

The presentation is in chronological order beginning

Not eveiy article will be mentioned, only those most

relevant to our discussion.

Upon completion of this chapter, the

stage will then be set for the results of the current survey on this
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topic, which hopefully will be the latest contribution to the
literature.

1956 -

1959
One of the earlier articles in this period included inde

pendence as part of its overall discussion; but it did not concentrate
on this aspect of MAS.

The author was not concerned with accounting-

type services, but rather with the non-traditional services such as
market research, job classifications, and warehouse layout.

He

pointed out that a number of objections could be raised about in
cluding such services as a proper part of the practice of public
accounting.

One of the main objections was the possible loss of

independence by CPAs who performed such services for their audit
clients.

The author did not indicate whether he personally shared

this objection on the basis of independence.
Apparently his primary concern was that CPAs may be stepping
outside the boundaries of the professional accountant by partici
pation in such a wide diversity of activities.
creation of a new profession.

His solution was the

This profession might possibly be

called the Certified Public Business Advisor (CPBA).
practice only in the field of MAS.

The CPBA would

Only persons who met certain

levels of competence for specific services would be "certified."

24

Hence, both the problems of competence and independence would be
solved.

To this writer's knowledge, there has not been anything else

written by other writers about this idea.

^Charles Lawrence, "Management Services and the Accounting
Profession," The New York Certified Public Acoountant, XXVII
(October, 19579» 671-76.

One of the first articles in this period devoted to the
ethical side of the MAS question was by Ira Frisbee.

Regarding the

specific point of MAS and auditing, he said, "In my opinion, most
of the management services which customarily are performed do not
in themselves make the auditor nonindependent, although situations

25

may exist where he would not be independent." ^

Frisbee's opinion

was based on the assumption that CPAs serve only in advisory roles.
He believed that if they ever made the decision for management, they
would cease to be independent.

As we will see, this distinction

between independence and nonindependence is shared by many other
writers.
John L. Carey, while serving as Executive Director of the
AICPA, wrote a book concerning professional ethics.

It was not an

official pronouncement of the Institute, and represented his opinions
only.

The .book included a chapter entitled "Ethical Responsibilities

in Management Services."

Very little in this chapter was devoted to

the question of independence, which at that time was not a boiling
issue.

Generally, his opinion parallelled that of Frisbee.

If a certified public accountant limits his "management
services" to a technical work and recommendations or advice
to clients, pointing out alternative courses and their con
sequences, but leaving the final decision to the management,
it does not seem that his objectivity as independent auditor
of the accounts of the same business enterprise need be adverse
ly affected. The precise type of service might have some
bearing on the question.26

25

■'Ira N. Frisbee, "Ethical Considerations in Rendering Manage
ment Services," The Journal of Accountancy. CIII (March, 1957)» 33•

26

John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Certified Public
Accountants (New York: American Institute of Accountants, 195^)i
P. 144.
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Carey also pointed out that tax advice to management "by CPAs
had long been accepted.

Seldom had questions been raised concerning

impairment of independence in this area.

He therefore implied that

advice to management in other areas is in the same category as tax
advice and should be considered in this light.
Several articles written during this period dealt quite
extensively with the opportunities and possible pitfalls for CPAs
in MAS.

But generally they were concerned more with the competence

of the CPA and merely skirted the question of independence.
One such article delved quite deeply into the opportunities
and limitations inherent in a MAS practice.
many ethical considerations.

This article considered

But it only mentioned, with no elab

oration, the likelihood of conflict with concepts of independence
as being deserving of thought.

27

Another article during this period also devoted considerable
coverage to the nature of MAS and ways to develop a MAS practice.
A slight mention was made of independence.
I have no patience whatever with those who say that because
the C.P.A. performs some service for his client beyond the scope
of the normal audit or tax service, he loses his independence.
He can be just as independent installing a standard cost system
or a system of internal control or a budgetary system, for
example, as in making an examination of the accounts and report
ing upon it. . . . But if he should become involved as part of
the management team by acting in the capacity of treasurer or
controller or in making management decisions, then he ceases to
be a professional and simply becomes just another employee. His

27

Max Blook, "Management Advisory Services— Opportunities and
Limitations," The New York Certified Public Accountant, XXVIII
(February, 1958)» 139*

independence vanished with the first act of this nature which he
performed.^8
Like the other writers, this author saw no threat to audit independ
ence provided that the CPA did not make management decisions.
A similar opinion was expressed by Thomas G. Higgins, who
at that time was chairman of the AICPA Committee on Professional
Ethics.

In discussing numerous ethical problem areas, he was not

overly concerned about independence and MAS.

He pointed out that

there was general agreement that the CPA could maintain his inde
pendent status provided he kept his MAS relationship at the advisory
level, as distinct from the decision-making or operating level.

29

Certainly, there is no basis for disagreement with this
opinion.

Up to that time this was the consensus of those who had

written on the subject.

During this entire period the only concern

regarding independence was that the CPA maintain an advisory role
only.

Everyone was in general agreement that should the CPA partici

pate in the decision-making role, he would lose his independence.
Ho writer ever mentioned the appearance of independence in the MAS
role.
The lack of concern over independence problems is easy to
understand.

During this period MAS as a separate function was

just beginning to come into its own.

Most writers apparently were

interested only in providing an awareness to CPAs of opportunities

28

Clinton W. Bennett, "Management Services by C.P.A.'s," The
Accounting Review, XXXIII (October, 1958), 611.
29

Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics and Publio Opinion,
The Journal of Accountancy, CVI (November, 1958), 37*
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in this emerging field.

As quoted earlier, MAS constituted only 5$

of total gross revenues for "Big Eight" firms in 1955*

Independence

did not really seem to he a major problem, and it probably was not.

1960 —

1964
During the early 1960's the accounting profession received

a new awareness regarding potential conflicts of independence in
relation to MAS and auditing.

University professors in particular

began to present a different outlook on this question.
George Mead, University of Illinois, wrote an interesting
article tying in MAS with service and the profit motive.

While

cautioning against the potential loss of independence, he recog
nized that this negative factor was sometimes offset by the good
derived from the MAS.

His argument was somewhat similar to that

presented in Chapter III of this paper.
. . . The profession must take care, then, that each new
"non-accounting" service deemed professionally compatible,
apparently increasing service and income, does‘not systematic
ally undermine its very foundation, . • . creating undue
pressure on independence . . . .
. . . Independence iB not an end in itself. Neither must
it be inferred that independence is an all or nothing propo
sition . . . . Unless bias is proven, less-than-aloof auditorclient relationships only cause degrees of probability or
measures of doubt as to independence, and even these weakening
influences may be offset to some degree by raising standards
of competence and integrity and by broadening public under
standing. Current practice demonstrates that auditing and
certain management advisory functions are not incompatible.
During the 19o0's writers began to realize the importance
of appearance to outside parties, a subject not mentioned in the

^George Mead, "Auditing, Management Advisory Servioes, Social
Servioe, and the Profit Motive," The Accounting Review, XXXV (October,

1960 ), 666 .

earlier period.

While not referring specifically to MAS, Carman

Blough mentioned this topic in discussing, "Responsibilities to
Third Parties."
Other situations are such that third parties are likely to
assume that the CPA lacks independence, even though he may
actually he, in fact, quite independent. Since one's usefulness
as an auditor is impaired by any feeling on the part of third
parties that he is likely to lack independence, he has the
responsibility of not only maintaining independence in fact, but
of avoiding any appearance of lacking independence.31
Robert Trueblood, in writing an article covering many aspects
of MAS, provided a somewhat simplified approach to the independence
question.

He stated that all phases of a CPA's work— audit, tax,

MAS, and others— are subject to review, examination, and criticism
by fellow practitioners.

Consequently, he concluded that it is

difficult to raise questions about the propriety of auditing and MAS.
True, CPAs are subject to a review by their peers to some
extent.

As a practical matter however, we would not normally see

this unless there was evidence of an ethical violation or of some
other unprofessional conduct.

Consequently, there appears to be

little validity in using that as a basis for concluding that the
CPA auditor-MAS relationship offers no possible threat to independ
ence.

It is an oversimplification of the problem.
We should not be too critical, however.

Up to that time,

no one had ever written anything refuting this philosophy.
specific problems had ever been reported.

No

There was really little
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Carman G. Blough, "Responsibility to Third Parties," The
Journal of Accountancy, CIX (May, 1960), 60.
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Robert M. Trueblood, "The Management Service Function in
Public Accounting," The Journal of Accountancy, CXII (July, 1961),
42-43.
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reason to question whether or not his attitude was the correct one.
At approximately the same time as Trueblood*s article a new
concept was advanced.

Professors Mautz and Sharaf published their

monograph, The Philosophy of Auditing.
paper.

This is a very well written

Members of the accounting profession have come to regard the

work quite highly.

Their chapter entitled, ’’Independence," provides

the basis for our discussion here.
Mautz and Sharaf pointed out that auditors must have real
independence and apparent independence.

This, of course, is anal

ogous to the terms we have used throughout this paper, that is,
independence in fact and in appearance.

They then proceeded to

present a dispassionate view of 6 different threats to audit inde
pendence, of which service to management was one.

Their concern was

not for independence of individual practitioners, as such.

Rather

they were interested in independence of the profession as a whole.
Consequently, they centered their discussion on those characteristics
that the general public may question as threats to the auditors'
independence.
The authors refuted the arguments so frequently advanced by
proponents of MAS that CPAs are merely serving as advisors, and that
independence is a state of mind.
There tends to come a time in any arrangement for management
services when the mutuality of interest of the consultant and
the client becomes so significant that the accountant ceaseB to
be independent in the sense that we feel he should be for auditing
purposes. Management requests advice because it expects to use
it; the consultant gives it to be used; the consultant knows that
as a consultant he will be judged by the ultimate usefulness of
his advice in bringing success to management's efforts. He has
had a hand in shaping managerial deoisions and will be judged by
management on the same basis that the management itself will be
judged. How then can he claim to be completely independent?
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. . . He now has an interest in that company, a financial
interest based on his prestige as a successful advisor, and his
interest differs not in kind but only in degree from that of a
full-time employee.
. . . Does anyone really believe that we can offer the
managerial consulting type of advice to management on a fee
basis and still appear completely independent to alert and
intelligent outsiders? More and more, independent auditors
will work in the harsh, cold light of public scrutiny; it will
not be enough that we feel we are independent and can convince
our clients of the same fact. More and more we will have to
convince others.^
Their solution for this problem was to provide specialization
within the profession.

In this vein, auditing would be recognized as

a specialty separate from the other public accounting functions.
Consequently, those who serve as auditors would perform no other
functions for their clients.
not engage in audits.

Those performing other functions would

Staff members would be declared as either

auditors or non-auditors and would be restricted to the classification
which they select.

According to the authors, this decision would not

mean that a man could never change his mind.

However, he would be

committed to work in his area for the foreseeable future.34
Mautz and Sharaf would require this division of duties in
large CPA firms only.
. . . very few small firms make what may be called a public
audit. When audits are made by small firms they are of a restrict
ed usefulness, generally performed at the request.of a bank. Such
audits seldom carry any implications of general public interest.
Local banks tend to know local accounting practitioners and to know
which ones they can rely on. We feel that to restrict in any way
small accounting firms from performing audits would only make it
more difficult to service their clients and others with no sub
stantial offsetting benefits resulting from such restriction.35

33R. K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing
(Iowa City, Iowa: American Accounting Association, 1961), pp. 222-23.
34Ibid.. pp. 228-29.

35Ibid., p. 230.
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The authors further suggested that as soon as a certain client "became
so large that there was substantial public interest in his audited
statements, auditing and other services should be separated.
Thus Mautz and Sharaf adopted somewhat of a more moderate view
than Briloff, who would have prohibited MAS and auditing for the same
client entirely.

The accounting profession has never officially

acted on the recommendations by Mautz and Sharaf.

Unofficially,

many firms follow a policy along the lines of these recommendations.
This policy may differ among firms.

It is not necessarily as re

strictive as the authors suggested.

Each firm generally allows some

flexibility in this respect.

This writer's survey to CPA firms

asked two questions on this specific point.

The results are included

toward the end of this chapter.
In 1962, Thomas G. Higgins, who was mentioned in the previous
section, emphasized a point which was then gaining wide acceptance.
There are actually two kinds of independence which a CPA
must have — independence in fact and independence in appearance.
The former refers to a CPA's objectivity, to the quality of not
being influenced by regard to personal advantage. The latter
means his freedom from potential conflicts of interest which might
tend to shake public confidence in his independence in fact.36
This possibly was the first time that these two terms were used.

They

have been used quite frequently since then, as have many synonyms for
them.
Regarding MAS, Higgins generally restated his previous position.
Provided that CPAs merely advise and do not make decisions, he saw
no problem.

He did not discuss the possibility of independence in

•^Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics: A Time for Re
appraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, CXIII (March, 1962), 31.

appearance in connection with MAS.
In 1962 a hook edited by Carey restated his position of 1956
that so long as the CPA did not put himself in place of management,
there was no problem of independence.

It also stated the exact words

which Trueblood stated about the CPA being subject to review by his
fellow practitioners.

37

The book reflected the opinions of the AICPA

Committee on Long-Range Objectives.

Both Carey and Trueblood had

served on that Committee.
One of the first articles devoted exclusively to the com
patibility of consulting and auditing came in 1963.
took the positive approach.

This article

The author, Kenneth S. Axelson, re

marked that MAS provided only one of several pressures on independence
for the CPA.

The accountant's financial dependence on client fees and

past personal relationships with management also exerted pressure on
independence.
tioned.

Yet these pressures have never been seriously ques

The author pointed out the pressures on the other side that

help to insure independence— legal liability, possible reaudit by
regulatory agencies, and possible review by peers.
Axelson also put forth the argument frequently advanced by
proponents of MAS, that is, the advisory role of the accountant.
Furthermore, he stated that consulting fees were generally less than
audit fees.

A poor MAS engagement, either because of quality or lost

independence, may cost him the audit.

Thus this serves to strengthen

his audit independence.

^ J o h n L. Carey (ed.), The Accounting Profession; Where Is
It Headed? (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1 9 6 2 ), pp. 87-8 8 .
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The author would not separate the auditing and consulting
function unless there were a real threat to audit independence.

He

concluded that no such threat existed.
The following year Delmer P. Hylton, an accounting professor,
wrote an article expressing an opposite view from Axelson.

This was

the first article written exclusively to advance a negative opinion
on this subject.
His arguments parallelled somewhat those of Mautz and Sharaf.
He refuted the "advisory role only" argument.
. . . It is true that management is not required to adopt the
solution recommended by the management consultant, . . . . Surely
management does not anticipate ignoring the recommendations of the
hired consultant; otherwise he would not have been engaged in the
first place. And if he does not present a solution which manage-,q
ment believes suitable, he is not likely to be called upon again.
Hylton also brought out another consideration.

He admitted

the unlikelihood of a CPA's deliberately abandoning his independence.
But he believed that a CPA could unconsciously lose some of his im
partiality.

Thus the CPA could lose independence in fact without

realizing this loss.
Hylton restated the case for independence in appearance.

His

opinion was that CPAs who provide MAS for audit clients hardly present
an appearance of independence to outsiders.
His solution to this overall question was the prohibition of
MAS to one's own audit clients.

Although this may cause some ineffi

ciency and increased costs in performing MAS, Hylton acoepted this as

Kenneth S. Axelson, "Are Consulting and Auditing Compati
ble?", The Journal of Accountancy, CXV (April, 1963), 54-57*

39

Delmer P. Hylton, "Are Consulting and Auditing Compatible?—
A Contrary View," The Accounting Review, XXXIX (July, 1964)« 667*

one of the costs of maintaining independence.
Perhaps the solution to this problem is simply the adoption
of the practioe of referring the audit client to other C.P.A.s
when he requests management services, with an explanation as
to why this is done. Alternatively, the auditor could accept
the management services engagement and explain to this client
that he can no longer serve as his auditor. It is believed that
this policy would do much to further the image of the C.P.A. as
a truly professional man.^
This period witnessed an increasing awareness by CPAs of the
potential dangers to audit independence inherent in an MAS engage
ment.

Everyone did not agree with the negative attitudes expressed

by some writers.
the old ideas.

But by that same token, we saw a questioning of
No longer did everyone assume that the problems of

independence would disappear by merely assuming that they did not
exist.

In the next period we will find that writers discuss the

subject with even greater intensity than in this past period.

1965 —

Present
Possibly we could call this the "Schulte Era."
1

He published

the results of the first known empirical study on MAS and outside
parties in 1965*
on his study.

Many articles and additional research were based

Other articles did appear though.

Some made only

passing comments to Schulte|s work; others did not mention it at all.
The first pertinent article was Schulte's.
discussed it quite thoroughly in a previous section.
elaborate further on the substance of his findings.

We have already
We need not
Similarly, the

Carey-Doherty article and the Graese article need no additional dis
cussion.

Schulte published several other articles after his first
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one in .1965»

These generally were an extension and sometimes a

repetition of what he had said previously.

They are indexed in the

bibliography of this paper if the reader wishes to refer to them.
Briloff also published his findings during this period.

We

have already seen the results of his study.
We must give credit to both individuals for their contri
bution to accounting literature.

If they did nothing else, they

made the profession aware of the independence in appearance problem.
Everyone may not agree with their conclusions and recommendations.
But everyone must admit that they provided information where none
existed previously.

Their work set the stage for much of the litera

ture on this topic during this period.
beneficial.

This literature has been

The more a problem is discussed, the more enlightened we

all become, and the greater our chances of finding solutions.
Felix Kaufman devoted a small portion of a 1967 article to
the subject of independence.

He generally disagreed with those

individuals who saw threats to audit independence.

He made three

observations about the matter of independence.
First, CPAs have now rendered millions of hours of manage
ment services to their clients . . . , there are no instances
. . . confirming the impairment of independence because of
management services activity.
Second, CPAs have become eminent members of the management
services field . . . .
Third, some people have applied a rigorous logic to the
independence issue, concluding that to really achieve audit
independence an environment must be established in which the
auditor never has advocacy sentiments about his client . . . .
. . . Audit independence becomes an abstraction rather than
a positive and viable personal attribute. And it envisages the
auditor as a virtual automaton bereft of capacity for perception,
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discrimination or moral judgment.^
Although all of the above observations may be true, they
are not necessarily relevant.

They do not really appear to add any

thing pro or con to the argument.

It is particularly difficult to

understand the relation to independence of Kaufman's second conten
tion.

In his article Kaufman elaborates on the expansion of MAS,

bringing out facts similar to those discussed in Chapters I and II.
But nowhere does he show the relevance of these facts to the inde
pendence question.
In the December, 1967 issue of The Journal of Accountancy,
there was a 3 part article on the compatibility of auditing and
MAS.

Schulte took the viewpoint of an outside observer, discussing

the results of his survey.
viewpoint.

Devore gave the accounting profession's

It was an interim report by the Ad Hoc Committee on

Independence.

His viewpoint generally was included in the final

committee report, discussed earlier in this paper.

Prank J.

Hoenemeyer, an executive vice president with Prudential Insurance
Company, presented the viewpoint of a financial statement user.
Hoenemeyer's overall opinion was that independence in con
nection with auditing and MAS was not a serious problem.

He believed

that MAS could lead to a loss of independence but would not lead to
it because MAS are secondary to auditing.

He explained this position.

. . . By this I mean that the fees produced by the perform
ance of management consulting are less than those from the
auditing function. As I view it, the CPA firm gets its manage
ment service engagements because it is the company's CPA and it

^ F e l i x Kaufman, "Professional Consulting by CPAs," The
Accounting Review, XLII (October, 1967)* 719*
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is selected as a CPA because it is independent. Another way of
stating this is that if the CPA firm lost its reputation of being
independent, it would not then be the auditor and would not then
be hired as a management consultant.
If management services should grow to the point where they
are the tail that wags the dog there would be a real impact on
my thinking.42
In addition to the "could" and "would" distinction, which he
listed as his first point, Hoenemeyer brought out the following
points:
Second, some of the functions which a CPA now performs, and
which are not being questioned, are more likely to lead to a
loss of independence.
Third, so far as appearance of independence is concerned,
it is more important to solve the problem of what I call
multiple-choice or flexible accounting.
Fourth, the biggest problem so far as independence is
concerned, is that CPAs are selected and paid by the management
they are supposed to check o n . 43
Hoenemeyer had a very good opinion of CPAs and their repu
tation for integrity.

We can conclude that he, as a financial

statement user, had a positive attitude toward CPA participation in
MAS, even when the CPA also serves as auditor for the same client.
In Chapter II we saw that Kell classified MAS as "accounting
services" and "administrative services."

This same article by Kell

further expounded on these services as they relate to audit inde
pendence .
Accounting-based services have been rendered for over fifty
years without any effect on either independence in fact or in
appearance.
. . * Accounting-based management services by CPAs are
compatible with independence. There should be no question on

^ ^ r a n k J. Hoenemeyer, "Compatibility of Auditing and Manage'
ment Services— The Viewpoint of a User of Financial Statements,"
The Journal of Accountancy, CXXIV (December, 1967)» 35*
43Ibid.. p. 33.

106
this portion of the issue now; there should "be none in the
future. I am hopeful that all interested parties can agree
on this aspect of the controversy.44
All interested parties do not agree with Kell.

The evidence

does not support his statement that accounting-based services have
no effect on independence in appearanoe.

Chapter V will show that

some third parties look with disfavor on some of these types of
services as well as some non-accounting oriented services.
Kell focused his attention on administrative services, those
unrelated to accounting.

Even here, he did not regard independence

in fact as a major problem.

He therefore concluded:

Thus the real issue is not management services and.inde
pendence. It is not accounting services and independence.
It is not administrative services and independence in fact.
The real issue is the incompatibility between administrative
services for management and the auditor's appearance of inde
pendence.43
As a solution to the problem Kell proposed that the AICPA
formally recognize the two types of services, accounting and adminis
trative.

He further proposed that the rendering of administrative

services by a CPA to an audit client be identified in Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Ethics as constituting a relationship which
is incompatible with independence.4^

His solution was somewhat

similar to Hylton's proposal 4 years earlier.
tinguish between the two types of services.

Hylton did not dis
He also did not

specifically mention AICPA prohibition, although that was the im
plication.

To date, Kell's suggestion has not been acted on by the

44Walter G. Kell, "Public Accounting's Irresistible Force and
Immovable Object," The Accounting Review, XLIII (April, 1968), 268.
45Ibid., p. 269-

46Ibid.
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the Institute.

There appears to be little probability that they will

adopt his recommendations in the foreseeable future.
The last article which we will discuss, fittingly enough, was
a review of the issues that had arisen concerning this problem.

The

authors pointed out the major differences of opinion regarding com
patibility between proponents and opponents of MAS.

"Advocates of

'incompatibility' have been satisfied to demonstrate that combined
consulting and auditing has the potentiality for damaging the
auditor's independence, while the advocates of 'compatibility' have
demanded absolute proof that independence has been lost."4"^
Using "perceived" independence to mean independence "in
appearance," the authors summarized the status of the controversy.
A priori analysis indicates that performance of management
services is entirely compatible with professional independence.
While there seems to be no basic incompatibility between
consulting and objective audit independence, the consulting
relationship is potentially dangerous for maintenance of sub
jective audit independence. The extent of the danger cannot
be adequately determined without experimental research. The
status of perceived independence is a question of fact to be
determined from surveys of the opinions of third parties.
Previous surveys have shown that a significant number of ob
servers believe that an auditor's independence is impaired by
performance of consulting and auditing for the same client,
but future surveys coupled with public information programs
may reveal changes in this situation.
The danger to subjective audit independence to which they referred
is the possibility of subconsciously becoming biased or partial.
This factor was discussed earlier in the article by Hylton.

4 D. R. Carmichael and R. J. Swieringa, "The Compatibility of
Auditing Independence and Management Services — An Identification of
Issues," The Journal of Accountancy, XLIII (October, 1968), 705*
48Ibid.
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Independence Questions in Survey of CPAs

Several writers recommended a division between staff mem
bers who audit and staff members who render MAS.

At the present

time there is no formal requirement for such a division.

As a

part of the current survey of large CPA firms, however, this writer
asked several questions that had independence implications.

We

have seen earlier from the first two questions that all firms sur
veyed offer MAS and have a separate MAS department.
The third question and its choice of answers is shown below.
3. Do any of the individuals who perform management ad
visory services also participate in any audits?
All individuals performing management advisory services
participate in some audits.
Some individuals performing management advisory services
participate in some audits.
No individual performing management advisory services
participates in any audit.
None of them answered the first choice.
second choice; and 2 answered the third.

Eight answered the

Even some of those who

selected the second response modified or clarified their reply
somewhat.

Some firms indicated that dual participation in MAS and

audits was very minor.

In certain instances MAS staff members may

participate in an audit in a strictly advisory role.

For example,

they may advise the audit staff on certain aspects of the computer
system.

The audit staff can also give valuable information to the

MAS staff on organizational and other matters.
A related question followed, to be answered based on the
reply to the previous question.
4.

Answer this question only if you answered either of the
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first two choices in question number 3.
Do the individuals mentioned in question number 3 partici
pate in audits of those clients for whom they have performed
management advisory services?
Yes, always.
Yes, sometimes.
No, never.
All 8 firms that had answered the second choice in question
3 answered this question.

No firm answered, "Yes, always."

firms replied, "Yes, sometimes;"

Six

and 2 said, "No, never."

We can see that CPA firms have voluntarily separated the
audit staff and the MAS staff.

There are a few minor exceptions.

This division does not go as far as some authors have recommended.
However the firms have willingly separated these duties without
any requirements by the AICPA and without coercion by any other
group or agency.

The firms are aware of the need for avoiding

conflicts of interest.

This self-imposed division of duties

helps to insure factual independence.

We might suspect that

outside parties would be less fearful of independence conflicts
under this type of arrangement.
would be strengthened.

Thus independence in appearance

Whether or not this is so is one subject

in Chapter V.
Question number 6 of the CPA survey also had independence
implications.
6. What percentage of your management advisory clients
are also audit clients?

110
Replies

Less than 10$

Percent

0

0
11

1

26$ —

50$

1

11

51$ —

75$

4

45

3

33

9

100

I

tr\
CO

Number

Over 75$
Total

In order to have potential problems of independence, we
must have a large percentage of firms rendering MAS to a substantial
number of their audit clients.

This proves to be the case.

The

above reply shows that 78$ of the 9 firms answering the question
perform audits for 50$ of their MAS clients.

For the "Big Eight"

films (not stratified above) 100$ of the 5 answering the question
perform audits for over 50$ of their MAS clients.
do not indicate any problem of independence.

These statistics

However, they do show

the magnitude of the problem if it is ever proven that a threat to
independence in fact exists.
To analyze properly this potential threat we would also
want to know the percentage of gross billings that MAS represent.
Some writers have used this as a partial criterion in evaluating
independence.

For this survey, the results of a question on this

point were presented in Chapter III.
7 firms answered the question.

The reader may recall that

For no firm did this percentage

exceed 25$» and for 2 firms it was less than 10$.

At the present

time CPA firms would appear to pass the test on this point.
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Summary

We have seen that there are two extremes regarding solutions
to the independence question.

One group would have CPAs divorce

themselves completely from performing all types of MAS for audit
clients.

At the other extreme we find those who oonsider it un

thinkable to suggest the possibility of any threat to independence,
and would therefore make no changes in the present status.

We also

have the more moderate views which fall somewhere between the two
extremes.

Some suggest that CPAs perform only accounting-oriented

services for audit clients.
between auditing and MAS.

Others suggest a formal staff division
All this discussion is healthy for the

profession, even if there is controversy.

It shows that we are

concerned about our independence, and that we are willing to search
for solutions to questions which threaten it.

We may not yet be in

complete agreement as to the proper solution.

But those writers

who keep us aware of the problem remind us of the need to guard
constantly against any threats to independence in fact or in
appearance.
This chapter has brought us up to date.

We now know the

opinions which both CPAs and financial statement users have expressed
on this subject in the past.

Our next step is to learn what financial

statement users ourrently think about CPAs performing MAS for their
audit clients.

The next chapter will present this analysis.

CHAPTER V

THE ATTITUDE OP FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the
survey sent to financial statement users.

The chapter includes the

methodology used in selecting the sample and constructing the ques
tionnaire.

Question number 4 was discussed in Chapter II.

The

results of the other questions are presented and analyzed in this
chapter.

Sample Selection

The objective was to send questionnaires to individuals who
use audited financial statements to make decisions.
are any number of people who fall into thiB category.

Obviously, there
Another cri

terion was that the questionnaires be sent only to those individuals
whose decisions may affect large numbers of people.

For example, an

individual investor who makes a decision to buy stock in a specific
company may be the only one affected by such a decision.

But an in

vestment officer of a mutual fund buys stock for thousands of investors.
Consequently, his decisions are of greater significance than those
of the individual investor, both monetarily and psychologically.
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Chapter I brought out the necessity for public confidence in
the CPA's integrity in performing audits.

The assumption now being

set forth is that the public is represented and influenced to a great
degree by representatives of major financial institutions.

Therefore,

the survey was directed to individuals of the financial community
representing institutions whose financial decisions may be of great
magnitude.

This writer believes that the opinions of the financial

analysts and executives with major financial institutions give a
valid indication of the public's confidence in CPA audit reports.
The survey sample was selected on this basis.
The types of films selected were:

banks, brokerage firms,

mutual funds, closed-end investment companies, life insurance com
panies, and property-liability insurance companies.

The number of

firms selected from each group was based on the firms' size.

The

criterion for size differed among the various types of firms.
Bank size is normally measured by total deposits.

Therefore,

the bank sample for the survey consisted of those banks with total
deposits of $500 million or more.

Moody's Bank and Finance Manual,

April 1969» was the source for determining those banks meeting this
standard.

At the time of seleotion, there were 109 banks in the

United States falling into this category.
Within banks there are basically two groups who might be
concerned with audited financial statements-trust officers and
commercial loan officers.

In order to obtain opinions from both

types, questionnaires were divided between the two groups.

Fifty-five

questionnaires were directed to trust officers, 54 to commercial
loan officers.

Beginning with the largest bank, a questionnaire was
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mailed to the trust officer of every other hank.

Beginning with the

second largest hank,, a questionnaire was sent to the commercial loan
officer of every other hank.

This method assured an even distribution

according to hank size of questionnaires addressed to trust officers
and loan officers.

Since some questionnaires were returned anony

mously, and since we cannot he certain in most cases as to who actually
completed the questionnaires, the results are not stratified between
these two groups.
Selecting the brokerage firm sample was slightly more diffi
cult.

Total capital is a frequent measuring device for the size of

brokerage firms.

Unfortunately, no data could he found listing

the total capital of brokerage firms.

The overall objective was to

select a number of firms large enough that they would have indivi
duals whose jobs were to analyze financial statements in order to
render investment advice.
research departments.

Firms of this size normally have separate

Consequently, the sample consisted of any

New York Stock Exchange member with 20 or more offices.

It was felt

that this criterion would provide a list of the types of firms de.sired.

Using the Commerce Clearing House New York Stock Exchange

Guide, October, 19^9« 38 firms were selected.

Questionnaires were

addressed to the "Directors of Research" of these firms.
Mutual funds are normally measured by total net assets.
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual again served as the source for selec
tion.

Any mutual fund with total net assets of $300 million or more

was included in the sample.

In some cases, several mutual fluids

belong to one investment group, but are listed separately by Moody's.
When this fact was known, the funds were combined; and one
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questionnaire was sent to the group representing all the funds within
the group.

Questionnaires were sent to the attention of "Investment

Officer."
Moody's lists 4 closed-end investment companies with net
assets of $300 million or more.

A questionnaire was sent to the

investment officer of each of these 4 firms.
Life insurance companies are ranked according to total ad
mitted assets.

Moody's Bank and Finance Manual was the source for

this data also.

The sample consisted of those companies having

total admitted assets of $1 billion or more.

There were 28 companies

meeting this criterion; and investment officers of these firms re
ceived questionnaires.
Total admitted assets was also the baBis for selecting the
property-liability insurance companies which were included in the
survey.

With $1 billion as the criterion, 8 firms were selected

from this group.
Altogether, 220 firms were selected to receive questionnaires.
One point must be remembered.
duals representing these firms.

The questionnaires were sent to indivi
The replies therefore were individual

replies and did not necessarily reflect the opinions of the firms.
explained in Chapter II, 3 firms sent 2 replies each.

As

They were

included in the total response because they were individual replies.
These 3 additional replies increased the total sample to 223.
This was not a random sample.
institutions.

The sample was limited to larger

Therefore, the results are not necessarily represent

ative of all finanoial statement users.

The term "sample" as used in

this study refers to the individuals to whom questionnaires were sent.
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This author believes that a good response from this type of group
gives information on which valid conclusions can be drawn regarding
MAS and independence in appearance.
Another major problem, in addition to sample selection, was
the questionnaire construction.

The considerations of this problem

are discussed next.

Questionnaire Construction

Questionnaire Objective

The primary objective of the questionnaire used in this survey
was to determine the opinions of financial statement users regarding
the independence of CPAs who perform MAS for their audit clients.

To

achieve this overall objective, the questionnaire was directed toward
learning whether these third parties think that audit independence is
lessened by CPA participation in MAS.

Regarding those financial

statement users who do feel that there is a lessening of independence,
another objective was to determine the degree of their concern.
There was another point to be considered.

Schulte received

some criticism because his questions revolved around the teim "man
agement consulting," with no relation to specific categories of
service.

In constructing this questionnaire, this writer believed

that possibly some third parties might object to CPAs performing
some services for audit clients, but not necessarily all services.
Therefore, the questionnaire listed 33 specific types of services
in which it was known that some CPAs participate.

This allowed the

respondent to check only those which he believed might cause a loss
of independence.
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A secondary objective of the questionnaire was to determine
how knowledgeable financial statement users are regarding the specific
MAS which CPA firms currently render.

Chapter II included an analysis

of the results of this objective.

Construction of Specific Questions
As with any questionnaire, designing the questions was a
difficult task.

The questions needed to be clear and unambiguous.

They needed to be designed so that the specific information desired
could be obtained.

One problem peculiar to questionnaires on MAS

and independence is trying to assure that the replies are based on
independence only.

Possibly respondents might answer these type

questions based on their opinions of CPA competence to render MAS.
Hopefully, the questions were worded in such a manner that the re
spondents answered them based on their opinions of independence.
The cover letter accompanying the questionnaire also stressed the
independence factor.

The-complete questionnaire with the accompanying

cover letter and follow-up letters is included in Appendix B.
The first question asked for the type of firm which the re
spondent represented.
section was listed.

Each of the 6 groups mentioned in the previous
The purpose of this question was to allow for

group identification of the questionnaire in the event that it was
returned anonymously.

This was necessary in order to stratify

replies according to the type of respondent.
The second question asked, "Approximately how often do you
analyze (or review) financial statements which have been audited by
CPAs and on which a report has been rendered?"

The questionnaire
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provided 5 possible responses— constantly, frequently, occasionally,
seldom, and never.
The question's purpose was to insure that the questionnaires
were completed by the types of individuals for whom they were in
tended.

Whether or not the respondent was specifically designated as

a trust officer, loan officer, or investment officer was immaterial.
The survey was directed to financial statement users.

The results

of this question would indicate whether the respondents meet this cri
terion.

Obviously, a majority of "seldom" or "never" responses

would have made the survey invalid for its intended purpose.
The reader might have some misgivings as to what is meant
by each of the possible responses except "never."

Admittedly, there

is some ambiguity as to the difference between "constantly" and
"frequently," "frequently" and "occasionally," and "occasionally"
and "seldom."

Quantifying the frequency of financial statement

analysis is veiy difficult.

It does not lend itself to the normal

measuring yardstick, such as, "so many times a week," or "so many
statements a day."

The author considered several other possible

responses for this question.

But they all were more ambiguous than

the terms used, and were consequently inferior to the choices decided
upon.

The terms used appeared to present fewer problems than any

others considered.
The third question with its possible responses read as follows:
Many CPA firms provide management advisox-y services to their
clients. Were you aware of this fact before receiving this
questionnaire?
a.
b.
c.

I was well awai’e.
I had heard that they do.
I was completely unaware.
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This question was ' ■'tended primarily for general information
about the overall awareness of financial statement users regarding
CPAs and MAS.

If a large percentage of individuals were well aware,

thiB might indicate, although not necessarily, a better understanding
of the CPA’s role in rendering MAS.

Certainly if a large number of

respondents were completely unaware, we might conclude that they have
very little knowledge concerning the CPA's role in such services.
The fourth question provided a list of 33 specific services
and asked the respondents to check those which they knew or thought
that CPAs performed.

Chapter II elaborated on this question and its

results quite extensively.

No further mention is needed here.

The fifth question led into the independence issue.

It asked:

Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to clients
whose financial statements they also audit. Do you think that
providing any of the following services to audit clients may
possibly result in a CPA's losing some of his audit independence?

The respondents were given 3 possible choices.

First, they

could indicate that they did not think that providing audit clients
with any of the listed services might result in a loss of audit
independence.

Any respondent checking this reply would be expressing

confidence in the CPA's integrity to perform MAS and auditing services
for the same client.

If a very high percentage of respondents checked

this reply, this would be evidence that independence in appearance is
not a problem.
The second possible answer allowed respondents to check those
specific MAS which they though might result in some loss of audit
independence.
repeated here.

The same list of 33 items presented in question 4 was
They could check as many items as they felt were

120
applicable, leaving blank those not considered as a possible factor
in the loss of independence.
The third possible reply allowed respondents to indicate that
they had no opinion aB to whether providing any of the services to
audit clients might result in some loss of audit independence.
The implications of this question are clear.

Answers to this

question can provide concrete evidence that concern over the possible
loss of audit independence does exist.

The question pinpoints this

concern by indicating the specific types of services about which the
respondents are worried.
Using the term may possibly in the question may provoke some
criticism.

Some might argue that practically any type service may

possibly result in lost independence, but that does not mean that the
service actually would result in lost independence.

Hoenemeyer,

executive vice-president at Prudential, was quoted in Chapter IV
as saying could does not mean would.
The author agrees with this contention.

Those individuals

who believe that there is no loss of independence or those who have
no opinion present no cause for concern regarding independence in
appearance.

However, the accounting profession is given some ground

for concern by those respondents who think that one or more services
might cause some loss of independence.

The degree of concern that the

profession should have can be measured by the remaining questions.
Therefore, question 5 shows how many respondents think MAS could
cause a loss of independence.

The other questions show how many

think MAS would cause a loss of independence.
Question number 6 was applicable only to those individuals
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who had ohecked one or more of the listed services in question 5*
The purpose of this question was to measure the concern of those indi
viduals who feel that some services might possibly result in lost
independence.

The question read as follows:

If you were to analyze financial statements which had been
audited by a CPA Who had provided any of the management advisory
services that you checked in the preceding question, how would
this affect your confidence in the CPA's audit report?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Not applicable . . . .
Iwould have considerably more confidence in
Iwould have slightly more confidence in it.
It would not affect my confidence in it.
Iwould have slightly less confidence in it.
Iwould have considerably less confidence in

it.

it.

It was not expected that anyone would check b or c.

If a

person thinks a specific service may possibly result in decreased
audit independence, he would not normally have increased confidence
in the audit report if such a service were performed.
If respondents checked d, they are expressing confidence in
the CPA.

For although they think that certain services may possibly

result in a loss of audit independence, they apparently are not worried
about this possibility.
Responses e and f have negative connotations for the CPA.
Obviously, a high proportion of responses here would be indicative
of an independence in appearance problem.
Question 6 was written in reference to the individual CPA, the
assumption being that there was no division between the audit staff
and the MAS staff.

To measure opinions when there is this separation

of functions was the purpose of question 7»
Only those respondents answering e or f in question 6 were
asked to answer question 7»

The theory here is that if a respondent
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has confidence in the audit report when there is no separation of
functions, he certainly would have confidence when the audit staff and
MAS staff are not the same.

The question specifically asked:

If the management services that you checked in question #5
had "been performed "by the same CPA firm that had performed the
audit, but by individuals other than those performing the audit,
how would this affect your confidence in the CPA's audit report?
As in question 6, the respondents could express varying degrees of
confidence from considerably more to considerably less.
The aim was for this question to be considered without
regard to the assumption in question 6.

In other words, respondents

were to express their opinion on MAS being performed when there were
two separate staffs.

Again, it was not expected that anyone would have

more confidence in the report, because they had already indicated
that they believed these services could lead to a loss of independence.
Rationally then, rendering such services would have either no effect
or a lessening effect on their confidence in the audit report.

Un

fortunately, this question was apparently misunderstood by some
respondents.

Some replies were not logical based on the conditions

set forth above.

This point is discussed below in the section which

analyzes the responses.
This writer considers question number 8 as the most important
in measuring the degree to which the accounting profession should be
concerned about independence in appearance.
Do you think that CPA firms should be prohibited from pro
viding their audit clients with those services which you checked
in question #5:
a.

assuming that the management advisory servioes and the
audit are conducted by the same personnel?
Yes

No

No opinion
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b.

assuming that the management advisory services and the
audit are conducted by different personnel?
Yes

c.

No

No opinion

Not applicable since I did not check any of the services
listed in question #5*

The importance of a and b is clear.

This gives a definite

measurement of the independence in appearance issue.

The question

differentiates between firms having a separate MAS staff and those
that do not.

It would appear that respondents could not express

their negative opinions more strongly than saying that certain spe
cific services should be prohibited.

Obviously, a high percentage

of

Yes answers would be detrimental to the profession's current position.
On the other hand, a large number of No replies would be a
strong vote of confidence.in the accounting profession.

It would

mean that although certain services could possibly lead to a loss
of audit independence, most respondents do not think that it is a
strong enough possibility to warrant prohibition of such services.
Question 9 asked respondents to add any other comments that
they felt were pertinent to the survey.
cannot normally be categorized.

Comments of this nature

Nevertheless, some comments provide

very interesting insights into a number of respondents feelings
on the subject of CPA independence and MAS.

Many of these opinions

are not and cannot be brought out in objective-type questions.

Thus,

this open-end question served a very useful purpose.
The final question, number 10, was for identification purposes
only.

It asked the respondent to indicate his firm's name.

The

primary purpose for asking this was to reduce the number of follow-up
questionnaires that needed to be sent to those not responding to the
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original request.
this respect.
name.

Generally, respondents were very cooperative in

Only 20 of 160 replies, 1 8 did not indicate the firm's

This did not hamper reply analysis in any way because all re

spondents did answer question 1, stating the type of firm which they
represented.

Methodology of Requesting Replies

The overall response rate of 71 •7i° is separated by types of
firms in Table 2-4, page 37*

Brief mention is made here of the

manner in which the replies were requested.
A questionnaire with a cover letter explaining the impor
tance of the survey and asking for cooperation was mailed to each
of the 220 firms selected as the sample.

Each letter included a

self-addressed, stamped envelope for returning the completed ques
tionnaire.
A pretest sample of 25 questionnaires was mailed in October,
1969*

The purpose of the pretest was to determine whether respond

ents appeared to have difficulty in answering or interpreting any of
the questions.

Had any problems of questionnaire construction been

apparent, corrections would have been made before mailing question
naires to the remaining 195 members of the sample.

Based on the

pretest, no problems seemed evident; and no changes were made.
remaining questionnaires were sent in November.

The

As mentioned earlier,

a copy of the questionnaire and its associated letters are shown in
Appendix B.
A second questionnaire with another letter asking for
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cooperation was mailed 12 days later to nonrespondents of the first
appeal.

Another stamped, self-addressed envelope was included.

At

this point the response rate waB 31*8$.
Approximately one month after the second questionnaire had
been sent, a third and final request was made.

Nonrespondents to

*

the previous requests received another questionnaire with a stamped,
self-addressed envelope.

As before, the questionnaire was accom

panied by a letter stressing the importance of the research project
and asking for help in conducting the study.

At the time this last

follow-up was mailed, the overall response rate was 58.7%•
Most of the additional replies following the final request
were received in January, 1970, with a few arriving in February.
total response was 160 replies out of 223, or 71»7$»

The

As noted earlier,

the extra 3 replies (223 rather than 220), resulted from 3 firms
returning 2 replies each.

Apparently, one individual completed the

original questionnaire, and someone else answered the follow-up
questionnaire.

Since the survey was intended to obtain the opinions

of individuals and not firms, these additional replies were valid re
sponses.

They therefore were added to the original sample of 220.
Having discussed the manner in which the sample was selected,

the questions were constructed and the questionnaires were sent, we
turn now to an analysis of replies to the specific questions.

Analysis of Replies

The first question was one merely of respondent classifi
cation.

The total number of responses stratified by type of firm is
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illustrated in Table 2-4, page 37*

Replies to some questions of the

survey are also stratified according to the type of firm represented
by the respondent.

Question Number 2
Replies to question number 2 give an indication of whether the
questionnaires were answered by financial statement users.

These

results are illustrated in Table 5-1•

TABLE 5-1
FREQUENCY WITH WHICH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ARE ANALYZED OR REVIEWED

Percent of Replies
Banks
( 9 0 replies)

Brokerage
Firms
(23)

Mutual
Funds
(19)

Life Ins.
Co.
(23)

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)

Tota!
(160,

Constantly

62

78

79

65

80

67

Frequently

24

18

5

31

20

21

Occasionally

12

4

16

4

0

10

Seldom

1

0

•0

0

0

1

Never

1

0

0

0

0

1

100

100

100

100

100

100

This table shows that QQ% of all respondents use audited
financial statements in their work constantly or frequently.
2f> of the total fall into the seldom or never categories.

Only

The

percentages are fairly consistent among all groups of respondents.
Brokerage firms and life insurance companies apparently use state
ments more than any other types of firms.

The percent of respondents

in brokerage firms and life insurance companies using financial
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statements constantly or frequently is 9&%»

Because there were only

5 respondents, percentages for the property-liability group may be
misleading if compared with percentages for other groupB.

In this

table the percentages are fairly consistent with the other groups.
But in some of the tables there are radical differences.

Even in

Table 5-1 property-liability insurance companies show 100% for con
stantly and frequently, which is slightly above the 9&% for brokerage
firms and life insurance companies.

But with only 5 respondents it

is not as meaningful as the 96% for these other two groups.
We can conclude from the results of question 2 that the
survey was completed by persons for whom it was intended.

This means

that the objective of obtaining opinions from knowledgeable outside
observers who use financial statements has been accomplished.
Accordingly, this gives significance to the questions regarding
independence.-

It will allow us to draw valid conclusions on third

party opinions regarding CPA audit independence and MAS.

Question Number 3
The replies to question number 3 further the belief that
the questionnaires were answered by knowledgeable third parties.
Table 5-2 shows that 86% of all respondents are well aware that
CPAs provide MAS to their clients; 14% are somewhat aware; and no
one is completely unaware.
Some possibility exists that there may have been a psycho
logical reluctance for a respondent to say that he was completely
unaware, even if he was.

If a respondent thought that this was a

subject about which he probably should be aware, he may have been
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unwilling to admit that he was unaware.

Given that this possibility

existed, it would appear to have had diminutive effects on the overall
response.

Conceivably, if an individual did not check that he was

completely unaware when he was, he probably selected the second
Thus the conclusion that 8656 are well aware remains valid.

choice.

TABLE 5-2
FINANCIAL COMMUNITY'S AWARENESS THAT CPAS PROVIDE MAS

Percent of Replies
Banks

Brokerage
Firms
(9 0 replies)
(23)

Mutual
Funds
(19)

Life Ins.
Co.
(23)

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)

Total
(1 6 0 )

Well aware

89

87

84

83

60

86

Somewhat aware

11

3

16

17

40

14

0

0

0

0

0

0

100

100

Completely
unaware

100

100

100

100

The results show a remarkable consistency among the groups.
All groups, except property-liability, were in the 80$ range for
well aware.
Question 4 results were previously discussed in Chapter II.
This analysis can be found there.

Question Number 5
Question number 5 is the first question related to inde
pendence.

This is the question in which the respondents were asked

to indicate those specific types of MAS which they thought might
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possibly result in a CPA's losing some of his audit independence.
In analyzing replies to this question, the author noted
that 4 were inconsistent.

The respondents first checked that they

do not think that providing any of the services may result in a loss
of independence.
services.

But then they also checked some of the specific

The latter action would indicate that they think those

specific services may cause some loss of independence.

Consequently,

determining the opinions of these 4 respondents on this question
was not possible.
One other respondent commented that he thought some services
could cause a loss of independence; but he did not mark the specific
services.

His reply was considered valid for purposes of this ques

tion.
Because of the 4 inconsistent answers, the total number of
replies used in this question was 156 rather than 160.

Results

shown in Table 5-3 are on this basis.

TABLE 5-3
RESPONDENTS' INDICATION THAT SOME MAS MAY RESULT
IN SOME LOSS OP AUDIT INDEPENDENCE

Percent of Replies
Banks

Brokerage
Firms
(87 replies)
(23)

Mutual
Funds
(18)

Life Ins.
Co.
(23)

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)

Total
(156)

None of the
Services

46

43

56

26

0

42

One or more
Services

48

48

33

65

60

49

6
— —
100

9
...
100

11

9
■■■— ■
100

40
■■■■■—
100

9
--100

No opinion

—

—

100
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The survey indicated that 49$ of the respondents think that
a CPA's providing one or more of the listed services to his audit
clients may result in some loss of audit independence.

Forty-two

percent do not think that any of the listed services may cause a
loss of independence, and 9$ have no opinion.

For purposes in ana

lyzing the independence ru appearance issue, the no opinion answers
can be combined with the none of the services replies.
Combining these replies gives us 51$ who have no concern
about a lessening of independence, and 49$ who think that the pos
sibility exists.

Taken alone with no further analysis, these results

would indicate a very serious problem for the accounting profession.
They would imply that almost one-half of the most informed and most
interested financial statement users question the independence of
CPAs who provide certain MAS to audit clients.
Analyzing the results further, however, will indicate the
degree to which these respondents consider the"possibility as a factual
reality at the present time.

The other point of view is that over 50$

of the respondents do not even see a possibility that independence
may be impaired by CPAs rendering any of these services for audit
clients.

Thus the results of the remaining questions are very impor

tant in trying to determine whether or not a problem of independence
in appearance does exist.
Analyzing the replies to this question according to the type
of firm provides an interesting sidelight.

The percentage of banks

and brokerage firms indicating the possibility that some services
might affeot independence is exactly the same, 48$*
with the percentage of all respondents, 49$*

This corresponds

But mutual funds and
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life insurance companies are at opposite ends of the spectrum, 33$
and 65$» respectively.

Coincidentally, each differs from the total

by exactly 16$ in opposite directions.

The author has no explan

ation for this divergence between the two groups.
Although 49$ checked one or more of the services, this per
centage is not applicable to each specific service.

Table 5-4 shows

an alphabetical breakdown of the specific services which respondents
think may result in some loss of audit independence.

The table shows

the total number and the percentage of respondents checking each item.
The total used as a base is 155» rather than 1 5 6 .

As mentioned above,

one respondent, although feeling some services could cause a loss of
independence, did not specify those services.

Table 5-5 ranks the

services according to the frequency with which they were checked.
Table 5-6 categorizes the percentages according to the type of
respondent.
The analysis from these tables is significant.
was checked by all respondents.

No one item

The service indicated by the greatest

number of respondents as possibly leading to a loss of independence
was checked by 32$.

The bottom of the range was 7$«

Therefore, the

49$ in Table 5-3 should be interpreted in light of the specific
services.
It is interesting to note the ranking of these services in
Table 5-5 .
the top.

We see that mergers and business acquisitions ranks at

One possible explanation fox' this is the unfavoi'able recent

publicity regarding "pooling" and business acquisitions.
journals and newspapers have discussed this topic widely.

Financial
CPAs have

received some criticism for some of the presently accepted practices
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in accounting for business acquisitions.

Although no question re

garding CPA audit independence has arisen, many financial executives
are disturbed about the whole subject of mergers.

Conceivably, they

may have reflected this attitude in their responses.
Other unfavorable services according to the respondents are
those in which the CPA apparently works closely with top management—
policy determination, 27$; executive recruitment, 27$; personnel
appraisal and/or selection, 23$; executive and wage incentive plans,
21$; and management audits, 19$*
The results also refute claims made by some writers that
accounting-oriented services cause no concern to third parties.
Assistance on specific accounting problems, capital budgeting,
and financial budgeting all ranked fairly high.

Yet packaging de

velopment, material handling, factory automation, distribution
channels, and several other nonaccounting services are ranked toward
the bottom of the list.

This is completely contrary to what some

writers have advanced.
This writer is unable to explain this apparent paradox.
Possibly, the respondents feel that providing MAS which are unrelated
to accounting is also providing MAS which are unrelated to auditing.
Hence, they see no conflict between the audit and the services.

The

possibility also exists that some respondents were unfamiliar with
the nature of certain services and preferred to leave them blank,
rather than indicate a possible loss of independence from a service
about which they have no knowledge.

Yet we would ordinarily think

that people would be against CPAs performing some unknown service
which obviously is unrelated to accounting.

133
TABLE 5-4
TYPES OF MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
THINK MAY RESULT IN SOME LOSS OF AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
LISTED ALPHABETICALLY

Replies

Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Capital budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Development of work measurement
standards
Distribution channels
Executive and wage incentive plans
Executive recruitment
Factory automation
Financial budgeting
Forms design
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems
Insurance analysis
Inventory control
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Management audits
Material handling
Mergers and business acquisitions
Operations budgeting
Packaging development
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Plant layout
Plant location
Policy determination
Product engineering
Product pricing
Quality control
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
Warehousing

26
26
17

17
17
11

15
13
32
42
13
27
11

10
8
21
27
8
17
7

19

12

21
16
18
23
24
14
30
12
50
18
12
36
16
17
42
16
16
16
21
22
20
16

14
10
12
15
16
9
19
8
32
12
8
23
10
11
27
10
10
10
14
14
13
10
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TABLE 5-5
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
THINK MAY RESULT IN SOME LOSS OP AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
LISTED ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY

Replies
Type of Service
Mergers and business acquisitions
Executive recruitment
Policy determination
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Executive and wage incentive plans
Management audits
Financial budgeting
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Capital budgeting
Labor negotiations
Inventory valuations
Salesmen compensation plans
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems
Sales forecasting
Wage incentives
Installation of cost accounting systems
Inventory control
Operations budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Plant location
Insurance analysis
Plant layout
Product engineering
Product pricing
Quality control
Warehousing
Development of work measurement
standards
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Distribution channels
Factory automation
Material handling
Packaging development
Forms design

Number

Percent of 155

50
42
42
36
32
30
27

32
27
27
23
21
19
17

26
26
24
23
22

17
17
16
15
14

21
21
20
19
18
18
17
17
16
16
16
16
16
16

14
14
13
12
12
12
11
11
10
10
10
10
10
10

15
14
13
13
12
12
11

10
9
8
8
8
8
7

TABLE 5-6
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS THINK M Y RESULT IN SOME LOSS OF AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
RESPONSES CLASSFIED BY TYPES OF FIRMS

Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Banks
Type of Service
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Capital budgeting
Computer systems and applications
Development of work measurement
standards
Distribution channels
Executive and wage incentive plans
Executive recruitment
Factory automation
Financial budgeting
Forms design
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Installation, review, and improve
ment of overall accounting
systems
Insurance analysis
Inventory control
Inventory valuations

Brokerage
Firms

Mutual

Funds

Life Ins.
Co.

P-L Ins.
Co.

Total

(5)

(155)

(23)

(18 )

(23)

17
17
22

17

26

40

6
6

13
9

20
20

22
17

11

20
29
9
15
6

26

17
17

20
20
20
40

21
27

13
22
17

17

6

0
0
22
22
0
22
0

20
20
20

17
7

11

17

11

13

20

12

9
12
12
14

22
13
17
17

11
6

22
4
9
13

20
20
20

14

40

15

(86)a

13

20
9
8

8

30

6
6

6
11

^ h e number in parentheses indicates the total number of respondents for each type of firm.

17
17
11

10

8
8

10
12

TABLE 5-6 (continued)

Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Banks
Type of Service
Labor negotiations
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Management audits
Material handling
Mergers and business acquisitions
Operations budgeting
Packaging development
Personnel appraisal and/or selection
Plant layout
Plant location
Policy determination
Product engineering
Product pricing
Quality control
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
Warehousing

(8 6 ) ,
17
9
20
7
28
12
8
26
12
12
30
12
11
12
15
15
13
8

Brokerage
Firms
(23)
22
13
26
13
35
17
13
30
17
17
22
17
17
13
22
22
17
17

Mutual
Funds
(1 8 )

Life Ins.
Co.
(23)

6
6
6
6
22
6
6
11
6
6
11
6
6
6
6
6
11
11

9
4
22
4
48
9
0
17
0
4
35
0
4
4
4
9
9
9

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)
20
20
20
20
60
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Total
(155)
16
9
19
8
32
12
8
23
10
. 11
27
10
10
10
14
14
13
10
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The ranking also indicates that the replies apparently were
not answered on the basis of CPA competence.

Those services in which

the smallest number of respondents seem to fear a possible loss of
independence are the ones which the CPA as theoretically least com
petent to perform.

This seems somewhat paradoxical also.

We would

expect incompetence to result in bad performance, which might cause
some compromise to be made in the audit.

But apparently respondents

to this survey were not worried about this possibility.

The remaining

questions will enlighten us as to how worried third parties are about
those services which they did check.

Question Number 6
The seriousness of the potential independence in appearance
problem can be measured to some extent by question number 6 .

In

this question respondents were asked to indicate how their confidence
in the CPA's audit report would be affected if the CPA had provided
any of the services checked in the previous question.

The assumption

in this question was that there was no staff division for audits and
MAS.

The question was applicable only to those who expressed the

opinion that one or more services may possibly cause a loss of inde
pendence.
question 5»

There were 77 respondents who had expressed this opinion in
Table 5-7 shows how these respondents replied to ques

tion 6 .
Table 5-7 shows that 25$ would have considerably less con
fidence and 55$ slightly less confidence.

Combining these, we find

that 80$ of the 77 respondents who think that there may be a possible
loss of independence when one or more types of MAS are performed, also
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would lose some confidence in the CPA's audit report if these services
were performed.

The reader should remember that this is with the

same CPA providing both auditing and MAS.

On its face, this would

appear to be very detrimental to the profession.

TABLE 5-7
EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN AUDIT REPORT WHEN THE SAME CPA
PROVIDES MAS AND PERFORMS AUDIT
BASED ON 77 RESPONDENTS

Percent of Replies
Banks
(4 2 replies)

Brokerage
Firms
(1 1 )

Mutual
Funds
(6 )

Life Ins.
Co.
(1 5 )

P-L Ins.
Co.
(3 )

Total
(7 7 )

Considerably
more

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slightly
more

2

0

0

0

0

1

No effect

21

9

50

7

34

19

Slightly
less

57

73

50

40

33

55

Considerably
less

20

18

0

53

33

25

100

100

100

100

100

100

The percentage breakdown by firm may be slightly misleading
because the totals are small.

But it is interesting to note again the

different opinions between mutual funds and life insurance companies.
The mutual funds show an even split between no effect and slightly
less.

The life insurance companies show only 1% as no effect with

53$ stating considerably less.
Although Table 5-7 indicates a definitely negative attitude

toward. MAS by third, parties, Table 5-8 probably gives a better perspec
tive.

The table shows the effect on confidence in relation to the

total number of respondents.

Since 79 respondents did not check any

specific services in Question 5» the assumption is that there would be
no lessening of their confidence in the audit report if any of the
services wei’e performed.

Looked at from this point of view, only 39$

of all 156 respondents would have less confidence in the audit report.
This is still a fairly high percentage.

But it is still based on no

separation of the audit and MAS functions.
to each type of service.

Also it is not applicable

Later questions examine this data from these

latter two points of view.

TABLE 5-8
EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN AUDIT REPORT WHEN THE SAME CPA
PROVIDES MAS AND PERFORMS AUDIT
BASED ON 156 RESPONDENTS

Percent of Replies
Banks
(8 7 replies)
No services
checked

Brokerage
Firms
(23)

Mutual
Funds
(18)

Life Ins.
Co.
(23)

P-L Ins.
Co.
(5)

Total
(156;

52

52

66

35

40

51

Considerably
more

0

0

0

0

0

0

Slightly
more

1

0

0

0

0

1

No effect

10

4

17

4

20

9

Slightly
less

28

35

17

26

20

27

9

9

0

35

20

12

Considerably
less

Tables 5-7 and 5 - 8 show 1$ as having slightly more confidence
even though some services were checked in question 5*
resents one individual.

The

rep

It does not seem logical that he would have

more confidence when he had indicated that he thinks some services
might cause a loss of independence.
this reply.

The author is unable to explain

Possibly he checked slightly more by mistake.

Question Number 7

Like question 6 , question 7 was applicable only to those
respondents who had checked one or more items in question 5»

Further

more, it was applicable only to those who had said that they would
have slightly less or considerably less confidence in audit reports
prepared by CPAs who had also rendered certain MAS.

There were 61

respondents to whom question 7 was applicable; there were 60 replies.
Question 7 was intended to be answered without regard to the
assumption in question 6 .

Respondents were to assume that MAS had

been performed by the same firm that had performed the audit but by
different individuals.

They were to express the effect that rendering

these services would have on their confidence in the audit report.
Since the respondents had already indioated that they thought these
services could lead to a loss of independence, it was not expected
that rendering such services would increase their confidence in the
audit report.
Unfortunately, some respondents apparently misinterpreted
this question.

Table 5-9 reflects the replies to this question.

It shows that 2$ would have considerably more confidence, and 13$
slightly more confidence.

Apparently Borne respondents answered this
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question in relation to question 6.

They probably meant that they

would have more confidence if the MAS were performed by different
personnel than if they were performed by the same individuals.
this was not what was asked.

But

Because of this apparent misinterpre

tation, the results are not completely meaningful.

TABLE 5-9
EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN AUDIT REPORT WHEN MAS AND AUDIT FUNCTIONS
ARE CONDUCTED BY DIFFERENT PERSONNEL

Percent of Replies
Banks
(31 replies)
Considerably
more

Brokerage
Firms
(1 0 )

Mutual
Funds
(3)

Life Ins.
Co.
(14)

P-L Ins.
Co.
(2 )

Total
(6 0 )

0

0

33

0

0

2

Slightly
more

16

0

0

21

0

13

No effect

13

40

67

21

0

22

Slightly
less

55

50

0

21

50

43

16

10
— —
100

0
— —
100

37
— —
100

50
— —
100

20
—
100

Considerably
less

---

100

One point is relevant, however.

At least 63$ of those who

expressed less confidence in question 6, still would have less con
fidence even if there were a separation of functions.

The percentage

is significant under both interpretations of the question.

If the

question had been answered correctly by all those replying, undoubt
edly the percentage would have been higher.

Those who answered more

confidence would have answered no effect or less confidence.
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Since the results are not completely valid, a table was not
prepared showing replies according to type of respondent for the entire
sample.

However, viewed as a percent of the entire response, there

are at least 38 respondents, 24$ of 1 5 6 , who would have less confi
dence in the audit report if certain MAS were performed for the audit
client even with a separation of functions.

As above, this percentage

most likely would have been higher if the question had not been mis
interpreted.
Although it is unfortunate that the analysis of question 7 is
not as complete as it may have otherwise been, this is not critical to
the analysis of the overall results.

Probably question 8 provides the

best analysis of the extent to which independence in appearance is a
problem.

Question Number 8

In this question all respondents who had indicated that per
forming certain services might result in a loss of independence were
asked whether they thought CPAs should be prohibited from providing
such services to their audit clients.

This question certainly measures

their degree of concern regarding independence.
The question was divided in two parts.

Respondents were first

asked their opinion based on the assumption that MAS and the audit were
conducted by the same personnel.

Next they were asked to answer assum

ing that each function was conducted by different personnel.
The question was applicable to the 77 respondents who had
checked one or more services in question 5*
to the first part, as shown in Table 5-*10»

There were 72 replies
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TABLE 5-10
OPINIONS REGARDING PROHIBITION OP SOME MAS FOR AUDIT CLIENTS
WHEN THERE IS NO SEPARATION OP PERSONNEL PERFORMING FUNCTIONS

Percent of Replies
Brokerage
Firms

Banks

Mutual
Funds

Life Ins.
Co.

P-L Ins.
Co.

(15)

(2)

Totaj

(4 0 replies)

(1 0 )

Prohibit

73

80

80

80

50

75

Do not pro
hibit

17

20

20

13

50

18

10
— —
100

0
--100

0
——
100

7
—
100

No opinion

(5)

(72;

0

7
—

-----

100

—

100

A very large majority, 7 5 definitely favor prohibiting some
types of MAS.

However, this question must also be considered in regard

to the total number of respondents.

In this case, those who checked no

specific services in question 5 are assumed not to favor prohibiting
any services.

This is shown below.

Number

Percent

Prohibit

54

38

Do not prohibit

88

62

142

100

The total number of 142 was used as a base rather than 160
for several reasons.

As mentioned previously, for question 5 (and

hence for question 8) 4 replies were inconsistent and not used.
respondents did not answer question 8a.

Five

In addition, 9 respondents

who did not check any specific services in question 5» did answer
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Yes that certain services should "be prohibited.

Actually, they

should have answered the question not applicable.

Apparently, they

believe that MAS should be prohibited even though they personally
are not concerned about independence.
know what they were doing.

These respondents appeared to

Several of them noted that they knew the

question was not applicable to them; but they said they wanted to an
swer it anyway.

These 5 were not included in the overall total

above because it would be misleading to show them as not in favor of
prohibiting any services, even though they checked no services in
question 5»

Actually, they should be shown as favoring prohibition.

If we do this, the results are:

Number

Percent

Prohibit

63

42

Do not prohibit

88

58

151

100

Whichever total is used, 142 or 151, we can conclude that a
substantial minority of respondents favor prohibiting some MAS when
there is no separation of the audit and MAS functions.
An analysis of the percentage favoring prohibiting each
specific service is provided in Table 5“11•
in order of percentages.

The services are ranked

There are two columns, one based on a total

of 53 replies and one based on a total of 141 replies.

The 53 came

from subtracting 1 from the 54 in Table 5“10f shown as favoring
prohibition.

(75% of 72 = 54*)

This was the one respondent who

thought that some MAS could lead to a loss of independence and who
favored prohibition, but who did not indicate the specific services.
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TABLE 5-11
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
THINK SHOULD BE PROHIBITED ASSUMING
SAME AUDIT AND MAS PERSONNEL

Replies
Type of Service

Mergers and business acquisitions
Executive recruitment
Policy determination
Management audits
Personnel appraisal and/orselection
Executive and wage incentive plans
Financial budgeting
Capital budgeting
Labor negotiations
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Inventory valuations
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Installation, review, and improve
ment of overall accounting
systems
Wage incentives
inventory control
Operations budgeting
Plant location
Computer systems and applications
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Maintenance planning andscheduling
Plant layout
Product pricing
Warehousing
Development of work measurement
standards
Insurance analysis
Product engineering
Quality control
Factory automation
Distribution channels
Forms design
Material handling
Packaging development

Percent of 53

Percent of 141

66
55
53
47
45
40
38
36
32

25
21
20
18
17
15
14
13
12

30
30
28
26

11
11
11
10

25
23
21
21
19
17

9
9
8
8
7
6

17
17
17
17
17

6
6
6
8
8

15
15
15
15
13
11
11
11
11

6
6
6
6
5
4
4
4
4

The 141 was determined by subtracting this same 1 from the 142 used
on the previous page.
Based on Table 5-11» it appears that a substantial minority of
all respondents favor prohibiting CPAs from providing some services
when the same personnel conduct both the audit and the MAS.
be different opinions as to how to define "substantial."

There may

This writer

feels that 20$ is substantial; and less than 15$ is not substantial.
Between 15$ and 20$ is a gray area, particularly when there are
differences of only 1$.

One point is evident.

A very large majority

of respondents do not favor prohibition of most services even when
there is no separation of functions.
The second part of the question, 8b, asked for opinions on
prohibiting services when there is a separation of functions.

Since

all large CPA firms have separate MAS departments, this question is
particularly relevant to them.
As before, the question was applicable to 77 respondents who
had checked specific services in question 5»

There were 73 replies.

Table 5-12 shows that 51$ of 73 favor prohibition under these circum
stances.

There are 40$ who do not think that any services should be

prohibited; and 9$ have no opinion.
The number favoring prohibition should also be considered as
a percent of the total number of respondents.

Looking at it from

this point of view, we obtain the following results.
Number
Prohibit
Do not prohibit

Percent

37

24

112

76
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TABLE 5-12
OPINIONS REGARDING PROHIBITION OP SOME MAS FOR AUDIT CLIENTS
WHEN THERE IS A SEPARATION OP PERSONNEL PERFORMING FUNCTIONS

Percent of Replies
Banks

Brokerage
Firms

Mutual
Funds

Life Ins.
Co.

P-L Ins.
Co.

(5)

(15)

(2 )

Tota!

(41 replies)

(1 0 )

Prohibit

46

60

0

73

50

51

Do not pro
hibit

44

40

80

20

0

40

10

0
—
100

20
■—
100

No opinion

------

100

50

7
—

(73;

—

... ..

100

100

9
—

100

The 149 was determined hy starting with 160, subtracting the
4 inconsistent replies, subtracting 4 respondents who did not answer
question 8b, and subtracting 3 respondents who did not check any serv
ices in question 5> "but who said Yes in this question.

These 3 are

similar to the 9 discussed in question 8 a.

Based on their answer to

question 5» question 8 was not applicable.

If we included them in the

total as favoring prohibition, the results would be as follows:

Number
Prohibit
Do not prohibit

Percent

40

26

112

74

152

100

Whether or not we include these 3 does not really make too
much difference.

In either oase there appears to be a substantial

minority favoring prohibition of some services.

148
Table 5-13 provides a breakdown of percentages by types of
services.

The order of ranking is quite similar to Table 5-11» but

the percentages are less.
of 37 and 149*
Table 5-12.

The percentages are based on the totals

The 37 is the total favoring prohibition based on

(51$ of 73 = 37»)

The 149 is the same total explained

on the preceding page.
This table indicates that very few persons favor prohibiting
any of the services when there is a separation of functions.

The two

highest ranking services are mergers and business acquisitions. 17$»
and executive recruitment, 15$•

Whether these percentages of dis

favor should be considered serious or substantial is subject to debate.
Probably either side could make a good case.

Generally, however,

there appears to be no great support by financial statement users for
prohibiting MAS performed for an audit client when there is a sep
aration of the MAS and audit functions.

Question Number 9
Question 9 asked respondents for any additional comments which
they felt were pertinent to the survey.
commented, which is 39$ of 160.
others were very long.

Forty-four respondents

Some comments were quite short;

Naturally, these comments cannot be mechan

ically catagorized and analyzed on a percentage basis, as with the
objective-type questions.

They do, however, present some veiy in

teresting insights into the opinions which many outside observers
have about CPAs and MAS.
There were 10 respondents that specifically stated that
their confidence in the audit report generally depended on the
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TABLE 5-13
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
THINK SHOULD BE PROHIBITED ASSUMING
DIFFERENT AUDIT AND MAS PERSONNEL

Replies
Type of Service
Mergers and business acquisitions
Executive recruitment
Management audits
Policy determination
Personnel appraisal and/orselection
Capital budgeting
Executive and wage incentive plans
Financial budgeting
Assistance on specific accounting
problems
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
Sales forecasting
Installation, review, and improve
ment of overall accounting
systems
Inventory control
Operations budgeting
Salesmen compensation plans
Computer systems and applications
Installation of cost accounting
systems
Plant location
Product pricing
Wage incentives
Maintenance planning and scheduling
Plant layout
Warehousing
Development of work measurement
standards
Insurance analysis
Quality control
Factory automation
Product engineering
Distribution channels
Forms design
Material handling
Packaging development

Percent of 37

Percent of 149

70
59
49
49
46
41
41
41

17
15
12
12
11
10
10
10

32
32
30
30

8
8
7
7

27
24
24
24
19

7
6
6
6
5

19
19
19
19
16
16
16

5
5
5
5
4
4
4

14
14
14
11
11
8
8
8
8

3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
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individual CPA firm.

They stated that such factors as size, repu

tation, and integrity had a bearing on their confidence.
Several respondents felt that if MAS are performed, some
reference to this fact should be made in the footnotes to the financial
statements.
Appendix C includes some selected comments by respondents.
Some are quite favorable; some are extremely unfavorable.

All are

interesting and informative.

Summary

This section summarizes the results of the questionnaire.
The author's own conclusions as to their significance to the accounting
profession on the overall question of independence in appearance are
presented in Chapter VII.
The overall response rate, 72%, was quite high; and a very
large majority of those responding evidently are frequent users of
audit financial statements.

Thus the survey reached those for whom

it was intended.
The financial community is about evenly divided in their opin
ions as to whether any of the 33 listed MAS might possibly lead to a
loss of audit independence when provided by the CPA auditor.

Fifty-one

percent checked no specific item; 49% checked one or more items.
Eighty percent of those checking specific services would have
less confidence in the audit report should these services be per
formed by the CPA auditor.

But these respondents as a percentage of

all respondents total only 39%«

151
A majority of those checking specific services, 75%i favor
prohibiting such services when there is no separation of functions.
As a percentage of the total, 28% favor prohibition of one or more of
the services under these circumstances.
If the audit and MAS functions are separate, however, only
51% favor prohibiting one or more services.

This is 24% of the total

number of respondents.
Looking at the specific services, we find that those in which
CPAs apparently work closely with top management are the ones of great
est concern.

There appears to be no great concern about CPAs perform-,

ing nonaccounting-type services, as long as they do not seem to be
closely related to top management.
Percentage-wise, the evidence does not show muoh support for
prohibiting MAS when there is a separation of functions.

Prohibiting

CPA participation in mergers and business acquisitions is favored by
17% of all respondents.

This is the largest percentage for any

specific service when the functions are separated.
We have now seen the opinions of a large number of knowledge
able financial statement users.
also exists, the SEC.
on this topic.

One other very interested observer

The next chapter discusses the SEC's position

CHAPTER VI

THE SEC AND MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES

Purpose

Chapter V discussed the opinions of many outside third
parties who are interested in financial statements.

There is

another third party, however, who has a vital interest in finan
cial statements and the work of CPAs, and whose opinion cannot be
ignored.

This party is the SEC.
Regardless of the opinions of the AICPA or of financial

statement users, the SEC's opinion is all important.

By law it

has the authority to take any necessary action to improve financial
statement reporting.

With the stroke of a pen, the SEC could out

law CPA participation in MAS for corporations registered with the
SEC.

Generally, the SEC has not promulgated accounting principles.

Nor has it prescribed acceptable and nonacceptable activities for
CPAs.

This job has been left to the accounting profession.
Since the SEC has such far-reaching authority, however,

we must take cognizance of anything it says on the subject of inde
pendence.

Opponents of MAS have sometimes raised the fear of

possible government action as one reason for advocating that CPAs
be prohibited from perforating MAS for their audit clients.
fear legitimate?

Is this

This question is discussed in this chapter.
152
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The purpose of this chapter is to present any pronouncements
or positions taken by the SEC or any of its members on the subject
of independence, and more specifically on the subject of MAS. If
the SEC believes

that there is a problem of independence, then so far

as the accounting profession is concerned, there is a problem.

How

ever, if the SEC

is not concerned, the profession need not beconcerned

about government

decree or intervention in this area.

Pronouncements by the SEC

Regulation S-X
SEC Regulation S-X provides requirements for the form and
content of financial statements which must be filed in accordance
with several laws.

1

Rule 2.01 of the regulation prescribes the

qualifications of accountants who audit the statements of those firms
filing with the SEC.

Regarding independence, the rule specifically

states:
The Commission will not recognize any certified public
accountant as independent who is not in fact independent. For
example, an accountant will be considered not independent with
respect to any person or any of its parents or subsidiaries in
whom he has or had during the period of the report any direct
financial interest or any material indirect financial interest
or with whom he is, or was during such period, connected as a
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or
employee.
In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not
independent with respect to a particular person, the Commission
will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances,
including evidence bearing on all relationships between the
accountant and that person or any affiliate thereof, and will
i

Securities Aot of 1933; Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; Investment Company Act
of 1940.

154
not confine itself to the relationships existing in oonnection
with the filing of reports with the Commission.
The rule makes no specific mention of MAS.

It states only

that accountants must he in fact independent, and lists several
relationships in which an accountant would not he considered inde
pendent.

MAS is not listed.
In the second paragraph of the ahove quote, the rule states

that the Commission will consider all relevant circumstances in
determining whether an accountant is independent with respect to a
particular person.

This apparently is applicable to specific cases

upon which the SEC might rule.

Conceivably, the SEC might find a

CPA to he lacking independence in performing MAS for some client.
Even if the SEC were to make such a ruling in a specific case, this
would not necessarily serve as an indictment of all MAS by all CPAs.
We can conclude that based on Regulation S-X, there is no
specific prohibition against CPAs providing MAS for their audit
clients.

In an individual case, however, the SEC could find that

rendering MAS makes a CPA not independent, if evidence were to
indicate this facti

Accounting Series Release No. 81
To augment Regulation S-X, the SEC from time to time will
issue an Accounting Series Release (ASR).

In some instances these

releases provide specific accounting procedures which the SEC either
recommends, approves, or requires.

Many releases are merely decisions

rendered by the SEC on specific cases involving CPAs who are guilty of

^SEC Reg. S-X, 17 Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 210.2-01
(1970).
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unethical and. improper professional conduct or of violation of some
other SEC rule.
ASR No. 81 specifically relates to CPA independence.

It is

entitled, "Independence of Certifying Accountants— Compilation of
Representative Administrative Rulings in Cases Involving the Inde
pendence of Aocountants."

This release, issued in 1958» basically

summarizes a number of cases relative to CPA independence which have
been brought before the SEC during the 14 years prior to the release.
ARS 81 cites specific cases in which CPAs have been held to be not
independent, as well as cases in which they were considered to be
independent.

It discusses 34 cases in the former category, and 20

cases in the latter category.
Many cases concern relationships in which CPAs had a finan
cial interest in the audited company, or in which the CPA had served
as director, officer, or employee of the company.

The release also

lists cases in which the wife of the CPA had a direct interest in
the audited firm.
There is only one case which appears to be related to MAS.
In this case:

"Accountants had installed an accounting system and

prepared tax returns for a registrant prior to being engaged to certi
fy financial statements to be included in a registration statement."^
In this case the accountant was considered to be independent.
A review of Accounting Series Releases issued since 195$
revealed no cases decided upon by the SEC relative to MAS and inde
pendence .

^Accounting Series Release No. 81. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1958» P» 10*
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So far as official pronouncements are concerned, there is no
evidence to indicate that the SEC is concerned about CPAs rendering
MAS to their audit clients.
the SEC could
by evidence.

rule

As mentioned above, in an individual case

that independence had been violated if supported

But apparently there have been no such cases of this

nature in the past.

Unofficial Pronouncements
Naturally CPAs are most concerned and affected by official
rules, regulations, and decisions of the SEC.

However, CPAs must

also take cognizance of anything said by high-ranking officials of
the SEC, even

when

they arenot speaking in an official capacity.

The reason we

must

be awareof these unofficial pronouncements is

that they may be made by someone who is in a position to help make
them official.

Therefore, whenever an SEC representative speaks

about some particular aspect of accounting, it may be a hint of some
future SEC aotion.
There has not been too much said by SEC members on the sub
ject of MAS and independence.

1966 seems to be the only year in

which some of these unofficial views came to light.

An article in

Fortune made the following comment:
It is ncrteworthy in this connection that the Securities
and Exchange Commission has been in no great hurry to condemn
multi-faceted auditing operations. Close students of the
situation believe that this hands-off attitude reflects the
view of Andrew Barr, chief accountant of the commission, who
believes the public is better served by permitting the auditors
to advise on a fairly wide range of subjects. This view is
based on the conviction that auditors, as professional men
bounded by strong ethical canons, will be a strong force for
more complete disclosure and sounder management methods
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throughout business.^Shortly after this article was published, Manuel P. Cohen,
at that time chairman of the SEC, made a speech before the annual
meeting of the AICPA.

He spoke on several aspects of financial

reporting and included MAS in his discussion.

His comments have

often been quoted by those who are opposed to CPAs providing MAS
for audit clients.
However, a word of caution is in order with respect to
what one of your prominent members describes as "consulting
services which cannot be related logically either to the fi
nancial process or to broadly defined information and control
systems, [such as] market surveys, factory layout, psychologi
cal testing, or public opinion polls." And, I am disposed to
add, executive recruitment for a fee. An accountant who directs
or assists in programs of this kind raises serious questions
concerning his independence when it comes time to render to
creditors, to investors and to the public his opinion on the
results of the programs. Public accountants should carefully
reconsider their participation in these activities lest their
continuation and extension undermine the main function of the
independent accountant— auditing and the rendering of opinions
on financial statements.5
V

Mr. Cohen apparently was not concerned with accountingoriented MAS.

But he left little doubt that he was definitely

opposed to the nonaccounting types of MAS.

A warning of this nature

coming from such a high source as the chairman of the SEC should
have caused some concern within the accounting profession.

As will

be discussed below, it apparently caused no concern.
One month after Mr. Cohen's speech, an article in The Wall
Street Journal included the following statement:

^T. A. Wise, "The Very Private World of Peat, Marwick, and
Mitchell," Fortune. LXXIV (July 1, 1966), 130.
^Manuel F. Cohen, "The SEC and Accountants: Co-operative
Efforts to Improve Financial Reporting," The Journal of Accountancy,
CXXII (December, 1966), 57.

The SEC will.move against such firms if they do not "recon
sider" their outside services and stick to their principal job,
says Andrew Barr, chief accountant of the SEC. "The commission
doesn't want to deal with the problems of financial reporting
or conflicts of interest by ultimatum but we will if we have to,
he declares. Mr. Barr will give no specifics, but he notes that
without certification from the SEC, a CPA cannot audit corporate
reports.
This statement by Mr. Barr was in complete contradiction to
the comment in the Fortune article quoted above.

The possibility

exists that the Fortune article was incorrect in stating that Mr.
Barr was in favor of MAS.

It is also possible, of course, that Mr.

Barr's opinion on this subject changed.

What would appear to be

most likely, however, is that Mr. Barr was merely reflecting and
expanding on the opinions of the SEC chairman, Mr. Cohen.
Regardless of the reasons for the apparent about-face of the
SEC, these unofficial pronouncements evidently had little effect on
the accounting profession.

Opponents of MAS used these comments as

a warning flag that the profession was headed into trouble with the
SEC if it did not change its ways.
deaf ears.

The warnings apparently fell on

There is no evidence that the profession as a whole waB

overly concerned about SEC intervention in the MAS field.
Mr. Cohen made his comments in October, 1966.

The AICPA

Ad Hoc Committee on Independence was formed in December, 1966.
Possibly Mr. Cohen's remarks, coupled with the research by Schulte
and Briloff, was partly responsible for the formation of the Commit
tee.

Nevertheless, if there was any reconsideration, as urged by

Mr. Cohen and Mr. Barr, it resulted in no change to current practice.

^"CPAs Under Fire," The Wall Street Journal. November 15,
1966, p. 2.
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Despite the SEC's warnings, it is interesting to note that
the SEC has taken no action toward reducing CPA participation in MAS.
Also, as far as this author knows, no member of the SEC has made any
further public statements regarding MAS since those made in 1966 .

In 1969 Mr. Cohen stepped down as chairman of the SEC, and
Hamer H. Budge was named to replace him.

Consequently, if the state-

j

ments made by Mr. Cohen reflected his personal viewpoint, rather
than a consensus of the SEC membership, they are irrelevant now.
To date Mr. Budge has made no public statements regarding CPA involve
ment in MAS.
This author considered sending a questionnaire to the SEC
as part of this current study.

It would have been designed especially

for obtaining opinions from SEC representatives on the subject of
CPA independence and MAS.

However, an SEC official informed this

writer that any questionnaires sent to the SEC would be returned
unanswered.

He said that the SEC is flooded with questionnaires on

various topics.

He explained that the SEC can give no opinions other

than the official rules, regulations, and decisions which it period
ically issues.

Officials at the SEC are cautioned against expressing

their personal opinions via questionnaires lest these opinions be
construed as official SEC policy.
ramifications should this occur.

Obviously there could be serious
Consequently, the SEC has a firm

policy of not answering questionnaires.

Summary

The accounting profession must be concerned with the SEC's

160

offioial position on any accounting matter.

Generally, the SEC has

preferred to allow the accountants, primarily through the AICPA, to
set the standards of financial reporting and to regulate the conduct
and activities of CPAs.

The SEC has provided no official position

regarding CPA participation in MAS.

Consequently, by its silence

we can assume that the SEC concurs with the present official policy
of the AICPA on the subject of MAS.
The profession must also stay alert to statements made by
SEC representatives, even when they are not speaking on official
SEC policy.

These individuals are aware of the current feeling

within the SEC.

Their unofficial statements may well be a prelude

to some future official policy.
cially, about CPAs and MAS.

Little has been said, even unoffi

Mr. Cohen's 1966 denouncement of CPA

participation in nonaccounting services seemed very important, as
well as threatening, at the time.

However, he is gone now and his

past comments presently have little, if any, significance.
Since the SEC has not raised the question, either officially
or unofficially, about CPA independence when performing MAS for audit
clients, it would appear that this is not a problem for the profession
at the present time.
problem in the future.

This does not mean that it will never be a
Certainly, we must keep a constant vigil on

pronouncements by the SEC which may affect the current status.

But

for the time being the SEC seems satisfied to allow the profession
self-regulation regarding CPA participation in MAS.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Problem

For many years CPAs have provided "business advice to their
clients.

Since World War II this advice has expanded into a formal

service and has included many business areas, both of an accounting
and a nonaccounting nature.

The term most commonly used for these

additional services is "management advisory services" (MAS).
Although MAS has been expanding, the CPA's greatest service
to society is his ability to audit a client, and render an independ
ent and unbiased opinion to the public as to the fairness of the.
financial statement presentation.

The CPA's "claim to fame" is his

independence.
Questions have been raised both within and outside the pro
fession about whether the CPA can render MAS to audit clients and
still remain independent when conducting the audit.

There is a

question as to whether he can in fact remain independent.

There is

also a question as to whether those persons to whom he is responsible,
the public, believe him to be independent when performing both func
tions.

This latter situation is frequently called independence in

appearanoe.

No matter how independent in fact a CPA may be, if the

public does not believe him to be independent, his "usefulness to
161
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society is diminished.

This dissertation has heen a study of the

problem of independence in appearance.

Objectives of the Dissertation

The major objective was to determine whether or not the
user of audited financial statements thinks that the CPA's audit
independence is lessened by his participation in MAS for his audit
clients.

In this respect it was also desired to learn the degree

to which the user is concerned with this possibility.

This objec

tive was accomplished through the use of a mail questionnaire.
Supplementary to the major objective were several minor
objectives.

One objective was to determine specifically the nature

of MAS from three viewpoints:

(l) as described by various writers;

(2) as practiced by CPAs; and (3) as viewed by financial statement
users.

The latter two objectives were also accomplished through

the use of mail questionnaires.
The economic system was reviewed briefly to determine where
the field of MAS should be placed.

We considered the effect on

society if CPAs were to be prohibited from rendering MAS to their
audit clients.
The literature on the subject of MAS and independence was
reviewed in order to learn the arguments which have been advanced
both for and against CPA participation in MAS.

This provided a

background for understanding the nature and importance of the problem,
independence in appearance.
Pronouncements by the SEC on the subject of independence
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were also reviewed.
of accounting.

The SEC has a continuing interest in all aspects

The SEC also has considerable regulatory authority.

Accordingly, the SEC position on the subject of MAS and independence
was important to this dissertation.
The findings of the research in each of these above areas
are presented below in the order of the chapters in which they appear
in the dissertation.

In addition, the author's conclusions on points

brought out in each chapter are included in each applicable section.
The last section in this chapter presents the author's overall con
clusions and recommendations.

The Nature of MAS

The AICPA has provided a conceptual viewpoint of MAS with
out presenting a list of acceptable services.

Essentially, the AICPA

regards MAS as a function of providing technical advice and assistance
to enable the client to conduct his affairs more effectively.
Various writers have provided their own definitions of MAS,
which while possibly more precise, do not differ in meaning from that
of the AICPA.

There is general agreement that MAS can be divided into

two major categories— accounting-type services and nonaccounting-type
services.

There is disagreement, however, as to the effect which each

may have on audit independence.

A previous study into the nature of MAS, conducted in 1961,
revealed a very high percentage of CPAs who believed that certain
services in nonaccounting areas are not within the scope of the CPA.
These services are primarily in the fields of marketing and industrial

management.
This writer sent a questionnaire to 16 large CPA firms listing
33 specific types of MAS.

Respondents were asked to indicate those

services which their firm provides to clients.
plied to the survey.

All of the listed accounting-type services are

offered hy at least 90$ of the respondents.
of the respondents.

Ten firms, 62,5%, re

Many are offered by 100$

Some nonaccounting services are provided by 90$

of the firms; but some are provided by very few or none of the firms
responding.

A number of engineering and marketing services are in

this very low category.
This writer also sent 223 questionnaires to financial analysts
and executives who represent banks, brokerage firmB, mutual funds,
life insurance companies, and property-liability insurance companies.
There were 160 questionnaires returned, giving a response rate of 71-7$•
The representatives of the financial community were provided
with a list of 33 services, exactly the same as those sent to the CPAs.
They were asked to indicate those services which they know or think
that CPAs provide.

Ninety-seven percent are aware of one or more

services which CPAs provide.

A large number are aware of the account

ing services and some of the nonaccounting services.

In order of

frequency of responses, the list by the financial community correlates
quite closely with the list of those services actually rendered by
CPAs.
This author concludes that, in general, members of the finan
cial community are familiar with the types of MAS currently being
offered by CPA firms.
point.

There is no lack of communication on this

However, there is possibly a lack of understanding by some of

these representatives regarding the specific role of the CPA in
performing certain services.

Some CPA respondents made special

points to clarify or explain their position in performing MAS.

The

possibility exists that some members of the financial community are
unaware of the limitations which some firms have placed on their in
volvement in specific types of services.

Consequently, some financial

executives might be concerned about independence because of a misunder
standing about the CPA's specific role.

The Economics of MAS

There has been a strong demand for MAS by the business commu
nity.

Evidence indicates that this demand will continue to increase

in the future.

Because of the profit potential, as well as "the oppor

tunity for service to their clients, CPAs have been quite willing to
help satisfy this demand.
The author concludes that MAS is a form of monopolistic com
petition.

This market structure is not considered to result in an

optimum allocation of resources, as is pure competition.

However,

if CPAs were prohibited from providing MAS for their audit clients,
competition would be z-educed; and the monopoly power of the remaining
firms would be increased.

Consequently, the monopolistic competition

which we now have is better for society than the monopolistic competi
tion we would have if limitations were placed on CPA participation in
MAS.
Suggestions have been made that CPAs be prohibited from pro
viding MAS to audit clients in order to stz'engthen independence.

We
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must weigh the social costs of prohibiting MAS by CPA auditors
against the social benefits of increased independence.

If we find

that the degree of independence to be gained is exceeded by the social
costs of limiting MAS, then we should not restrict MAS.

Admittedly,

quantitative measurements of this type are very difficult.

Neverthe

less, it certainly is an important factor which must be considered
before taking any drastic steps to reduce the MAS which CPAs now
render to their audit clients.

The Question of Independence

The AICPA has officially sanctioned MAS, even when performed
for audit clients.

Opinion No. 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics

states that there is no ethical reason why CPAs may not perform MAS
while serving the same client as independent auditor.

In addition,

the AICPA has encouraged CPA participation in MAS through its Commit
tee on Management Services.
The most recent statement by the AICPA on this topic of MAS
is a report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Independence.

This committee

conducted a three year study during which they reviewed all pertinent
literature and previous surveys, and conducted interviews with 16
members of the financial community.

The committee concluded that

there is no problem of independence in appearance or in fact at the
present time.

It recommended that the profession keep abreast of

developments in this area that could alter its conclusions in the
future.
The first known empirical study on the topic of MAS and in
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dependence was conducted in 1963-64 "by Dr. Arthur A. Schulte, Jr.
He sent 1,260 questionnaires to members of the financial community.
He concluded that 33$ of the 635 respondents believed that there
was a conflict of interest when the CPA provided MAS for his audit
clients.
In another study conducted at about the same time, Dr.
Abraham J. Briloff had similar findings.

He found that 54$ of the 72

financial community representatives replying to his survey felt that
MAS detracted from the significance of the audit opinion.

He found

also that 49$ believed MAS were incompatible with the traditions of
the auditor; 58$ believed MAS were incompatible with independence;
and 54$ felt involvement in MAS should be discouraged and restricted.
Articles have been written about MAS for over 20 years.

But

emphasis on the independence issue has been most pronounced during
the past 10 years.

Some authors have used Schulte's study to support

their contention that outside third parties are concerned about the
CPA's independence when rendering both auditing and MAS.

Other authors

have attacked Schulte's study on various grounds as not really indica
tive of the opinions of third parties.

Regardless of one's position

on this subject, the controversy has been good for the profession.
It has enlightened members as to both sides of the argument.

It has

also let the public know that we are concerned enough about our inde
pendence to discuss and work toward solutions to the problems which
threaten it.
As part of his survey to CPA firms, this writer asked several
questions related to independence.

The survey showed that all CPA

firms responding have separate MAS departments.

In response to another
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question it was learned that 8 out of 10 firms responding have some
individuals who perform MAS and participate in audits.
out of 10 have no individuals performing hoth functions.

Two firms
Further

questioning of the above 8 firms which have some dual participation
revealed that 6 firms have individuals who sometimes participate in
audits of clients for whom they have performed MAS.

Two firms never

have individuals participating in both functions for the same client.
The survey also showed that 78$ of the CPA firms perform
audits for over 50$ of their MAS clients.
there is an independence problem.

This does not mean that

However, it shows how extensive

the problem could be if a loss of independence in fact were proven
to occur in such circumstances.
In terms of fees, 5 out of 7 CPA firms said that MAS accounts
for 10$ to 25$ of their gross billings; 2 firms replied that it was
less than 10$.

In this respect, MAS, while no doubt, a lucrative

business for CPAs, still plays a secondary role in the overall revenue
structure at the present time.
Some CPA respondents added comments to the questionnaire to
explain or modify some answers.
for independence.

Basically, they were showing a case

Based on the answers to the questions and the

additional comments, this writer concludes that the CPA films are
attempting to prevent circumstances that might cause them to lose
independence in fact.

Some controls, such as separate MAS depart

ments, also help independence in appearance.
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The Attitude of Financial Statement Users

To accomplish the dissertation objective of measuring the
extent of the independence in appearance problem, questionnaires
were mailed to 223 individuals representing the nation's largest
financial institutions.
on page 16 4 *

This is the same questionnaire discussed

As mentioned there, it received a very high response,

160 replies, or 71«7$»

In analyzing the results for some questions,

not all 160 replies could be used.
Eighty-eight percent of those responding indicated that
they analyze or review financial statements constantly or frequently.
Ten percent use them occasionally, and only 2% use them seldom or
never.

Thus, the author concludes that the overwhelming majority

of the questionnaires were answered by those individuals for whom
they were intended.

This gives significance to the replies of the

other questions.
The survey also showed that 86% of all respondents are well
aware that CPAs provide MAS to their audit clients; 14fo are somewhat
aware; and no one is completely unaware.
Respondents were provided with a list of 33 specific MAS.

They were asked to check those services which they think may result
in some loss of audit independence.

Forty-two percent of the re

spondents do not think that providing any of the services may result
in a loss of audit independence; 9$ have no opinion; and 4S$ believe
that one or more of the listed services may possibly lead to a loss
of independence.

This writer believes that the 49$ is not significant

when interpreted in light of the specific services and the other
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questions.

It shows that these respondents think the services

could lead to a loss of independence.

It does not mean that they

think the services would lead to a loss of independence.
Analyzing the replies in relation to specific services, we
find that the percentages range from a high of 32$ to a low of 7$»
Respondents are concerned most with mergers and business acquisitions
(32$) resulting in a loss of audit independence than with any other
service.

All services in which CPAs apparently would have to work

closely with top management in order to perform the service ranked
near the top of the list.
Contrary to popular belief, respondents generally are no
more concerned with nonaccounting services than with the accountingtype services.

The number, of respondents concerned about some of

the nonaccounting services in many cases was considerably less than
the number concerned about accounting-type services.

This is appar

ently the first time that this fact has ever been noted.

Therefore,

this author concludes that it is erroneous to automatically exclude
accounting-type services in discussing problems regarding MAS and
independence.

Potential problems exist in both types of services.

The seriousness of the independence in appearance problem
was measured.

Respondents were asked to indicate how their confi

dence in the CPA's audit report would be affected if the CPA had
provided any of the services which they think might possibly lead
to a loss of independence.

This question was asked assuming there

was no staff division between auditing and MAS.

As a percentage of

156 respondents, 12$ would have considerably less confidence in the
audit report under these conditions, and 27$ would have slightly

171
less confidence.
A similar question was asked assuming that auditing and MAS
are performed by different individuals.
ly misinterpreted by some individuals.

This question was apparent
Hence, the results are not

as meaningful as it was hoped they would be.

We can state, however,

that at least 24$ of 156 respondents would have less confidence in
the audit report if certain MAS were performed even with a separation ~
of functions.
To obtain a better indication of the degree of concern of
outside third parties, one question asked l'espondents whether they
think that CPAs should be prohibited from providing their audit
clients with the MAS which they had checked in the previous question.
They were asked to answer the question assuming: (1 ) that MAS and
the audit were conducted by the same personnel; and (2) that each
function was conducted by different personnel.
Based on the first assumption, 38 $ of 142 respondents think
i

CPAs should be prohibited from providing one or more of the 33 listed
services to their audit clients.

Assuming a division of functions,

24% of 149 favor prohibiting one or more of the services.
To be significant these replies must be analyzed in relation
to the specific services.

Assuming no division of functions, the

percent favoring prohibition for specific services ranges from a
high of 25$ to a low of 4$»

Mergers and business acquisitions is

at the top (25$) and from 15$ to 21$ of the respondents favor pro
hibiting other services requiring CPAs to work closely with top
management.

Specifically these services are:

executive recruitment,

policy determination, management audits, personnel appraisal and/or

selection, and executive and wage incentive plans.
Assuming a division of functions, the ranking is quite similar;
but the percentages are less.

In this case 17% favor prohibiting

mergers and business acquisitions, the highest on the list.
listed in the above paragraph ranged from 10^ to 15$.

The others

The low for the

entire list of 33 services was 2fo.
Based upon the survey responses, this writer does not believe
that independence in appearance is a serious problem for the account
ing profession at the present time.

A very high percentage, 49% think

that one

or more of the

listedservices might possibly cause someloss

of audit

independence. But when we measure the degree of this concern,

we find little support for prohibiting these services when the audit
and the services are performed by different personnel.
It is quite true, of course, that independence could be
strengthened by prohibiting MAS for audit clients.

However, this

author does not feel that the good to be gained from such a drastic
measure would offset the disadvantages to the clients, to the pro
fession,

and to the public, at the present time.

measures

which could be

There are other

taken,completely unrelated to MAS, whichwould

also strengthen independence.

Such things as rotating auditors yearly,

or even government payment of auditors fall into this category.

But

the necessity for measures such as this haB not yet been proven.

This

writer does not believe that the case for complete prohibition of MAS
by CPA auditors has been proven yet either.
As with any questionnaire, there is always the possibility
that percentages as raw figures are misleading.
nizes this limitation.

This author recog

But in ranking the services, we cannot deny
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that respondents are most concerned about the services in which CPAs
apparently would work closely with top management to provide the
service.

They are on the preceding page.

it would seem to be with these services.

If any problem does exist,
The recommendations at the

end of the chapter will say more about this point.
There is another reason why this author has concluded that
independence in appearance is not a significant problem.

As mentioned

above, in this author's opinion the results as shown do not indicate
a high degree of concern by third parties.
bly could be less.

The percentages conceiva

If some respondents have a misunderstanding as to

the role of the CPA in specific services, they may feel that such serv
ices should be prohibited.

Yet if they had a better understanding of

what the CPA does and does not do, their fears might be alleviated.
Of course, the converse could be true also.

Some respondents might

object to certain services if they knew more about them.

But this

writer is inclined to believe that the latter situation is less likely
than the former.
There is one other factor that possibly makes the percentages
against MAS slightly higher than they may have been otherwise.

By

their comments, several respondents revealed that they have absolutely
no confidence in CPAs anyway.

This lack of confidence is not based on

MAS, but on other factors in the accounting profession with which they
disagree.

In all cases these respondents advocated prohibiting all of

the listed services.

Because of their attitude toward CPAs generally,

it is doubtful that prohibiting the services would restore their con
fidence in the accounting profession.
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The SEC and MAS

CPAs must be concerned with all SEC pronouncements, both
official and unofficial, regarding accounting matters.
The SEC requires that accountants who serve as auditors be
independent in fact.

It specifically points out certain relation

ships in which CPAs are not considered to be independent.
not included in this category.

MAS is

A review of published decisions by

the SEC regarding accountants and independence revealed no cases in
which MAS was a factor in any decision.
There has been little said -unofficially by SEC staff members
regarding MAS and independence.

The most noted statement was by SEC

Chairman Manuel F. Cohen in 1966, speaking before the annual meeting
of the AICPA.

At that time he denounced the nonaccounting services

offered by CPAs to their audit clients.

He hinted at future SEC

action if CPAs did not reconsider their position in offering these
services.

However, Mr. Cohen is no longer with the SEC; and nothing

else has been said publicly since 1966 on this topic.
The author concludes that the profession need not be concerned
about the SEC's attitude regarding MAS at the present time.

His opin

ion is that unless there is evidence that MAS presents a serious threat
to independence in fact, the SEC will not be inclined to limit CPA
participation in such services.
Previous research by others has found no known cases of lost
independence in which MAS was a factor.

Should such a case of any

magnitude ever come to light, there is a good probability that the SEC
would change its position on MAS.

However, in such an instance, the
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profession would be faced with a reappraisal of its position anyway.
But until then, the SEC will most likely be content to allow the
aooounting profession to continue to regulate CPA activities in this
field without intervening.

Overall Conclusions and Recommendations

This author concludes that knowledgeable third parties are
generally aware of the types of MAS which CPAs presently render to
their clients.

There does in some cases appear to be a lack of

understanding as to the specific role the CPA plays in rendering the
service.

The AICPA through its Committee on Management Services has

done an excellent job in informing the CPA of his expected role in
MAS.

The author recommends that the AICPA provide similar information

to members of the financial community.

The purpose in such an educa

tional program should not be to "sell" MAS or to influence the financial
executive one way or the other.

The purpose should be to provide him

with information as to what the accounting profession expects of CPAs
who render MAS.

This would give third parties a better basis on which

they could form judgments about MAS and independence.
The author concludes that independence in appearance is not a
problem of great concern at the present time.

Nevertheless, the third

parties who do fear a possible loss of independence have centered most
of their concern on those services in which CPAs apparently would need
to work closely with top management in order to provide the service.
These services are:

(1) mergers and business acquisitions; (2) execu

tive recruitment; (3) management audits; (4) policy determination;

(5) personnel appraisal and/or selection; and (6) executive and
wage incentive plans.
In the past the AICPA has "been reluctant to speak in terms
of specific services.

But in conjunction with the first recommen

dation, this author recommends that the AICPA inform the public
as to the CPA's role in those specific services.
slightly among CPA firms.

The role may vary

But surely some consensus could be ob

tained to let the public know just what the CPA is doing when he
performs these services.
In this regard, the author also recommends that CPA films
review their own practices in performing these services.

Since

these are the services questioned most by third parties, CPAs
should insure that they are taking all necessary precautions to
safeguard independence, and should avoid any acts which may appear
to justify the fears expressed about these services.
This writer concludes that all types of MAS, both of an
accounting and nonaccounting nature, must be considered when dis
cussing the effect on independence.

Evidence from this survey

shows that third parties are more concerned about some of the
accounting-type services than they are about some of the
nonaccounting-type services.

To automatically exclude accounting-

oriented services as having no potential effect on independence is
erroneous.

Accordingly, it is recommended that both types be con

sidered in any discussion of the subject.
This dissertation is not the first research on this topic.
It should not be the last.
f

Our society is ever-changing; our

profession is ever-changing.

Accordingly, this author recommends

that additional research with questionnaires and/or interviews
be conducted in the future in order that the profession might keep
informed about the opinions of its most important client, the
public.
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819 Wiltz Drive
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806
February 16, 1970
Dear Sir:
Your help is needed in a very timely and important research
project being conducted at Louisiana State University. As part
of my dootoral dissertation for a Ph.D. in Accounting, I am attempt
ing to determine specifically the nature and extent of management
advisory services of leading CPA firms. I am also surveying finan
cial executives and analysts of major financial institutions to
obtain'their opinions as to what constitutes management advisory
services by CPAs and their feelings on CPA participation in such
activities.
There appears to be a lack of communication between CPAs and
the financial community as to what CPAs are doing in this field,
and as to what safeguards CPA firms have to insure auditing independ
ence. So far, results of the survey to the financial executives
indicate that some fear a possible loss of independence by CPA firms
whioh offer certain management advisory services to their audit
clients. By using the results of both surveys, the accounting pro
fession will be able to make a better decision as to how to allevi
ate these fears.
As one of the leading CPA firms, your response is vital to
this survey. You also have a stake in the final results; because
this is an area in which the accounting profession as a whole, and
CPA firms in particular, are greatly involved. It is quite likely
that the results of this survey will be published in a leading
accounting journal. Therefore, your response may affect the future
course of the accounting profession in this increasingly important
area.
The enclosed questionnaire should take no longer than 10 minutes
to complete. Your cooperation will be most helpful in resolving these
new problems that have arisen between the accounting profession and
the financial community. All replies will be held in strict confi
dence and none will be identified in any way.
A stamped self-addressed envelope is included for your conven
ience. Your prompt reply and assistance would be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,

Pierre L. Titard, CPA

TELEPHONE 343-4620

PIER RE L. TITARD
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C E R T IF IE D P U B L IC ACC O U N TA N T

P . O . BOX 2 2 9 7 2
BATON R O U G E , L O U IS IA N A

70803

March 6, 1970

(Name and address of firm)

Attn:

Managing Partner, Management Services Division

Dear Sir:
Two weeks ago your help was requested in solving a difficult problem
of the accounting profession* As mentioned then, I am attempting to
determine specifically the nature and extent of management advisory
services of leading CPA firms* Results will be included in my dootoral
dissertation for a Ph.D. in Accounting at Louisiana State University.
In another survey I have received an extremely good response from the
representatives of the financial community. I asked for their opinions
as to what constitutes management advisory services by CPAs and their
feelings about CPA firms which participate in these activities. Using
the results of both surveys will provide the accounting profession
with an insight into the extent of this problem area.
As you are probably aware, the AICPA "Ad Hoc Committee on Independence"
has recently suggested that the profession keep abreast of the views of
outside parties on this matter. These surveys should enable some of
their recommendations to be carried out. Since the results of both
surveys will quite likely be published in a leading accounting journal,
your reply can affect the future course of the profession in this
important area.
To reach a logical conclusion a representative number of questionnaires
must be returned. The response to date has been satisfactory. How
ever, your reply will give added assurance that the final results
validly represent the majority of those surveyed. Therefore, I am
again asking for your cooperation on this project.
If you have already replied to this survey, no additional response is
necessary. However, if you have not yet replied, I would be most
grateful if you would complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it
in the stamped self-addressed envelope, included for your convenience.
It should take no longer than 10 minutes; and it would help substan
tially in compiling the overall results. Naturally, all replies are
strictly confidential and will not be identified in any way.
Sincerely yours,

Pierre L. Titard
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SURVEY OP LEADING CPA FIRMS

1.

Does your firm offer management advisory servioes (as distin
guished from audit services) to its clients?
_______ Yes
_______ No
Note:

2.

If the answer to the above question is "No", the remaining
questions need not be answered.

Does your firm have a separate management services division or
section?
__________ Yes
_______No

3.

Do any of the individuals who perform management advisory services
also participate in any audits?
_______ All individuals performing management advisory servioes
participate in some audits.
_______ Some individuals performing management advisory services
participate in some audits.
_______ No individual performing management advisory services
participates in any audit.

4»

Answer this question only if you answered either of the first two
choices in question number 3 *
Do the individuals''mentioned in question number 3 participate in
audits of those clients for whom they have performed management
advisory services?
_______ Yes, always
_________ Yes, sometimes
_______ No, never

5.

What percentage of gross billings do fees from management advisory
services represent?
_______ Less than 10$
1056 —

25$

26$ —

40$

_______ 41$ —

50$

_______ Over 50$
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6.

What percentage of your management advisory seo'vi-ses clients are
also audit clients?
________ Less than 10$
10$ —

25$

26$ —

50$

51$ —

75$

_______ Over 75$

7.

From the following list, indicate the types of management advisory
services which your firm performs. Check as many as axe appli
cable.
__Assistance on specific
accounting problems
Capital budgeting
_Computer systems and
applications
Development of work meas
urement standards
Distribution channels
_Exeoutive and wage
incentive plans
Executive reoruitment
Faotory automation
Finanoial budgeting
_Forms design
installation of cost
accounting systems
installation, review, and
improvement of overall
accounting systems
insurance analysis
Inventory control
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
_Maintenance planning and
scheduling
Management audits

_Material handling
_Mergers and business acqui
sitions
_Operations budgeting
_Packaging development
_Personnel appraisal and/or
selection
Plant layout
_Plant location
Policy determination
Product engineering
_Product pricing
Quality control
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
_Warehousing
Others (Please list)

Survey of Leading CPA Firms

8.

In the space below please add any other comments you may feel
may be pertinent to this survey.

9.

In order that you will not receive any further correspondence
regarding this questionnaire, please indicate the name of your
firm on the line below. All replies will be held ir. strict
confidence and will not be identified in any way.
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PIERRE L. TITARD
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C E R T IFIED PU B L IC ACC O U N TA N T

P . O. BOX 2 2 9 7 2
BATON RO U G E , L O U IS IA N A

70803

Dear Sir:
Your help is needed in a very timely and important research project
"being conducted at Louisiana State University. For a number of years
many firms of certified public accountants have been engaged in
consulting type work, frequently referred to as management advisory
services. These services are in addition to the traditional auditing
and accounting services normally provided by CPA firms. Several
questions regarding independence of CPAs who practice both auditing
and management advisory services have arisen that yet are unresolved.
The accounting profession must be made aware of the opinions of
individuals in your field on this matter of independence in order
that the business community and society as a whole can be best
served.
Since many of the decisions which you must make are based on finan
cial statements, the accounting profession must insure that you can
rely on CPAs' opinions when expressed in regard to the fairness of
financial statement presentation. By answering the enclosed ques
tionnaire you will enable the accounting profession to meet better
its obligation to you.
The enclosed questionnaire Bhould take no longer than 15 minutes to
complete. Your oooperation will be most helpful in resolving these
questions on independence. All replies will be held in strict
confidence.
A stamped self-addressed envelope is included for your convenience.
Your prompt reply and assistance would be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,

Pierre L. Titard

TELEPHONE 343-4620
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PIER RE L. TITARD
C E R T IF IE D P U B L IC ACCOUNTANT

P . O . BOX 2 2 9 7 2
BATON R O U G E , L O U IS IA N A

70803

Dear Sir:
Two weeks ago your help was requested in solving a difficult problem
of the accounting profession. As I emphasized to you at that time,
your opinion is vitally needed in trying to resolve several questions
regarding independence of CPAs who practice both auditing and man
agement advisory services*
If the accounting profession is to insure that you are provided with
financial statements upon which you can place your full confidence,
it must have the opinions of individuals in your field regarding
this matter.
Conclusions of this study will be based on an analysis of responses
received. Unless a representative number of questionnaires are
returned, the conclusions reached may not validly represent the
opinion of the majority of financial executives and analysts sur
veyed. Your opinion is needed in order to insure that the results
do refleot the feelings of the majority.
If you have misplaced the original questionnaire, another is en
closed. It should take no longer than 13 minutes to complete. A
stamped self-addressed envelope is included for your convenience in
replying.
Please return the questionnaire as soon as possible. If you have
already replied to this survey, disregard this request and accept
my thanks for your cooperation.
Sincerely yours,

Pierre L. Titard

TELEPHONE 343-4620

PIERRE L. TITARD
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C E R T IF IE D P U B L IC ACCOUNTANT

P . O . BOX 2 2 9 7 2
BATON R O U G E . L O U ISIA N A

70803

December 16, 1969

Dear Sir:
Approximately one month ago you were ashed, to participate in a re
search project being oonducted at Louisiana State University.
Possibly itB nature and importance were not completely understood. I
am compiling the results of this researoh as part of my dissertation,
necessary for a doctoral degree in accounting. The results could
have far reaching implications for individuals in your field as well
as for the accounting profession.
As explained in the earlier correspondence sent to you, some questions
have been raised regarding the independence of CPAs who practice both
auditing and management advisory servioes. The accounting profession
has been unable to resolve some of these questions because they di
rectly concern the opinions of financial executives and analysts.
If meaningful results are obtained from this survey, they will quite
likely be published in a leading accounting journal. This will en
lighten the members of the accounting profession as to your feelings
on this matter and could have a definite effect on the future course
of CPAs in this area.
But to have meaningful results which can influence the profession, a
representative number of questionnaires must be returned. The re
sponse to date has been more than satisfactory. However, your reply
will give added assurance that the final results validly represent
the opinion of the majority of those surveyed. Therefore, I am again
asking for your cooperation on this project.
It is possible that you have already replied to this survey. If so,
no additional response is necessary. However, if you have not yet
replied, I would be most grateful if you would complete the enclosed
questionnaire and return it in the stamped self-addressed envelope,
included for your convenience. It should take no longer than 15
minutes; and it would help substantially in compiling the overall
results.
Sincerely yours,

Pierre L. Titard
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1.

2.

Which type of firm do you represent?
a»

Bank

^*-_____ Mutual fund
a

b*

Brokerage firm

e.

Closed-end investment
company

f.

r

•insurance company

PT,nnori+ , . ..
------ Property-liability
insurance company

Approximately how often do you analyze (or review) financial
statements which have been audited by CPAs and on which a report
has been rendered?
a .______ Constantly

d._____

Seldom

b._________ Frequently

e._____ Never

o.______ Occasionally

3.

Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to their
olients. Were you aware of this fact before receiving this
questionnaire?
a.

4.

I

was well aware.

b .______ I

had heard that they do.

c.

was completely unaware.

I

From the following list, indioate the types of management services
which you know or think that some CPAs perform. (You may check
as many items as you think are applicable.)
_Assistance on specific
accounting problems
_Capital budgeting
jComputer systems and
applications
_Development of work meas
urement standards
Distribution channels
_Executive and wage
incentive plans
Executive recruitment
_Factory automation
_Financial budgeting
Forms design

Material handling
_Mergers and business acqui
sitions
_Operations budgeting
_Paokaging development
_Personnel appraisal and/or
selection
_Plant layout
Plant location
_Polioy determination
_Product engineering
_Produot pricing
Quality control
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4.

(continued)
^Installation of cost
accounting systems
^Installation, review, and
improvement of overall
accounting systems
_Insurance analysis

Sales forecasting
^Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
_Warehousing
Others (Flease list)

_Inventory control
Inventory valuations
Labor negotiations
Jtaintenanoe planning and
scheduling
Management audits
_I am not aware of any specific types of management advisory
services that CPAs perform.

Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to clients
whose financial statements they also audit. Do you think that
providing any of the following services to audit clients may
possibly result in a CPA's losing some of his audit independence?
a.

I do not think that a CPA's providing his audit clients
with any of the services listed below may result in a loss
of any of his audit independence.

b.

I think that providing the following services to audit
clients may result in some loss of a CPA's audit inde
pendence:
(Check any items that you think may result in some loss of
independence. You may check more than one item. This list
is exactly the same as the one on the previous page.)
_Assistance on specific
accounting problems
^Capital budgeting
_Computer systems and
applications
^Development of work meas
urement standards
Distribution channels
^Executive and wage
incentive plans
Executive recruitment

Material handling
_Mergers and business acqui
sitions
^Operations budgeting
^Packaging development
_Personnel appraisal and/or
selection
_Plant layout
_Plant location
Policy determination
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5.

(continued)
______Factory automation
Financial budgeting
______Forms design
______Installation of oost
aooounting systems
______Installation, review, and
improvement of overall
accounting systems
______Insurance analysis

______ Product engineering
Produot pricing
______ Quality oontrol
Sales forecasting
Salesmen compensation plans
Wage incentives
Warehousing
Others (PleaBe list)

______Inventory control
______Inventory valuations
______Labor negotiations
______Maintenance planning and
scheduling
______Management audits
o.______I have no opinion as to whether providing any of the above
services to audit clients may result in some loss of a
CPA's audit independence.

6.

If you were to analyze financial statements which had been audited
by a CPA who had provided any of the management advisory services
that you checked in the preceding question, how would this affect
your confidence in the CPA's audit report?
a ._____ Not applicable sinoe I did not check any
listed in the preceding question.
b.

of the services

would have considerably more confidence in it.

c^

I would have slightly more confidence in it.

do

It would not affect my confidence in it.

e .____ _J[ would have slightly less confidence in it.
f .______I would have considerably less confidence in it.
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7.

If you answered j u , b^, c^, or cL, in the preceding question,
please disregard this question. If you answered e. or f. in
the preceding question, please answer this question.
If the management services that you ohecked in question #5 had
been performed by the same CPA firm that had performed the audit,
but by individuals other than those performing the audit, how
would this affect your confidenoe in the CPA's audit report?
a.
b.

_I would have considerably more oonfidence in it.
I would have slightly more oonfidence in it.

c .______It would not affect my confidence in it.

8.

d.

I would have slightly leBS confidence in it.

e.

I would have considerably less confidence in it.

Do you think that CPA firms should be prohibited from providing
their audit clients with those services which you checked in
question #$i
(Please answer both a. and b. or c.)
a. assuming that the management advisory services and the audit
are conducted by the same personnel?
_Yes

No

No opinion

b. assuming that the management advisory services and the audit
are conducted by different personnel?
______Yes

No

No opinion

c .______Not applicable since I did not check any of the services
listed in question

9.

10.

In the space below please add any other comments that you feel
would be pertinent to this survey.

In order that you will not receive any further correspondence re~
garding this questionnaire, please indicate the name of your firm
on the line below. All replies will be held in strict confidence
and will not be identified in any way.
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SELECTED COMMENTS FROM QUESTION NUMBER 9

Question 9 in the Survey of Leading Financial Executives
and Analysts asked respondents for any additional comments which they
felt were pertinent to the survey.
160 respondents.

Comments were made by 44 of the

Below are oomments made by some of the respondents.

They are not in any particular order.

These oomments are presented

in order to provide additional insight into the opinions which some
respondents have on the subject of CPAs and MAS.

The space between

the typewritten lines separates the comments of the various indi
viduals.
While there is a potential problem, ie., independence and
management services, I don't think it's insurmountable. I think
the big eight CPA firms can handle the problem satisfactorily
for the most part. The problem may be most serious for smaller
CPA firms where one client may be a substantial part of their
practice.

It has been my experience that it is impossible for an
accountant to retain critical objectivity in his audit of the
results of methods that he may have recommended as a management
consultant or of personnel that he may have had a hand in employ
ing. Additionally, I do not believe that the accountant can be
objective in auditing the work of other accountants in his firm
that are performing what are essentially management functions.
The fact that accountants are selected by and work closely
with management is enough of a deterrent to independence without
further complicating it by becoming involved in management.

I think that when CPA firms get too involved with overall
management problems they may lose some of their audit independence
and objectivity.

In instances when accountants are retained for advisory serv
ice beyond that normally falling within the definition of normal
accounting practice, I feel a referenoe should be made in the notes
to the financial statements evidencing the nature and extent of the
advisory service performed.

203
I've seen some accountants (CPAs) who tarnished their inde
pendence when they provided management services, the results of
which they audited. Others seem to do this without a problem. . .
Although there may be some question of the sacrifice of in
dependence, let's not legislate advice of accountants out of
existence unless you want to deal small business a near-fatal
blow.

Management consulting services provide an opportunity for
even closer insight into a client's business which helps, I think,
in providing audited statements. Loss of independence comes from
something other than a closer association with the client's
business.

To the extent that CPAs become more closely identified with
their clients, the audit becomes more of an informational device
than an independent opinion. If this becomes the case, bankers
will no longer require a certificate and that portion of the
CPA's business will disappear.

It is my belief that any reliable CPA firm will have as its
first concern the reputation of that firm. If the firm is
reliable, I see no reason why the two functions cannot both be
performed by the same group of accountants, as one function is
for internal use and the second (public accounting) is not.

You must judge the character and reputation of the CPA as
in any other business relationship. Even with no advisory serv
ices, there is some small percentage of CPA work that is unaccept
able as in any profession.

How can a profession, dedicated to protecting the "public"
against financial misrepresentations, maintain its complete
independence when it is favored with a little something on the
side? I think the better firms try to remain objective, but
they are human too.

I think CPAs have no independence. They can be replaced
by another firm if they don't bend. Only th.?. SEC has power.

I am sorry but I no longer believe that the accounting pro
fession is sufficiently independent of its clients on matters of
importance to financial analysts. Auditors have entered the world
of financial public relations and have lost stature thereby.

204
An audit, to "be independent, must be independent.

I do not believe any specific service performed by CPAs
jeopardizes their independence. The real danger, in my opinion,
is that if a CPA firm has a sizeable consulting contract with a
client company, they could lose the consulting contract aB a
result of taking a hard line during the audit. Therefore, an
unscrupulous CPA firm might compromise their audit in order to
keep the lucrative consulting contract.

At the request of the AICPA, the Financial Analysts Feder
ation last year rendered an opinion on this subject which in
essence concluded that there is no conflict of interest between
the audit and business services functions which cannot be ap
propriately handled by men of integrity.

Only redeeming factor for CPA firms is that they must beoome
legally liable for statements they audit or I will have no confi
dence anyway.

With respect to questions 5» 6, J, and 8, my confidence in
the auditor's opinion is based on the auditor's general reputation
and character. I would tend to regard (unfairly perhaps) the un
known auditor with less confidence than the well, known auditor
with a relatively good record. Confidence boils down to knowing
the auditor and scope of the audit.

CPA profession should determine to whom it is responsiblepublic, company, lenders, investors, etc. It should make avail
able upon request details of work certified to in general terms.

In some cases . . . , the advisory service and audit seem to
be in conflict. Other cases have been noted where the accounting
firms seemed to be "in the corner" of the company, aggressively
so, and under such circumstances the same confidence in the audit
is impossible.
I have long felt that there should be a complete divoroement
of the audit and advisory service except in routine accounting
procedures. Accounting should be a "watch dog" and unaffected by
factors involved in a sense with relationships of any business,
whether it be the audit per se or an advisory or consulting
service.
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